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CONCEPTUAL ROLES AND CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATION: 
HOW INTERNALISM CAN PROVIDE EVERYTHING WE NEED FROM A THEORY 




Advisor: Professor Jesse Prinz 
This dissertation attacks externalism about concepts. It argues that attributions of mental state 
content that posit externally individuated concepts lack explanatory power. Only the intrinsic or 
local properties of mental states are relevant to causal explanations of behaviour – relational or 
non-local properties of mental states do not have causal power. This dissertation focuses on 
expanding upon this argument, and showing that it has significant consequences for those who 
assert the externalist position.  
 I begin by setting out the primary criticisms levelled at internalist theories of concepts. 
These include the claims that a theory that individuates concepts purely internally will be unable 
to explain linguistic communication, or shared categorisation activities; it will not be able to 
account for intuitions we have about the nature and structure of our own concepts; and concepts, 
so conceived, would not be able to track objects in the world, nor would they be truth evaluable. 
I address these concerns systematically by asking how well externalism would respond to such 
requirements on a theory of concepts. I argue that the failure of the external individuation of 
concepts to explain behaviour, also means that it will be unable to explain behaviours such as 





generated by Twin Earth style thought experiments. I also argue that one can substitute an 
internalist-compatible account of conceptual utility and accuracy for a requirement of concepts 
having truth-evaluable properties, and thereby have a theory of concepts that provides a better 
link between our mentally representing the world, and our interacting with it.  
 I conclude that only the local or internal features of concepts will be able to account for 
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Philosophers have rarely had the wool so completely pulled over their eyes as has happened with 
externalism about concepts. Concepts can be characterised as the basic units of thought. They are 
called upon to explain mental and mentally-caused phenomena – our ability to track the world, 
our ability to communicate with others, the fact that we employ complex categorisation systems. 
However, they have come to be defined in a way that is at odds with their being able to explain 
any of these things. An asserted need for concepts to explain phenomena like ‘concept sharing’ 
has perpetuated the idea that concepts must be individuated in a way that is rigid and determined 
by the rules that govern theories of reference and word meaning. In reality, there is no evidence 
of concept sharing, in any strict sense. And, if it weren’t bad enough that strict theories of 
concept individuation miss what I will argue are all the relevant subtleties, complexity and 
vagueness of mental entities, the debate over conceptual taxonomies is one for which there is 
nothing that could count as evidence, and where any outcome would tell us little beyond which is 
the most internally-consistent classificatory system.  
 I will not be the first to point out that any externalist component of conceptual theories is 
causally inert. It is not new, after all, to draw attention to the fact that, if there is a component of 
someone’s thought that has in no way been represented or internally processed by that person, 
then this aspect of their thought can neither cause nor explain any of their subsequent behaviour. 
What has not been attempted, however, and what I will seek to do here, is to take this to its 
logical conclusion. If the external components of thought can’t cause behaviour, then they can’t 





externalism; and they can’t explain why it is relevant to any of our actions or predictions that our 
thoughts accurately represent the world. Yet all these things were implicitly what externalist 
theories were not only supposed to be able to explain, but these were the areas in which 
internalist theories of concepts were supposed to fail. 
 Internalists have not been blameless here. Rather than asking what evidence we have for 
believing that we have concepts, or what it is that we believe concepts explain, internalists have 
spent a lot of time arguing with the externalists on their own turf. The externalists are both 
correct and incorrect here: It is true that internalist theories of concepts are not compatible with a 
robust system of concept individuation that would allow for concept identity between individuals 
(ie. concept sharing). It is also true that, on an internalist account of concepts, an individual can 
neither be wrong about their own concepts, nor can they learn new things about their concepts. 
But it is not true, I will argue, that concept sharing or conceptual error matter, or that such things 
can explain why we believed there were concepts in the first place.  
 Internalists have modified their theories to try to incorporate these misplaced externalist 
expectations about the explanatory power of strictly defined individuation conditions for 
concepts. For the two most prominent contemporary defenders of internalist theories of mental 
content, Katalin Farkas and Gabriel Segal, when it comes to concepts, their internalist positions 
weaken. Meanwhile, others such as David Chalmers, Jerry Fodor, and Jesse Prinz, who argue 
that some content is narrow, still feel the need to incorporate broad content into their conceptual 
theories.  
 There is a reason philosophers have traditionally rejected studies regarding concepts in 
psychology on the grounds that they are irrelevant to the philosophical investigation of concepts. 





concept individuation, do particularly badly when it comes to explaining how concepts are 
acquired in the first place. Empirical findings and practical explanations have been considered 
irrelevant to theories of concepts that have instead focused on accounting for puzzles about 
reference and our intuitions in response to hypothetical examples involving imaginary replicas of 
Earth. This indicates that the evidence for and purpose of such theories has not been considered 
important. This thesis will argue that this is exactly what is important, and that it is only by 
looking at why it is that we believe there are particular requirements on theories of concepts, that 
we can really understand what it is to fulfil these requirements. It turns out that, despite 
appearances, this is something externalist theories of concepts are particularly bad at. 
 It is important to note at this point that this thesis will focus exclusively on the 
philosophy of mind. I am, at this stage, agnostic about whether externalism extends to language. 
It is likely that any explanation of individual cases of success communicating through language 
will need an internalist component (see Chapter 3). However, in so far as ‘literal’ meaning, say, 
is determined by word usage in a community, any explanation will need to look at how a 
community as whole uses a particular word or term. Such an explanation needn’t involve a 
discussion of the concepts of the individual members of any such linguistic community. 
 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis introduces the distinction between internalism and externalism about 
mental content, and sets out the reasons internalism has generally been thought to fail as a theory 
of concepts. While most internalists try to avoid at least some of the problems they face with 
individuating concepts by invoking something external, I argue that this strategy undermines the 





myself – I argue that internalism about mental content entails that concepts are individuated 
solely internally. This means that internalist theories of concepts must necessarily be 
‘idiosyncratic’. If there is any difference in the internal representation of two concepts, then they 
are not strictly the same concept. This leaves me defending the strongest internalist account of 
concepts possible, and one that appears to do badly at fulfilling requirements for concepts. 
However, having an ‘idiosyncratic’ conceptual theory is only a problem if a taxonomy of 
concepts is important for conceptual explanation, which, as I demonstrate during the rest of the 
thesis, it is not. 
 Chapter 2 sets the foundations for the argument that is at the core of position I am taking 
in this thesis. Here I show that the external elements of thought, or the relational properties of 
concepts, do not have causal powers over behaviour, and I argue that this means that any human 
behaviour cannot be used as evidence for externalism. I consider the question of whether 
concepts need to be broadly individuated to facilitate psychological explanation, and I argue that, 
while it may be useful to rely on a general taxonomy of concepts when talking about groups of 
people, this does not itself reflect the mechanisms involved in actually causing their behaviour, 
nor can it explain it.  
 In Chapter 3, I look at the first challenge to internalism: that it is unable to account for 
concept sharing or ‘publicity’ of concepts. I begin here by accepting the premise that concepts 
must be individuated externally if they are to share identity across persons. I then go on to argue 
that the evidence we have that concepts are shared is behavioural evidence. As external 
individuation of concepts is incompatible with conceptual explanations of behaviour, there is no 
evidence that there is concept identity across persons. We are left with either having to accept 





count as evidence for this position, and it cannot explain any of the behaviour that concept 
sharing was thought to explain, like linguistic communication. Or we try to find out what could 
explain the behavioural evidence that suggested that concepts were shared. Whatever explains 
this evidence would have to be internal, undermining one of the strongest arguments against 
internalism about concepts. 
 In the fourth chapter, I consider another kind of ‘evidence’ that has been claimed to 
support the externalist’s position, namely the intuitions generated by the well-known Twin Earth 
thought experiments. Chapter 4 presents multiple reasons for thinking that such intuitions might 
not be as prevalent as they have been presented and that that they may be generated by flaws in 
the design of these thought experiments. Even if Twin Earth intuitions were ubiquitous, and the 
product of well-designed thought experiments, I argue, they would still not support externalism. 
The truth of externalism cannot explain how we would come to have externalist intuitions: so, 
even if we do possess them, the accuracy of such intuitions would be nothing more than a 
coincidence. 
 The final problem facing internalism I address here arises because internalism cannot 
explain how we could come to be wrong about our concepts or how we could learn new things 
about our concepts. If concepts are idiosyncratic and are not determined through reference to 
something outside of the mind, then nothing external could serve as a measure for whether they 
are correct or incorrect. Chapter 5 responds to this by arguing that the correspondence between 
concepts and the world can be understood, not in terms of accuracy conditions, but rather in the 
utility value of concepts. We make predictions about the world based on our concepts, and revise 





considering ways to understand the mind as able to represent empirical truths, even if concepts 
are essentially subjective.   
There has been far too much emphasis placed on taxonomical structures in philosophical 
debates over concepts. Relational properties seem to give us a way of individuating concepts that 
is non-subjective and non-idiosyncratic, but the relational properties of mental states are useless 
– they do no work and there is no evidence that relational properties play any conceptual roles. 
There might be good reasons for wanting to divide concepts into groups, but this will not shed 
light on the ontology of concepts, or what it is that allows them to explain what we take concepts 
to explain. Being able to talk generally about concepts can be useful when trying to say 
something about all humans who have ever lived, or when talking about a particular family, 
cultural group, or linguistic community. But in working out what concepts are, this is the wrong 
debate to be having, and it has led us to the wrong conclusions. A taxonomical debate is, after 






Chapter 1: The Problems with Internalism 
 
Internalism about concepts is unpopular in philosophy. Contemporary internalists about mental 
content such as Katalin Farkas (2003, 2008) and Gabriel Segal (2000), while both drawing on 
examples that include concepts to argue for their positions, do not specifically discuss what their 
theories would mean for the ontology or individuation of concepts. Indeed, both authors have 
moments of weakening their internalist positions when touching on the topic of concepts in 
particular, as opposed to mental content more broadly.1  
 Even those contemporary philosophers who defend perceptually based theories of 
concepts – potentially promising examples of internalist theories of concepts – feel that the 
problems facing ‘pure’ concept-internalism are so insurmountable that they end up turning to 
something external, such as conceptual reference, to individuate concepts.2  
 I do not think that the problems with concept-internalism are insurmountable. It is the 
aim of my thesis to show that these are not actually problems at all. To understand the stronghold 
that externalism has on our contemporary understanding of concepts, this chapter will outline 
what I see as the four central areas with which internalism seemingly struggles: 
 
i) Internalism entails concepts are idiosyncratic. 
ii) Internally-individuated concepts fail to explain publicity. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 It should be noted that, while I am going to be talking about their internalist theories in terms of 
concepts, Farkas and Segal specifically phrase their argument in terms of mental content, not in 
terms of concepts. They might see a difference here, but I will argue in my thesis that mental 
content internalism entails internalism about concepts. 





iii) Internally-individuated concepts fail to explain intuitions generated by cases such as 
Twin Earth scenarios. 
iv) Internally-individuated concepts fail to account for conceptual error. 
 
To understand how concepts explain the relationship between thought and the world, our ability 
to share ideas with others and communicate, our ability to form complex systems of thought that 
combine distinctive individual elements, and our ability to represent, not just refer to, individuals 
and groups external to ourselves, we must first have an idea of what concepts are. As the 
underlying nature of concepts is under debate here, it is important to know exactly what we are 
investigating before we assess the merits of competing theories, lest it turn out that internalists 
and externalists have been arguing about two completely different things, but which they have 
both called ‘concepts’. I maintain that the best way to identify (or even specify) what concepts 
are, and thereby to be in a position where we can investigate their ontological nature, is to look at 
what, if anything, plays the roles that concepts have traditionally been thought to play. The types 
of thing that plays most (if not all) of these roles, whatever it may be, should be taken to be 
concepts.  
There is, however, another approach to identifying concepts and that is to begin with an 
idea of the kind of structure that concepts must have, and then investigate what roles things with 
this structure play. There is, for example, a general assumption that concepts are the kinds of 
things that can be shared across individuals; that they are the types of things that have a more 
general structure than just specific instances of the thoughts of individuals. As I will argue in 
subsequent chapters, it is not necessary for concepts to have such a structure in order for them to 





many that such a structure is minimally required for them to be concepts at all. This raises the 
question, then, of whether we should investigate the underlying ontology of concepts before we 
consider conceptual taxonomies, as I argue we should, or whether a taxonomy must come first if 
we are to know where we should be looking in order to investigate the mechanisms that underpin 
it. This discussion will be relevant to addressing the first two of the problems mentioned above, 
which revolve around the question of concept individuation.  
The third and fourth problems are distinct from, though tied to, the first two. The Twin 
Earth hypotheticals have been used as a way for us to investigate the nature of concepts. For 
those who see concepts as mental or linguistically-grounded entities, our own linguistic reports 
on our mental responses can provide vital insights into their nature. The need to make sure we 
are talking about the same thing when discussing concepts will call on our intuitions regarding 
exactly what it is that we think we are talking about. Similarly, the fact that our general practice 
is to admit that we have been wrong when corrected about our concepts and to believe that as we 
encounter new information we often come to the realisation that our conceptual understanding 
was, and likely remains, incomplete, speaks to intuitions not just about what concepts are, but 
what we use them for.  
I spell out each of these ‘problems’ in detail before responding to them in upcoming 
chapters. Problem ii), and the issue of the publicity or ‘shareability’ of concepts is the topic of 
Chapter 3; problem iii) concerning Twin Earth intuitions is dealt with in Chapter 4; and problem 
iv) forms the basis of a discussion of conceptual error and truth-tracking that makes up Chapter 
5. For this reason, I will not go through each one systematically in this chapter, but rather, use 





Despite the dominance of the assumption in favour of externalism, there is a range of 
competing externalist theories of concepts that are generally incompatible with one another. 
Understanding these theories will allow us to begin to see the reasons for the popularity of the 
externalist position. It will also help us to understand why the issue of conceptual taxonomy, 
which has significance for almost every part of this thesis, is such a contentious and complicated 
one. The externalist theory of concepts you endorse will affect exactly what intuitions you 
believe were generated by Twin Earth and similar hypothetical scenarios and it will determine 
which cases you believe represent instances of conceptual error or incomplete understanding.  
I will begin, then, with a brief account of internalism. I will then explore the one problem 
with internalism in detail in this chapter – the problem that essentially underpins all the other 
problems that internalism about concepts appears to face – namely, that internalism about 
concepts entails that concepts are idiosyncratic. A discussion of this position will also be used to 
explain the problem of explaining concept sharing. In the following sections I will present four 
different externalist theories of concepts, and use these to show what the internalist is fighting 
against. 
 
§1. What is Internalism? 
The most commonly used way to explain internalism about mental content is by invoking the 
contrast to externalism. The definitions of internalism tend to rely on an understanding of 
philosophical ‘twin’ scenarios: ironically, one of the most basic accounts that allows us to 
understand internalism derives from a thought experiment that has been set up explicitly to show 
the inadequacy of the internalist’s position. The fact that an introductory account of the 





believed to invoke anti-internalist intuitions could go some way to explaining why the third 
problem listed above – internally-individuated concepts fail to explain intuitions generated by 
cases such as Twin Earth scenarios – is taken to be so significant. 
Consider Hillary Putnam’s (1975) ‘Twin Earth’ example, presented as a defence of 
externalism in “The Meaning of Meaning”. Oscar lives on Earth in 1750, before the development 
of chemistry. Oscar often has thoughts about the watery stuff around him – the stuff that happens 
to be H2O, though, of course, he is unaware of this fact.  
In the universe there also exists a world that is almost identical to our own, which Putnam 
calls ‘Twin Earth’. On Twin Earth there is watery stuff that fills oceans, falls as rain from the 
sky, etc., but (and this is the one main difference between Earth and Twin Earth) the watery stuff 
on Twin Earth is not H2O. Rather, watery stuff on Twin Earth is composed of a different 
chemical compound – XYZ – that acts exactly the same as H2O does on Earth.3 Oscar also has a 
doppelgänger on Twin Earth – Twin-Oscar – who is a physical replica of Oscar (except for the 
presence of H2O in his body, but we can just imagine that here too XYZ plays the same role), 
and who has all the same subjective experiences as Oscar. However, Twin-Oscar’s watery-stuff 
experiences are caused by XYZ rather than H2O.  
Putnam argues that when Oscar and Twin-Oscar think about watery stuff they are having 
different thoughts – Oscar is having a thought about water (H2O), while Twin-Oscar is thinking 
about twin-water or ‘twater’ (XYZ). Given the fact that the two different thoughts are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 There are ways in which Twin Earth in this thought experiment has features that resemble 
Titan, Saturn’s largest moon. Titan has watery stuff that fills seas, forms clouds, and rains from 
the sky, but it is methane, sustained in this state due to the extremely low temperatures of the 
planet. Unfortunately for those wishing to turn the Twin Earth thought experiment from 
hypothetical to actual, it is unlikely humans could experience the ‘methane water’ of Titan in the 
way that they experience the ‘H2O water’ of Earth, as if they ever tried to swim in it they would 





represented in the same way internally, the externalist argues that something existing 
independently of the mind can contribute content to thoughts (in this case, the external thing is 
the chemical compound of the watery stuff on Earth and Twin Earth). In contrast, the internalist 
argues that Oscar and Twin-Oscar are having the same thought when they think about watery 
stuff, because only things internal to the mind can contribute to the content of thoughts.  
A further question about internalism that arises here is what it means for something to 
count as ‘internal to the mind’. I will present two different responses to this question below. 
However, it is worth noting here that the Twin Earth scenario works by suggesting that 
something is missing from any account that considers Oscar and Twin-Oscar to have the same 
concepts. What it is that is missing from the internalist account is not made explicit with the 
Twin Earth thought experiment, and as we will see below, there are several competing externalist 
theories that answer this question in very different ways. 
Both Segal and Farkas have offered definitions of internalism about mental content. As I 
will discuss in §2, their theories do not provide a conceptual taxonomy, but rather they attempt to 
identify what it is that mental content supervenes on. Since concept-internalists understand that 
conceptual content is mental content (and, as I will argue, mental-content externalists must also 
commit to this position for their position to be coherent), these accounts provide a picture of the 
kind of thing the internalists take mental content to be. However, it is not the purpose of my 
thesis to present a particular account of internalism, but rather to present reasons to reject 
externalist theories of concepts and adopt an internalist-compatible theory of concepts. 
Therefore, while I will not strictly adopt either of these accounts, I will make use of the language 






§1.1 Segal’s definition of internalism 
Segal (2000) defines internalism in terms of intrinsic and relational properties. Externalism, he 
argues, is the theory that cognitive content is a relational property – the content of a mental state 
is a property that mental state has in virtue of the relationship between a mind and the world. 
Considered in terms of Putnam’s Twin Earth example, the externalist concludes from such a case 
that Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s thoughts are different not because of any intrinsic bodily 
differences between them, but because of the relationship that they bear to their different 
environments. Internalism, which Segal defends, is the denial that mental content supervenes on 
anything but intrinsic properties.  
 In Segal’s example, the properties intrinsic to a thought are the microstructural properties 
that make up the person (or, more likely the person’s brain) having that particular thought. 
However, while microstructural brain properties can play this role, they are only one example of 
what could be presented in terms of intrinsic properties alone. Segal points out that you don’t 
even need to be a materialist to accept his form of internalism: “The Cartesian might or might 
not believe in the local supervenience of the mental on the physical. But that would not bear 
directly on the question of whether mental properties are intrinsic properties of their immaterial 
subjects.” (Segal, 2000: 9)  He leaves it open which intrinsic properties are the relevant 
components of mental content on his account.  
 Segal’s openness about what could count as ‘intrinsic properties’ makes it complicated to 
use his account of internalism as a working definition.4 It is not enough to know that intrinsic 
properties are those that the internalist counts as the only ones that make up the content of mental 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 David Hunter criticises Segal for providing neither a clear account of what it means for a 






states. It is also important to have an idea of which intrinsic properties are the important ones. 
This is to say, what properties count as being intrinsic to a thought or a mental state? The 
problem is not so much that we mistake intrinsic for relational properties, but rather that it is 
unclear which properties are intrinsic to thought, and which properties are just not relevant at all. 
Imagine being in several brain states at once, but only one of them is correlated with your having 
a particular thought – what are we to do if we have no guidelines as to which brain states we can 
count in an explanation of that thought and which we can’t? It is not available to Segal to say 
that the relevant brain states are those intrinsic to the particular thought under investigation, as 
the very thing being investigated is what it counts to be intrinsic to a thought. For this reason, 
Segal’s account may face its own problems when it comes to the individuation of thoughts or 
concepts. Nevertheless, it does provide a framework for understanding the kinds of things 
assumed by the internalist, and the problem of concept individuation, as we will see, is 
something faced by all internalist theories. 
 
§1.2 Farkas’ definition of internalism 
Farkas (2003, 2008), in contrast, provides a more specific definition. She presents internalism as 
being concerned with how a thought seems or appears to the person having it. Mental content, 
according to Farkas, is nothing over and above how a thought appears to the bearer of that 
thought.    
Putnam’s doppelgängers share many things in common – identical molecular make-up;5 
contact with worlds that are identical in appearance; and their thoughts about watery stuff appear 
the same to them. Farkas’ account of internalism holds that the relevant quality that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





doppelgängers share in Twin Earth thought experiments is that their thoughts “would appear the 
same”.6 Farkas believes this relevant ‘internal’ feature can be captured (or perhaps is captured in 
Putnam’s thought experiment) by imagining the thoughts of Oscar and Twin-Oscar being 
indistinguishable to them – that is, to the individuals having those thoughts. She refers to this 
criterion for an internalist theory as ‘subjective indistinguishability’.7 
Farkas’ account is even more controversial than Segal’s. One problem that it faces as an 
account of mental content is that our thoughts are only rarely consciously revealed to us (ie only 
when we are currently thinking of them) and given the extent of mental processing that is 
unconscious, such a position appears to rule out the possibility that a very great deal of internal 
mental processing can be relevant for an account of mental content. In addition, it is not clear 
whether subjective indistinguishability is going to cover sub-personal states.  
The externalist accepts that there is a way in which the thoughts of Oscar and Twin-Oscar 
are indistinguishable – this is, after all, stipulated by Twin Earth thought experiments – but they 
disagree that the thought itself only consists of the features of the person having the thought. 
Rather, the externalist argues, the appearance of a thought to the thought-bearer has either 
nothing to do with the content of that thought, or the subjective experience of a thought does not, 
on its own, constitute that thought. This is why, for the externalist, we cannot necessarily know 
the content of our own thoughts by merely reflecting on how they appear to us – mental states 
are more than they appear to the person having them.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Farkas (2003: 7). 
7 Farkas understands ‘subjective indistinguishability’ in terms of the two states having an 
identical phenomenal character. There are people who reject this account – those who deny that 
phenomenal character would be the same, for example disjunctivists such as John McDowell and 
M. G. F. Martin [references: Farkas, 2008: 94-5]. I will not get into this debate here. For a 
defence of her view that ‘subjective indistinguishability’ consists in phenomenal properties, see 






§1.3 A working definition of internalism 
It should be noted that there are those people, for example, Brian Loar (1985, 2003), Ned Block 
(1986) Chalmers (2002) and Prinz (2004), who have sometimes been classed as internalists 
because they argue that there is such a thing as narrow content (content that supervenes on the 
internal properties of mental states). However, as their theories also incorporate broad content, 
such dual-factor theories are not strictly internalist in the way that I will be using the term here. 
Instead I will include only those theories that take all mental or conceptual content to be narrow 
as being strictly ‘internalist’. While some of the arguments for this kind of internalism may be 
used to support a theory that recognised the significance of narrow content, the arguments I will 
present against externalism will apply equally to all theories that incorporate broad content. 
There is still a question to be settled about what it is that is ‘doing the work’ for the 
internalist. There are problems with both the Segal and Farkas accounts, and, while at times I 
will use some of the language of Segal’s position, for the rest of the thesis I will adopt a less 
specific working definition, provided by Joseph Mendola (2008: 2): “According to internalism, 
my mental states of crucial and characteristic types – for instance my beliefs, desires and 
sensations – would exist and retain their characteristic contents even if there was nothing outside 
me and no past, as long as what is currently inside my skin were unchanged.”8 In this thesis, I 
will be arguing that whatever turns out to play the concept role must be internal. 
 
 
§2. Internalism and the problem of concept individuation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





Internalism about mental content entails that concepts are individuated solely internally. As I will 
argue throughout this thesis, one can taxonomise concepts any way one likes, and the system one 
uses for individuating concepts or saying that two concept-tokens are of the same type will vary 
in its usefulness depending on what we use it for. However, just as deciding to group objects 
together in order of height rather than colour will be useful under certain circumstances, 
choosing one taxonomical system over another itself does not change the ontological nature of 
the objects being classified. So, to say that internalism entails that concepts are individuated 
internally is to say that the underlying nature of concepts does not carve up concepts into natural 
categories along relational or externalist lines. In other words, anything external to concepts is 
not part of the identity conditions for concepts, and so if two concepts have identical internal or 
intrinsic properties then they are the same concept, and if they have different internal or intrinsic 
properties then they are different concepts. This is the first problem presented above: internalism 
entails that concepts are idiosyncratic. 
The problem with individuating concepts internally is clear.9 The internal stuff always 
varies between individuals, and indeed in one individual over time. If two concepts have to be 
internally identical to count as the same concept, then, aside from the examples where internal 
indistinguishability is specified such as in the Twin Earth type cases, it would almost never be 
the case that there were two instances of the same concept instantiated in the world, or even that 
one concept might be repeated over time. As one of the central arguments in my thesis is that the 
best theory of concepts is one that is compatible with internalism, having such an individuation-
requirement on internalist theories of concepts may appear to make the task a great deal harder. 
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that would be relevant in individuating concepts for the internalist would be those internal to the 





However, I believe my arguments are capable of defending the strongest internalist position 
possible, and I also have no choice but to accept that this is one of the entailments of the 
internalist position, as I shall now argue. 
So far the accounts of internalism have been phrased in terms of mental content rather 
than concepts. This language is used deliberately, although the two internalists considered above, 
Segal and Farkas, consistently use the word ‘concepts’ to refer to the kinds of thoughts they are 
considering.10 Neither author, however, gives an account of what they take concepts to be. And 
as the role that concepts are traditionally understood to play is different in certain ways from the 
role that thought is traditionally understood to play, how an internalist provides an account of 
concepts in particular is a task with its own specific challenges.  
 Being an internalist about mental content does not entail being an internalist about 
concepts; however, being the former without being the latter means accepting the most extreme 
form of externalism about concepts. Georges Rey (1985, 1999), for example, understands 
concepts to be abstract entities without mental components.11 In theory, this account of concepts 
is compatible with internalism about mental content – as it implies that conceptual content is not 
mental content, since concepts themselves are non-mental. Therefore, the internalist about 
mental content could consistently hold that concepts, as non-mental entities, are not internal. 
However, this is not a naturally appealing position for the internalist.  
The central externalist cases that contemporary internalists focus on – Putnam’s (1975) 
Twin Earth and beach/elm hypotheticals, Tyler Burge’s (1979) arthritis case, among others – are 
specifically focused on concepts: namely, the concepts ‘water’, ‘beech’, ‘elm’, ‘arthritis’. The 
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(2002) uses the term less often, but says several times “concepts, or thought contents”, indicating 
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point of such examples is not just to stir externalist intuitions. They also focus on the possession 
conditions for concepts, particularly where understanding is incomplete. What is being argued 
about in such cases is concepts (and concepts that are generally presented as having a mental 
component); so, if any internalist insists that they are talking about mental content but not 
concepts or conceptual content, they are not addressing the main externalist arguments.  
To begin with, there are very good reasons why the internalist about mental content 
should want to be an internalist about concepts as well. To understand why internalism about 
concepts entails such strict internal conditions on individuation, we need first to revisit the 
commitments of externalism. Externalists hold that it is possible to have cases of two 
subjectively indistinguishable mental states that have different mental content. Applied to the 
Twin Earth example, the conclusion would be that Oscar and Twin-Oscar have different 
concepts or mental contents, even though their mental states are subjectively indistinguishable. 
Similarly, externalists argue that two individuals with subjectively different mental experiences 
can nonetheless have the same concepts or mental contents. In Burge’s (1979) arthritis example, 
discussed below, someone can have false beliefs about arthritis, for example, that they have it in 
their thigh, and yet still possess the concept of arthritis. In Putnam’s (1975) elm and beech 
example, one can have the concept of an elm tree even though one cannot tell it from a beech, 
and yet this is a concept one can share with experts who can tell the trees apart. 
 Internalists generally focus on the point that if two individuals have thoughts with the same 
narrow content, they have the same concepts or mental content. However, neither Farkas (2008) 
nor Segal (2000) explicitly argues the converse; namely, that it is never possible for two 
individuals to have different subjective representations of a concept, but still have the same 






1) If you have subjectively indistinguishable concepts then you have the same concepts.  
 
I will argue that the reasons for holding 1) to be true equally support the following:  
 
2) If you have subjectively different concepts then you have different concepts.  
 
 A similar story can be told about Segal’s definition of internalism. If mental content 
reduces to intrinsic properties, then if you believe: 
 
1*) Intrinsically identical concepts are the same concepts, you should also believe that:  
 
2*) Intrinsically different concepts are different concepts. 
 
 I will argue that the internalist cannot individuate concepts such that two people with 
different internal mental states (whatever definition you use) can be understood as having the 
same thought or possessing the same concept.12 By being committed to 1) and 1*), one’s theory 
of concept individuation must entail that two concepts are always the same if their corresponding 
internal properties are the same. To reject 2) and 2*), one’s theory of concept individuation must 
entail that two concepts can be the same even in cases where their corresponding internal 
properties differ. The question is what system of concept individuation could entail both these 
outcomes? 
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 Consider Farkas’ definition of internalism – the content of a concept is nothing more than 
how the concept subjectively appears to the person who possesses it. Two concepts that are 
subjectively indistinguishable are the same concept. However, subjective indistinguishability 
cannot do the work of explaining how two people with subjectively distinguishable thoughts can 
share the same concept. If one wants to individuate concepts on the basis of subjective 
distinguishability then they will get 1), but they will also have to accept 2). 
 Alternatively, one might argue that subjective indistinguishability is merely a guide to 
subjective similarity. In the cases where two concepts are subjectively indistinguishable they are 
clearly similar enough to be the same concept, thereby keeping a commitment to 1). But, in such 
an account, two concepts only need to be subjectively similar enough to count as the same. So if 
Oscar and Twin Oscar had very slightly different ‘watery stuff’ experiences, their concepts might 
be very slightly subjectively distinguishable. Such concepts could be understood as being 
subjectively similar enough for them still to be the same concept. This would entail the rejection 
of 2). However, the fact of two concepts being subjectively similar cannot on its own account for 
the identity of any two concepts so long as they are in any way subjectively dissimilar.  
 Consider the following example: I am aware that Sally and Sarah are identical twins. When 
I think about Sally it is very subjectively similar to when you think about Sally. There are some 
differences – we have seen Sally in different circumstances, from different angles, wearing 
different clothing – but our Sally-related thoughts have enough subjective similarities that we 
feel warranted in saying that we share a ‘Sally’ concept. However, my thoughts about Sally are 
also very subjectively similar to my thoughts about Sarah. Once again, there are some 
differences – I have seen Sally and Sarah in different circumstances, from different angles, 





Sarah concepts as there is between my Sally concept and your Sally concept.13 If subjective 
similarity (but not identity) were enough to say that my ‘Sally’ concept and your ‘Sally’ concept 
are the same, then it would also be enough to say that my ‘Sally’ concept and my  ‘Sarah’ 
concept are the same. This, however, is a conclusion that surely even an internalist would be 
inclined to reject. The problem is that subjective similarity seems to be stronger than conceptual 
similarity, and so, if subjective similarity alone is used to individuate concepts, we will end up 
with many concepts that are inconsistent with our intuitions or behaviour. 
 Another way for the internalist to individuate concepts such that subjective 
distinguishability (or intrinsic variation) does not entail different concepts is to try to individuate 
them on the basis of their reference or extension. An internalist could define concepts internally 
(using either Farkas’ or Segal’s definition), but as referring to things in the external world, for 
example. One could define mental content internally, but argue that concepts should be 
individuated in accordance with their referents. However, the concept-internalist will face 
insurmountable problems if they believe concepts should be individuated by their referents or 
reference conditions.  
 To begin with, an internalist will have to reject the idea that it is possible to have the same 
concept with different referents, if they want to individuate concepts by their referents. Consider 
the Oscar/Twin-Oscar case. The internalist about concepts is committed to 1) or 1)* - that Oscar 
and Twin-Oscar have the same watery-stuff-related concepts in virtue of their mental states 
being subjectively indistinguishable or intrinsically identical. If the internalist concludes that, 
while Oscar and Twin-Oscar have indistinguishable thoughts, their concepts have different 
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referents, then reference cannot be used to individuate concepts if 1) or 1)* is to be retained. 1) 
or 1)* is the central commitment of internalism: so, if an account of concept individuation entails 
that Oscar and Twin-Oscar have the same concepts then it is not internalist.  
 If the internalist argues that concepts may have many referents, but that only certain 
referents are relevant for concept individuation then they must have an account of what these 
referents are. The internalist will be unable to turn to any of the existing externalist theories to 
determine what these referents are, as each of the existing theories provide accounts that are not 
compatible with 1) or 1)*. What the internalist in such a situation needs is a robust account of 
reference where, if two concepts are subjectively indistinguishable or intrinsically identical, they 
always refer to the same thing. But this would entail that reference couldn’t go beyond what we 
could subjectively distinguish, meaning individuating by reference couldn’t go beyond the 
psychological. Not only would this prove to be an uninformative (and circular) internalist 
account of reference, but it would not do the work that the internalist wanted it to do, namely 
maintaining 1) and 1)*, but rejecting 2) and 2)*.  
 In summary, the position that concepts are idiosyncratic – that any variation in the internal 
stuff will entail different concepts – is entailed by the argument that internally identical concepts 
are necessarily the same concepts. There is no robust internalist-compatible account of concept 
individuation that can satisfactorily include cases where two concepts differ internally and yet 
are still the same concept.  
 For the internalists discussed above, the internalist debate is not about individuation, but, at 
least when first addressing the arguments of externalists, I am going to treat it as such. The 
problem with concept individuation is one of the objections raised by externalists when they 





individuation.14 Consider, for example, the second problem with internalism as listed in the 
introduction to this chapter: internally individuated concepts fail to explain publicity. 
 Concepts are traditionally understood as units of thought that can be shared. The ‘internal’ 
mental content which relates (or refers) to any particular object, idea or category, is going to 
differ interpersonally, and even within the same person over time. If one holds the position that 
concepts are individuated by, say, the phenomenal experience of having a particular thought or 
concept, it is very unlikely that there are ever cases of one person’s possessing a particular 
concept more than once, or two people thinking of the exact same concept (except in cases like 
the Twin Earth example, where identical ‘internal’ mental content is specified).15 However, as 
argued above, the internalist is committed to the position that concepts must have 
indistinguishable narrow content to count as the same concept. Since one of the traditional 
requirements for a theory of concepts is that it accounts for how concepts can be shared, this 
would raise a major problem for internalism about concepts: such a theory would cut off all hope 
of concept sharing. 
 
 
§3. Mentally-based externalist theories  
Internalists and externalists tend to agree that concepts are mental entities, or at least entities with 
mental components. This is not the only way of understanding concepts, as will be seen in the 
following section, but as concepts are largely brought in to explain mental phenomena or 
phenomena dependent on our mental states (such as linguistic phenomena) it is reasonable to 
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believe that concepts are themselves something mental. Whether concepts are purely mental, or, 
if not, what non-mental stuff combines with the mental to form them, is a matter of debate not 
just between internalists and externalists, but also between externalists themselves.  
One may believe that the referents of concepts contribute to their content, and yet have 
differing theories about what the referents of concepts actually are. One school of argument 
states that what our concepts refer to is largely determined by an individual’s social community 
(I will call this ‘social externalism’). The second holds that the referents of certain concepts 
(natural kind concepts, but also possibly concepts associated with proper names) are groups (or 
individuals) that have a shared essence, or that are part of natural categories into which the world 
is divided up (I will call this ‘natural kind externalism’)16. There will, of course, be instances 
where these two theories overlap, but they are in essence two accounts that are at odds with one 
another.  
  The ‘social’ and ‘natural kind’ externalist theories have two main externalist components 
or assumptions built into them. The first externalist assumption is that what concepts refer to is 
fixed by something more than the idiosyncratic application of an individual. One can imagine the 
position that holds that the referents of one’s concepts are none other than what one classifies 
under such concepts – they are not determined by natural categories or social practices.17 On 
such a theory, if someone understands their ‘fish’ concept to refer to whales as well as other fish, 
then this is what their fish concept refers to – an intuition explicitly rejected by Putnam (1975) 
and Burge (1979) in their arguments for the theories described below. Social and natural kind 
externalists both reject such an individualist theory of fixing concept reference because, amongst 
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somewhat misleading. However, as he and Putnam broadly agree on the extension of natural 
kind concepts, this will be the feature of this kind of theory that I focus on. 





other reasons, it cannot account for the fact that not only do we believe that people, such as those 
who believed whales were fish, were wrong about the application of their concepts, but, once 
corrected, people themselves accept the fact that they were wrong in such cases. This brings us to 
the fourth problem mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: internally-individuated concepts 
fail to account for conceptual error. 
In contrast, the internalist may embrace such a theory of concept reference for the reason 
that the nature of natural categories and the conventions of a society (particularly when it comes 
to the knowledge of experts) are presumably unknown in almost all cases of individual concept 
possession. If elements unrepresented by me contribute to my mental content, then this is 
incompatible with internalism. If you can be wrong about your concepts then concepts (or their 
content) cannot be entirely mental or internal. If a concept were nothing more than what is going 
on in the mind, then something outside the mind could not have a bearing on the correctness or 
incorrectness of that concept. 
 The second externalist component of ‘social’ and ‘natural kind’ externalism is the fact that, 
in virtue of referents contributing to conceptual content, features of the referents of our concepts 
of which we are unaware also contribute to conceptual content. For the internalist contemplating 
the Twin Earth scenario, it doesn’t matter if there are experts in Oscar’s community who know 
water is H2O, or that the referent of Oscar’s ‘water’ concept is indexically tied to H2O because of 
the practices of his social community, or even that, as a natural kind, water is necessarily H2O.  
 Both these kinds of externalism arise, in part, from the argument that the internalist 
position has left something out in its account of concepts. The mental component of concepts is 





  At the start of “Individualism and the Mental”, Tyler Burge argues that the social 
environment that individuals inhabit has largely been overlooked in accounts of their mental 
lives. Burge (1979) presents the example of a man, Alf, who has many true beliefs about 
arthritis, but also the one false belief that he has arthritis in his thigh. Upon visiting a doctor, Alf 
is told that it is impossible to have arthritis of the thigh, so he revises his beliefs about arthritis. 
In contrast to the case of Alf, we are asked to imagine Twin-Alf, who is in every way identical to 
Alf, except that he lives in a slightly socially different world. In the counterfactual world 
inhabited by Twin-Alf, the definition of ‘arthritis’ includes all the joint pain cases of the real 
world, but it is also used to apply to other rheumatoid ailments, including the ailment Twin-Alf is 
currently experiencing in his thigh. Twin-Alf is identical to Alf in every way relevant for their 
sharing narrow mental content, but it seems that the concept that each man associates with the 
word ‘arthritis’ is different, although they would be completely unaware of this difference 
unless, and up until, corrected by their respective doctors. 
  Similarly to Burge, in “The Meaning of Meaning”, Putnam argues that, particularly in the 
age of the rise of many scientific concepts, it may be experts who decide (or discover) the 
meanings of our natural-kind words. In other words, it is experts who can tell us what the 
extensions of words are, and whether we are using them correctly or incorrectly.18 Putnam 
(1975) referred to this as the ‘division of linguistic labour’. Putnam gives the example of the 
concepts (words) ‘beech’ and ‘elm’: we can use the word ‘beech’ to talk about a particular kind 
of tree even where we would be unable to distinguish a ‘beech’ from an ‘elm’. Our word ‘beech’ 
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the collective linguistic body, and in this way, the most recherché fact about water may become 
part of the social meaning of the word while being unknown to almost all speakers who acquire 





has the meaning it does because there are people out there, tree experts, who can make this 
distinction. And because of this, whatever the word ‘beech’ means will be determined by the 
way it is used by experts in our linguistic community. Therefore, when I bring to mind the 
concept ‘beech’, that concept contains content that was determined by or decided upon by 
experts. There may be features of the concept ‘beech’ of which I am consciously unaware (like 
what makes a beech tree different from an elm tree), but that still form part of that concept (and, 
by extension, my mental content if I possess the concept ‘beech’). 
 Contrast this with ‘natural kind’ externalist’s position where what is taken to be missing 
from the internalist’s account is not the contribution of socially-determined reference, but rather, 
with natural-kind and proper-name concepts at least, reference fixed by the essence of these 
entities. ‘Social’ externalism faces some of the same criticisms that internalism faces – namely, 
that we still want to say that the concept ‘water’ in 1750 refers exclusively to H2O, even if there 
are no experts who could reliably detect instances of water in 1750, even under the ideal 
conditions of the time. (If anyone from 1750 was exposed to XYZ, there would be no way of 
their telling the difference between that and H2O). Similarly, some medical problems, such as 
arthritis, might themselves be natural kinds, so to imagine a world in which arthritis is grouped 
together by ‘experts’ with a bunch of unrelated ailments does not mean that their concept should 
refer to arthritis and all these other ailments, merely because they believe it does.  
 For Saul Kripke (1981) the feature that fixes the reference of our natural kind and proper-
name concepts is essences. While people may identify gold as yellow and shiny, it is possible to 
imagine gold that has neither of these features, while it is not possible to imagine gold that did 
not have the atomic number 79 – any substance that had a different atomic number would not be 





Richard Nixon, though it is possible to imagine that Nixon actually missed out on being 
president. It is not possible, however, to imagine Nixon with different parents (or different 
DNA); someone with different DNA would not be Nixon.19 Kripke (1981) uses modal examples 
such as these to illustrate necessary essences – those features (like atomic number or DNA) that 
are the necessary features of certain kinds of concepts.20  
 The commitments of this ‘natural kind’ externalism when it comes to conceptual error are 
going to be different from that of ‘social’ externalism. Both kinds of externalists agree that you 
can be wrong about your own concepts, but their accounts of conceptual error are completely 
tied to their theory of concepts, and these differ. Internalists do not deny that one can ever be 
wrong about the world – concepts might shape future predictions, but they don’t guarantee their 
correctness. Similarly, the fact that the internalist may take Oscar’s concept to refer to H2O and 
XYZ does not mean that he could not be wrong about the chemical compound of the liquid in 
front of him. Conceptual error (something incompatible with internalist theories of concepts) is 
about concept individuation and application. For the ‘natural kind’ externalist, the doctors in 
Burge’s (1979) world who believe arthritis and other ailments fall under the same concept are 
wrong. For the ‘social externalist’ one can imagine a case where experts have one concept that 
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19 When talking about proper names, Kripke does not identify essences with DNA. According to 
one’s view of personal identity it is possible that DNA may not be enough to play the role of a 
person’s essence, but this raises a host of other problems for a theory of essences that will not be 
discussed here. It is worth, however, pointing out that one should not reject the idea that DNA 
could be the essence of a person just because of the belief that identical twins have the same 
DNA. Recent research suggests that while being extremely genetically similar, even 
monozygotic twins do not have identical DNA (Bruder et. al., 2008). 
20 Note, that while these are often expressible in terms of microstructure, thinking of essences as 
abstract properties would better capture the scope of Kripke’s argument as he uses them to 
capture the referents of proper names which could include things like the planet Venus, which 





refers both to gold and fool’s gold, and so they would be incorrect if applying their concept to 
only instances of gold.  
 What is interesting about the way that Burge (1979) phrases the case for ‘social’ 
externalism, by arguing that what the internalist account of concepts is missing is an account of 
the role that social context plays in determining what concepts we have, is that it does not present 
an argument for adoping externalism in the abstract, but rather a call to acknowledge the role that 
purely social factors have to play in the mental states of individuals. This puts Burge’s theory at 
odds, not just with internalism, but with all other kinds of externalism. This is even more so the 
case for the theory of concepts that does not even take them to be mental entities (which will be 
discussed in the following section). 
 
§4. Concepts as abstract objects 
The debate over concepts has both a taxonomical component and an ontological one. While the 
internalist is presenting an argument about concept ontology, their account of concepts is mostly 
criticised due to its taxonomical failures. The extent to which the conceptual ontological 
commitments of internalism differ from those of the externalist theories discussed above is not as 
straightforward as it is with the position that argues that concepts are not mental entities, or do 
not have mental components.   
 The problem with theories of concepts that individuate concepts by their referents is that 
such theories fail to explain many of the concepts that are intuitively taken to exist. If concepts 
are individuated by their referents, then this seems to rule out non-referring concepts such as 
‘ghost’, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘phlogiston’. Furthermore, there are many co-referring concepts 





by reference alone. As Frege (1948) pointed out, ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ are 
different concepts, even though they share the same referent – Venus.  
 Georges Rey (1985, 1999), defends the view that concepts are abstract objects. He rejects 
the idea that concept ontology requires a psychological component.  On this account, concepts 
are like numbers – entities that can be grasped mentally, and used in rational thought, but about 
which we can also be wrong, and are themselves neither mental, nor natural artifacts. This theory 
understands concepts in a Platonistic or Fregean way.21 Frege demonstrated that reference cannot 
be the only thing meant by a proper name, or rather that the extension of a proper name could not 
constitute its meaning. From this point, Frege went on to establish the notion of sense (Sinn), 
which could play the role of the meaning of proper names. Rejecting a psychologistic 
understanding of sense, Frege instead identified sense as something objective. 
 If one believes, à la Frege, that the meaning of a sentence is a proposition – an abstract 
object with truth bearing properties – then sentence meanings exist independently of the mind. 
Propositions are what one grasps as one comes to understand the meaning of a sentence. When 
two people have the same belief – such as the belief that elephants are large – what is it that they 
both believe, what makes it the case that they have the same belief? According to the Fregean 
tradition, ‘elephants are large’ is a proposition to which many people can all bear a belief-
relation (it can be the object of multiple beliefs). 
 Applied to concepts, one can understand propositions as being made up of more basic units 
– similar to sentences that are made up of words and phrases. As the proposition itself is abstract 
and mind-independent, this entails that the units that make it up will similarly be abstract objects. 
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It is these basic units that make up Fregean propositions, and that are understood by some to be 
concepts.22  
 Rey refers to his particular account of concepts as the ‘Hypothesis of External Definitions’: 
“the correct definition of a concept is provided by the optimal account of it, which need not be 
known by the concept’s competent users.” (Rey, 1999: 293)  According to Rey, some concepts 
are definitions that include individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (such as the 
definition of a square which includes the features of being a closed polygon; having four equal 
sides; and having four equal internal angles – all of which are necessary, and the combination of 
which is jointly sufficient for something’s being a square). Other concepts are definitions that 
include features, none of which are necessary, but combinations of enough of them are sufficient 
(an example of this are Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblance’ concepts, such as ‘game’). 
 Rey’s position is motivated by the fact that there is a great deal of evidence of people’s 
ignorance of concepts, but, he argues, the degree of knowledge that any individual (or group) has 
should not have any bearing on something that is, in essence, metaphysical. When we consider 
the concept ‘water’ we are considering the metaphysical question of what stuff counts as water, 
not the epistemological question of how we know whether something is water or not. 
 The theory of concepts as abstract objects is such an extreme position that I will only be 
touching on it briefly in the rest of this thesis. My aim is to show that relational properties and 
broad content cannot be part of a theory of concepts that has any explanatory power. If I can 
show this even in cases where narrow content and internal properties are still acknowledged to 
have some role in conceptual explanation (which is at least possible with the mentally-based 
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externalist theories described in the last section), then it will certainly be applicable to theories of 




It may appear that we have been left with at least four good reasons for rejecting internalism. I 
have argued here that the internalist about mental content must also be an internalist about 
concepts, accepting that concepts must be individuated internally, so if any of these problems 
turn out to be an insurmountable barrier to an internalist theory of concepts, this will be a 
problem for all internalists. In contrast, attacks made on externalist theories of concepts have 
often been made by other externalists, where what is at stake is not externalism itself, but rather 
the specific form it takes.  
 In the following chapters I will be defending internalism primarily by attacking 
externalism as a general theory on the grounds that: no externalist theory of concepts can account 
for the appearance of concept sharing, no externalist theory of concepts can account for the fact 
that we may have externalist intuitions, and we were mistaking the fact that we could be wrong 
about the world with the idea that we could be wrong about our concepts. I will argue that having 
a useful taxonomy is not the same as having a taxonomy that reveals features of ontology, and 
the only ontology that could explain what concepts are understood to explain is that which is 
purely, narrowly, intrinsically mental. After all that, none of the ‘problems’ mentioned in this 







Chapter 2: Evidence, Behaviour and Explanation 
 
To evaluate competing theories of concepts, or to understand what a viable theory of concepts 
would look like, it is useful to have criteria or requirements that, when met, help indicate better 
or worse theories. It is my argument in this thesis that, though many philosophers start from the 
same point when thinking about concepts, we have been deeply mistaken about how to 
understand the virtues of different theories of concepts, and have substantially misinterpreted the 
requirements for theories of concepts. In particular, I will argue that these errors in understanding 
what role concepts play has led to the false belief that any viable theory of concepts must be 
externalist.  
 In subsequent chapters I will look specifically at the argument that externalism is needed 
to explain concept sharing, and that externalism explains the intuitions generated by Twin Earth-
type hypothetical scenarios. I will argue that, to fully understand these requirements, we must 
look at the reasons we have for believing they hold. Why do we believe concepts are shared? 
Why do we intuit that Oscar has a different concept to his doppelgänger? These questions must 
be answered, at least in part, by turning to the evidence we have for making such claims. Indeed, 
one of the central questions underpinning my thesis is the following: what evidence do we have 
that suggests externalism is true? 
 In this chapter I will explore externalism’s relationship with evidence. Specifically I will 
be thinking about what we could observe that would give us information about mental states – 
what kind of observations could lead us to form beliefs one way or another about the nature of 
the mind. These will be primarily behavioural observations. In the next chapter I will discuss 





that concepts are shared. In this chapter, I will argue that non-local mental content does not have 
causal powers. And if it has any explanatory properties, such properties still do not allow the 
externalist to explain behaviour in a way such that any instance or series of behaviours could 
non-circularly be used as evidence for there being non-local mental content.  
 
§1. The case against the explanatory power of relational properties  
Gabriel Segal (2000) defines the divide between internalism and externalism in terms of the 
significance each school assigns to the intrinsic or relational properties of mental states. 
Internalism, which Segal defends, is the denial that anything but intrinsic properties (such as 
brain states) constitutes mental content. Whereas externalism, he argues, is the theory that 
cognitive content is a relational property – the content of a mental state is a property it has in 
virtue of the relationship between an organism and the world. Considered in terms of Putnam’s 
Twin Earth example, the externalist concludes from such a case that Oscar and Twin-Oscar’s 
thoughts are different, not because of any intrinsic bodily differences between them, but because 
of the relationship that they bear to their different environments.  
Expressing the difference between internalism and externalism in this way provides one 
model upon which we can compare the causal and explanatory powers of the properties of 
mental states that are significant to either camp. In other words, if the relational properties of 
mental states have causal powers, then this is going to be of concern for the internalist, as this 
suggests that such properties are both real and significant components of mental states. However, 
if only the intrinsic properties of mental states have causal power then this raises questions about 





externalist models of mental states (that their content is determined by, or formed by, their 
relational properties) could be explanatorily inert. 
 The primary argument against the ability of externalism to explain behaviour states that 
relational properties are causally inert. In other words, a change purely in the non-local 
properties of mental states, with no difference in intrinsic properties of mental states, will see no 
difference in the causal powers of those mental states. The context in which someone finds 
themself may well have an effect on how that person behaves, but only insofar as it is mediated 
by intrinsic mental properties such as states of their brain. You needn’t even believe that the 
mental supervenes on the neural (though many people do) to accept that the world cannot bypass 
the brain in causing a person to act.23  
 Every object in existence has an infinite number of relational properties at any one time, 
but only a set number of intrinsic properties. Every change in a state of the world will have a 
corresponding change in the relational properties of brain states. Someone with whom I have 
never come into contact with can flip a coin on the other side of the world (Fodor, 1987), the 
outcome of which I am completely unaware, and this will cause a change in the relational 
properties of every part of my organism. I (and every particle in my body) will now have either 
the property of being in a world where that coin displays heads or a world where it displays tails. 
However, as the coin flipping has no physical interaction with any of the particles that make up 
me as an organism, having the relational property of being in a world where the coin either 
displays heads or tails would not be part of the explanatory apparatus of any of my particles. In 
other words, a change in which side of the coin was displayed would not change the causal 
powers of any of my particles, and, by extension, any of my brain states. (Fodor, 1987: 34) 
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 Indeed, one need not presuppose any particular theory of mental state individuation to 
conclude that the coin-based relational property of any mental state will not make any difference 
to the causal powers of that mental state. For the same reason, the fact that the relational 
properties of, say, Oscar’s and Twin-Oscar’s watery-stuff concepts differ has no bearing on the 
causal powers or explanatory apparatus of their respective mental states. Oscar’s being in an H2O 
world is relevant only in accounting for the relational properties that his mental states have. Such 
properties, i.e. the property of being an Oscar’s mental state in an H2O world has as little causal 
power as the property of being an Oscar’s mental state in a world when Fodor’s coin is turned to 
show heads. Such a property could not be the cause of any aspect of Oscar’s behaviour. 
 This is not to say that the relationships that mental states have with the external world are 
themselves causally inert. The external world is what causes us to have mental states in the first 
place – it is the source of mentally represented information. If Oscar were to know that water 
was H2O and his twin were to know that twater was XYZ then these differing states of the world 
might well have causal powers over the mental states of the two men. However, the causal 
powers of a relationship with the external world can only be understood in terms of intrinsic 
properties. In the scenario where Oscar and his doppelgänger know about the chemical 
compound of the watery stuff around them, their mental states differ intrinsically. The relational 
property itself remains inert, even where the relationship might not. Importantly, the fact that 
something in the external world causes a particular mental state does not give us any information 
about the causal powers of that mental state. 
Jerry Fodor (1987) uses the causal inefficacy of the relational properties of mental states 
to conclude that they should be individuated on the basis of their intrinsic properties, on the 





claims about science below, but it is worth pointing out here that one can accept the causal 
inefficacy of the relational properties of mental states and still hold that mental states should be 
individuated on the basis of their relational properties.24 This argument or observation on its own 
is not enough to undermine externalism, although I will argue in my thesis that, if understood 
correctly, the causal inertness of relational properties will end up undermining most, if not all, 
the arguments for concept externalism. 
To say that the relational properties of mental states that form the basis of the 
externalist’s understanding of mental content do not themselves have causal power, does not 
mean that they are explanatorily inert.25 It merely means that they cannot play a particular role in 
a causal explanation. However, we do use mental states in causal explanations of actions and 
behaviours. Indeed, explaining actions in terms of the beliefs and desires of an agent is a 
distinguishing feature of psychological explanation.26  
 Christopher Peacocke (1981) describes a position he refers to as “the objection from 
psychological redundancy”. This position, he argues, does not need to take a side on whether 
there is a wider way of understanding a psychological state which would result in our being able 
to say that the mental states of Putnam’s doppelgängers differ. Rather it claims that “these wider 
psychological states are of no significance for the explanation of your or of your doppelgänger’s 
behaviour. Since your actions will be the same, psychological states in this wider sense are 
explanatorily inert.” (Peacocke, 1981: 198) The assumption that in the event of differences in 
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24 See, for example, Burge (1982). Stich (1978), McGinn (1989) and Jacob (1992) all argue that, 
regardless of one’s theory of content, causation is local. 
25 Jacob (1992: 204), for example, who argues that only local properties of mental states can be 
causes of behaviour, is aware that this alone does not rule out that non-local properties of mental 
states could still have explanatory power: “Explanation, unlike causation, is an epistemic notion 
subject to pragmatic constraints.” 





broad content, behaviour remains the same if narrow content remains the same is written into the 
hypothetical scenarios presented to illustrate or defend externalist intuitions. Oscar and Twin 
Oscar continue to have very similar interactions with the watery stuff around their respective 
selves; the subject in Tyler Burge’s (1979) arthritis example goes to the doctor and complains of 
the pain in his thigh in all possible worlds Burge imagines for him27; and, despite the fact that 
Donald Davidson (1987) argues for all content being broad and, therefore, a complete change in 
broad content faced by his ‘swampman’, both the original Davidson and his swampman replica 
behave in exactly the same way as one another.  
 A change in relational properties of mental states is not accompanied by a change in 
behaviour. Even more importantly, for a behaviour, x, and accompanying mental state, q, if there 
is only ever a change in x when there is a change in the intrinsic properties, qI, then x would have 
followed from qI regardless of the relational properties qR. Therefore, it is not qR that explains 
behaviour x and there is nothing left for qR to explain, at least as regards behaviour x. A 
particular property can have non-causal explanatory relevance in cases where its counterfactual 
absence would have led to different outcomes.28 If it is the case that a change in relational 
properties of mental states alone would have no effect on behaviour, then that property fails 
another criteria for explanatory relevance. 
If differences in relational properties do not track differences in behaviour, this also 
affects predictive power. Imagine Igor and Ida, who go out into their respective back gardens to 
cut down a tree because it is casting so much shade that their flowers are not growing well. 
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because it will cause a change in the intrinsic properties of the subject’s concepts.  
28 For example: Ethel’s house being made of wood is of explanatory relevance when explaining 
why it burnt down, though the fact that it was made of wood did not cause it to burn down. But 
saying that Ethel’s house burnt down because it was made of wood, assumes that ceteris paribus 





Igor’s tree is an elm, while Ida’s is a beech. The fact that the specific tree (and type of tree) 
differs in these two cases, and therefore results in the tree-directed mental states of the two 
people having different relational properties, does as little for the explanation of why they cut 
down their respective trees, as it does for predicting when they might cut down trees in the 
future. Both Igor and Ida like their flowers (possibly different kinds of flowers) and both believe 
that cutting down the tree in their back yard will help their flowers to grow. If the tree in Igor’s 
garden were an elm rather than a beech, the intuition is that this would not make any difference 
to his behaviour, especially if Igor is unaware of the difference between the two trees. Indeed 
Igor does not even need to be right about the thing in his garden being a tree – maybe it is a 
replica-tree – for us to be able to predict the same actions on the basis of his mental states. The 
irrelevance of the relational properties of mental states extends further. 29 
 One might want to argue that elms and beeches are very different in terms of density, so 
much so that Ida has such a difficult time cutting down her beech that she decides never to cut 
down a garden tree again. In such a case, predictions about Igor and Ida’s future behaviour might 
be very different if, as a third person observer, one knew that Ida had been going to chop down a 
very dense tree and Igor had not. So, the argument goes, sometimes knowing about how the 
world is does lead to different predictions about behaviour. This is right, but it is not what is 
being disputed here. The fact that there are worldly features that lead to different predictions 
needn’t tell us anything about mental or conceptual content. To begin with, the difference in the 
predictions made for Igor and Ida in this scenario relies on the belief that the differences in their 
circumstances will lead to differences in the intrinsic properties of their mental states. Ida will 
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begin to think about trees differently when she finds that she can’t cut down the beech; if she 
didn’t then she wouldn’t vow never to cut down a tree again. Furthermore, there are many things 
one could know that would help predict future behaviour. One could know, for example, that 
there is a poisonous snake in Igor’s tree so it is likely he will die before he can finish chopping it 
down. Once again one’s knowledge of the environment allows one to make predictions about 
future behaviour (or in this case, lack of it), but these predictions were not made on the basis of 
differences in the relational properties of mental states. 
   
 
§2. Reply: Where relational properties change, behaviour also changes 
Consider the following, implied in the argument above:  
 
a) Where person a and person b are ‘internally’ identical, their behaviour will always be 
identical.  
 
b) If identity of the intrinsic properties of mental states entails the identity of behaviour, 
then any difference in non-intrinsic properties of mental states in such cases will be 
irrelevant in determining (or explaining) their behaviour. 
 
One objection to such an argument focuses on the first premise. The physical movements of, say, 
Oscar and his doppelgänger may be indistinguishable, but this alone does not entail that their 
behaviour is the same. When, on their respective planets, both men turn on the tap and lift the 





Depending on how you individuate behaviour, therefore, mental states that are intrinsically 
identical, but relationally different, may indeed produce different behaviour. 
 An individual’s environment is very significant in explaining his or her actions – 
behaviour is, after all, interaction with environment. The question is whether, where the 
environment differs, this will change the very nature of behaviour. Peacocke (1981: 199) argues 
that this is exactly what happens – when the doppelgängers reach for a glass of water, their 
beliefs cause them to reach for different glasses of water; identical indexical beliefs that “this is 
the time to do x” will result in actions at different times, if the time when this is thought differs; 
furthermore, the beliefs of the doppelgängers will always result in their acting in different 
locations. Peacocke (1994) argues, furthermore, that we use a person’s relationship to their 
context to individuate intentional behaviour.30  
 If behaviour is not individuated with reference to the agent’s relationship to their context 
then this entails far more than just that Oscar and his twin have the same behaviour. We can 
imagine a woman, Justine, who believes that small dogs are actually domestic cats. She behaves 
in exactly the same way towards small dogs as she does to cats, and does not distinguish between 
them in her mind. When Justine’s cat runs away she replaces it with a poodle. Even though 
Justine acts the same way towards her poodle as she did towards her cat, it does not seem 
unreasonable to say that her behaviour has changed – she no longer scratches the head of a cat, 
for example, but rather she scratches the head of a dog, and so on for all her pet-directed 
activities.31  
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31 One could point out that there is a difference in this case to that of the Oscar doppengängers 





 Gareth Evans (1982) argues that it is not just the case that an agent’s relationship to 
context is relevant to individuating behaviour, but that our behavioural expectations are different 
in cases where we know that two agents have locally-identical, but widely-different, mental 
states. This would mean that knowledge of the relational properties of mental states does in fact 
contribute to predictive power, contra to the argument in §1. Evans (1982: 203) describes a case 
where, he argues, there is a difference in behaviour between two people with internally identical 
indexical thoughts (where they are doppelgängers). Two men, with locally-indistinguishable 
mental states, are looking for their cat, and both have the thought “my cat is in this room”. In 
looking for his cat, the first man is not going to search the second man’s room and vice versa.32 
If we merely knew the local properties of each man’s mental states, we would not be able to 
predict where he was going to look – we would not know that the two men were going to look in 
different places, for example. The difference in the two men’s contexts has not only led to 
differences in behaviour, but differences relevant for prediction. 
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associated with cats and dogs would have different in local, not just wide content. This, however, 
will not solve the problem for the internalist.  
 To begin with, the internalist does not want to individuate mental states so finely that any 
difference in local content means that there is a difference in mental states that is significant for 
individuating behaviour. If this were the case then, among other things, there would never be two 
instances of the same behaviour unless the behaving agents had locally-identical mental states 
(which is only likely to happen in hypothetical cases where this is specified). I discuss the 
question of how the internalist can generalise over behaviour below in §6. 
 Another reason why reference to the local properties of Justine’s mental states will not 
help the internalist in such cases is that the example can be modified so that narrow content 
remains stable, but the objects in the world that an agent is interacting with remain significantly 
and observably different. It could be specified, for example, that she has a selective neural 
disorder that prevents her from being able to distinguish between dogs and cats (something like 
an unusual variation of a condition like prosopagnosia).  
32 Evans (1982: 203): “[I]t is not surprising that singular beliefs – beliefs about particular objects 






 Jennifer Hornsby (1986) has further argued that explanations of behaviour need to 
include reference to external things – any account of behaviour that simply looks at local-
psychological states will not, and, importantly, is not used to explain behaviour.33 Furthermore, 
just as we need to clarify facts about the world in giving explanations of the behaviour of agents, 
knowing about an agent’s mental states, especially their relational states, may also teach us about 
the world (Hornby, 1986: 113). 
 It is important to point out here that external terminology is important in descriptions of 
behaviour. Consider, for example, a baby born in Sydney who immediately begins to cry. You 
can say that that baby is engaging in a certain behaviour, namely crying in Sydney, which can be 
an accurate description of behaviour of the baby that incorporates features of the baby’s 
environment that certainly will not have been mentally processed by that baby. However, if 
anything, this indicates that, just because you include external features in describing or 
individuating behaviour, does not mean that your theory of mental content is doing the 
explanatory work. Furthermore, while this, and the arguments above, indicate the causal power 
of the world itself, they do not show that there is causal power in its relational properties. 
 
§3. Causal powers as causal dispositions 
The question of when to distinguish between two instances of behaviour and when to rule that 
they are the same behaviour is at its essence a taxonomical one. Below I will devote some time 
to discussing the reasons for dismissing the arguments presented in §2, and then move on to 
considering the consequences for the internalist position if we were to uphold the principle that 
behaviour changes with changes in relational properties, even where intrinsic properties remain 
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the same. I will then discuss further questions relating to taxonomy. I ask how internally-
individuated mental states could be generalised so that they cover a range of behaviour broad 
enough that they could account for psychological laws. However, it is most significant that I 
establish that the relational properties of mental states are causally inert. This not only provides a 
firm basis for the arguments presented in the rest of this chapter, but for much of what I argue in 
the rest of the thesis - that an externalist understanding of concepts does no work, and lacks 
supporting evidence.  
One of the things repeatedly stressed by the authors in §2, is the significance of context 
for behaviour. The problem is that it is hard to compare the causal powers of two objects (or the 
properties of those objects) when those objects are in different contexts. To determine what 
causal powers something has we always look across contexts to understand what it could 
possibly cause, not just what it is currently causing. I want any understanding of causal powers to 
be able to accommodate the fact that my toaster has the power to toast slices of bread, even if it 
has never been plugged in, or has only been tested during a blackout. Put another way, my 
toaster has the power to make toast, in the right context. 
The causal powers of an object are best understood across a range of possible contexts.34 
Take a billiard ball, B. In most contexts, when rolled in the direction of another billiard ball the 
force of B will cause any other billiard ball it hits to move; in most contexts, when rolled in the 
direction of a building the force of B will not cause the building to move; and in no contexts will 
B knit a cardigan, make a sandwich, or walk a dog. While we might be able to imagine B being 
rolled towards a building made of cards or jelly, or aimed at a billiard ball that has been nailed to 
the table, such examples do not mean that the causal powers of B have changed. Rather, such 
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alternative world scenarios are included in a set x, where x in its entirety is the causal powers of 
B.35 To work out whether x applies to B, B must remain constant between worlds – meaning that 
its intrinsic, or physical properties must remain constant. We will not learn about the causal 
powers of B by doing experiments (whether hypothetical or real) on giant, inflatable billiard 
balls, though we may get a good idea of B’s causal powers though doing experiments on 
physically very similar billiard balls, and we will learn exactly about B’s causal powers by 
actually observing B. 
If we want to discover which properties are relevant to a particular object’s causal 
powers, we can isolate them and once again test the object across a range of contexts. If B were a 
different colour, would this make a difference in its causal powers? If B were pink, rather than 
black, it would have exactly the same effect on the world in contexts where we were testing its 
capacity to exert force on other objects. However, B’s colour may have an effect on whether it 
could be identified in low light etc.36 Causal powers are a function across contexts. Causal effects 
vary across contexts. 
 Understanding causal powers as a function across contexts provides a proper framework 
to judge whether relational properties ever have causal powers. There are some cases where 
differences in the non-intrinsic properties of certain objects do appear to have an affect on their 
causal powers. Money, for example, is understood to have many of its causal powers precisely 
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right circumstances, etc. 
36 Jacob (1992: 209) points out that not all of the properties of an object are relevant to its causal 
efficacy. He uses the example of the colour of a pill, and the location I bought it etc. being 
irrelevant to its causal efficacy. However, what he means is that things like colour do not affect 
the efficacy of a pill as a pill. Meaning that if two pills that were identical in every respect apart 
from colour  were used under the same conditions to treat the same illness, their results as a 
treatment would be the same. This does not mean, though, that the colour difference wouldn’t 
affect my likelihood to take one pill rather than another, or whether I experienced a particular 





because of its unique relational properties. Similarly, cases of discovered forgeries in art appear 
to indicate that the way that we behave towards artworks is determined by the relational 
properties of works of art, rather than (merely) their intrinsic properties. Take, for example, a 
genuine Monet painting, which appears to have its value in virtue of its relational properties (the 
identity of its creator, the status of its creator in the art world, his age when he painted it, and so 
on). Imagine that Mathilde, the greatest art forger the world has ever known, makes a perfect 
copy of the painting. She carefully uses identical techniques, she uses chemically-identical 
paints, she does it on old canvas. Mathilde’s painting looks precisely the same as the original 
under all tests known to science or connoisseurship. Here we have a case where the intrinsic 
properties of the two paintings are identical, but their causal powers appear to vary in accordance 
with relational properties. No one is going to pay much for Mathilde’s forgery, but Monet’s 
original could be sold for many millions of dollars. This seems to show that relational properties 
do have causal power. However, this is a mistake that has arisen from not isolating context when 
considering the comparative causal powers of the paintings. In fact, we can use this case to 
illustrate how the causal powers of paintings and forgeries do not vary as context varies, which 
they should if their relational properties determine their causal powers.  
Consider the case where I try to sell Eleanor my Monet - this may cause her to look over 
it, investigate it, and pay me money for it. Now imagine that instead of the real Monet, and 
without my knowledge, Mathilde’s exact replica is switched in its place. To test the causal 
powers of the painting, its history can vary from the original painting, but its intrinsic properties 
and context must remain the same for us to know what causal powers it has in this environment. 
This means that my and Eleanor’s (intrinsic) mental states are the same as in the case where I am 





these circumstances that all of the following events will be the same – Eleanor will look over it, 
investigate it, not find anything wrong with it (it is an exact replica after all) and pay me money 
for it. So the causal powers of the two paintings are in fact the same, even if their relational 
properties vary.  
Indeed, we can even imagine that the people involved know that there is a difference in 
the relational properties of the two paintings while the paintings continue to have identical causal 
powers. Imagine that Mathilde performs a devious masterstroke. She steals the real Monet 
painting, places both the original and her copy in a safe. When on her death-bed, she writes a 
note revealing what she has done, but does not say which painting is which. Now the art world is 
aware of the paintings’ different relational properties, but not which painting was painted by 
Monet and which was not. While the relational properties of the two works remain different, 
their causal powers are once again exactly the same. 
 It could be argued that the relevant relational property here is not something to do with 
the history of the painting, but the very fact that we would pay so much for it, or hang it in a 
national gallery etc. However, such an argument is circular and tells us nothing about the 
connection between relational properties and causal powers. On such an account both the 
original painting and the forgery have the same causal powers because of their shared relational 
properties (one might call this property value) which amount to the fact that people are willing to 
pay so much money for them. However, the fact that people would pay a lot for a particular 
picture does not explain the behaviour of their paying for that picture, nor does this property 
cause those people to pay for it. 
 Of course, if someone knew the histories of both the pictures then they might treat them 





placed the real picture in a situation that made it look like it had been painted by the forger, then 
it would not be accepted as the original, though once again for reasons of context rather than 
anything to do with the causal powers of the painting itself. 
 Returning to the arguments made in §2, we can consider the claims that causal powers 
should be understood across contexts, and that relational properties have no causal powers, to 
analyse the strength of the argument that a change in the relational properties of mental states can 
cause a change in behaviour. One difference, highlighted by Peacocke (1981), between the 
doppelgängers, is that Oscar drinks water while Twin-Oscar drinks XYZ. However, contra 
Peacocke, we can see that this difference is not due to a difference in the causal powers of their 
respective mental states. The difference in their contexts has resulted in a difference in the causal 
effects of their actions, but as these causal effects would remain constant in a particular context, 
independently of which doppelgänger was acting, they cannot be used to illustrate any difference 
in causal powers of either individual’s mental states. In ‘switching’ cases where Oscar and Twin-
Oscar are suddenly, and unknowingly relocated, Oscar would drink XYZ and Twin-Oscar would 
drink H2O and this would be a result of their intrinsic properties plus their context, as opposed to 
their historical-relational properties.  
 One might object that, as soon as context is changed, relational properties change, and so 
this cannot be used as a method for testing the causal powers of relational properties. However, it 
is worth distinguishing between indexically-fixed relational properties, and historically-fixed 
relational properties. Indexically-fixed relational properties are those that will vary with context 
in every instance. In the example proposed by Evans (1982), mentioned in §2, where two men 
both have the thought “my cat is in this room”, the room to which their thought referred (and the 





so long the intrinsic (and, in this case, syntactic) properties of their thoughts remained the same 
across contexts. If such properties were the only kinds of relational properties relevant to fixing 
the content of mental states, then if Oscar were to be suddenly, and unknowingly, switched with 
his doppelgänger, or if all the water on earth were suddenly switched with XYZ, then Oscar’s 
‘water’ concept would also instantly refer to XYZ even before he had any interactions with the 
watery stuff in his environment. 
 In contrast, historically-fixed relational properties would be those that form the basis of 
almost every externalist theory of mental content. For the externalist who believes that 
conceptual content depends on real natural categories in the world it is not just the fact that Oscar 
is in a world with H2O that means he has an H2O concept, but rather the fact that he has 
historically interacted with water, which has led to the development of his concept.37 Similarly, 
those who argue that conceptual content is determined by an individual’s linguistic or social 
community include a story in their argument about that individual’s historical relationship to that 
community.38 Physical presence in a particular context is not sufficient for the kind of concept 
possession that is outlined in either of these positions. A change in context will not automatically 
result in a change in historically-fixed relational properties. 
 The fact that indexically-fixed relational properties will vary with context adds nothing 
more to our understanding of the causal powers of mental states, or of any objects for that matter. 
As indexically-fixed relational properties are tied to context, there is nothing that could decide 
whether it was purely the relationship with context that was significant in determining the causal 
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his account may have a role for versions of these two kinds of properties. 





powers of that object, or its relational properties. To know which indexically-fixed relational 
properties held for a particular individual would be to know nothing that could extend beyond a 
description of the local properties of that individual’s mental states and a description of their 
environment.  
 It is not just the relational properties of mental states that lack causal powers, but all 
relational properties. This does not mean that context does not determine the causal effects of 
objects, although causal effects are often confused with causal powers.  
   
 
§4. What does it mean for behaviour to change with context? 
I will return now to the question of whether behaviour varies in cases where the intrinsic 
properties of mental states remain the same, but their relational properties differ. We have seen 
that the answer to this question has no bearing on the causal powers of relational properties: 
however, it may still be important for explanatory purposes. As mentioned at the beginning of 
§3, the question of whether two instances of behaviour are the same is a taxonomical question, 
and therefore one that doesn’t necessarily have a correct answer. How we decide to individuate 
behaviour may vary depending on what it is that we are trying to understand or achieve with 
such categories, and it is possible to have multiple taxonomies that, in playing different roles, do 
not come into conflict with one another. However, there can still be better and worse ways to 
develop a taxonomic system – if we classify behaviour in the right ways it can enable us to make 
predictions of future actions and understand previous actions, and may shed light on the mental 





 In the next section I will discuss how a good taxonomy of behaviour should provide us 
with a framework for proposing and understanding psychological laws. Here, however, I want to 
suggest a few reasons why a taxonomy that individuates behaviour in accordance with the 
relational properties of mental states is a poor taxonomy.  
Consider Peacocke’s (1981) argument above, that the doppelgängers could be understood 
as having different behaviour for any number of reasons – their behaviour is directed at different 
objects, it takes place in different locations and it could also take place at different times. This 
suggests that any number of relational properties of mental states could be used in behaviour 
individuation, and risks sounding like the trivial point that any two token instances of intentional 
actions will not be the same as one another. When Oscar drinks a glass of H2O at 5pm on a 
Monday, why would he not be behaving differently from when he drinks a glass of H2O at 6pm 
on the same Monday? After all, the chemical compound of the substance drunk might be 
constant across such cases, but the token substance itself is not the same. As any single change in 
any part of the universe will result in a change in the relational properties of a mental state in that 
universe, this point is not just trivial, but viciously holistic.39 Merely saying that the relational 
properties of mental states are relevant to the individuation of behaviour is not an account of 
behaviour individuation, but rather an argument that calls for an independent theory of behaviour 
individuation.  
The externalist can argue that there are obviously some properties that are relevant when 
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39 It is worth noting that if we want to describe behaviour only in a way that is unique-context 
specific then the externalist would face exactly the same problem as the one the internalist is 
accused of when it comes to individuating concepts. In a way this is the problem with the idea 
that relational properties could have causal powers – because there are an infinite number of 
relational properties that we could specify, so if you thought that it was bad to be a holist about 
the mind when individuating concepts, you are going to have a very serious problem using 





individuating behavioural acts, and others that are not. The problem for the externalist is how to 
decide which relational properties of mental states are relevant to the individuation of behaviour. 
What the externalist cannot do in this case is invoke their theory of concept or mental content 
individuation to pick out the states of the world relevant to behaviour individuation. Frances 
Egan (1991) points out that one cannot just say that behaviours are different because there are 
different intentions behind them, as this would beg the question. Rather, she argues, “the type-
distinctness of behaviour is intended as a premise of an argument for the type-distinctness of 
mental states, rather than as a conclusion from it.” (Egan, 1991: 182) 
Even if there were a non-circular method available to the externalist that individuated 
behaviour in line with their theory of concept or mental content individuation, there would still 
be the challenge of showing the value of such a taxonomical system. Where we understand 
behaviour as varying with the relational properties of the mental states of an acting agent, we get 
reduced predictive power. Imagine I am observing one of the Oscars and I want to make 
predictions about his future behaviour. It is true that if I know only about the local properties of 
the Oscar’s mental states, I will not be able to make predictions about whether he will drink H2O 
or XYZ, because I have no way of telling which Oscar I am observing. However, I would still be 
able to predict that whoever it is that I am looking at will drink the watery stuff found in his 
environment. If I know local properties plus context then I will be able to make the more fine-
grained predictions about what kind of watery stuff the Oscar I am observing will drink. 
However, as ‘switching cases’ illustrate, even if I know the local properties of the Oscar I am 
observing, and I know the relevant features of his context, this will still not tell me which Oscar I 
am observing. It could be that the man I am observing is Twin-Oscar who has been switched 





knew the historical-relational properties of his mental states. However, knowing the historical-
relational properties of the Oscar I am observing would not give me any more information upon 
which to make my prediction – I could not make a better prediction with that information than I 
could have merely knowing the local properties of the man I am observing and knowing that he 
is on Earth. In fact, in the switching cases, knowing the historical-relational properties of the 
man’s mental states, but not knowing his context would lead to worse predictions, as I would 
predict that Twin-Oscar was going to drink XYZ, not knowing that he was now on Earth. 
Contrast this to the case where I know the local properties of his mental states, without knowing 
his context. Here my predictions might be less fine-grained, but they do not turn out to be false.  
 In cases of ‘incomplete’ concepts, predictions made on the basis of relational properties 
are even more likely to be wrong. Borrowing Burge’s (1979) example, we can imagine a case 
where Alf goes to an arthritis specialist because he mistakenly believes that he has arthritis in his 
thigh. Knowing that Alf is wrong about arthritis may help us predict what would happen to him 
after he goes to the doctor, but if it led to any prediction of his behaviour that differed from the 
prediction made on the basis of local properties, it would be getting it wrong. People who have 
pain in their thighs typically don’t go to the doctor and ask for arthritis medication, particularly 
in a world where ‘arthritis’ only refers to ailments of the joints, but none of this is needed to 
predict what will happen in Alf’s case. Similarly, if we wanted to explain why Alf went to the 
doctor (in a way that would lead to future predictions) we would not focus on what he didn’t 
know, but rather on what he believed. Alf thought his thigh pain was cause for concern – that is 
why he went to the doctor. 
The stumbling block for those who argue that behaviour accompanied by the same local-





when explaining the significance of this argument. There are two things that vary when the 
context of an agent changes. The first is obviously the environment that that agent is in, and the 
second is that agent’s relational properties. It is not sufficient for the externalist to show that 
behaviour varies with context alone, or that we consider environment when individuating 
behaviour. One needs to be careful not to mistake the claim that only the intrinsic features of 
mental states have explanatory power over behaviour for the claim that internalists are unable to 
use context or environment to make predictions about behaviour. There are going to be lots of 
cases where being in a different physical environment is going to lead to different behavioural 
outcomes – this is a shared assumption on both sides. Context is something that internalists use: 
they have as equal licence to use it as externalists do. Knowing context can be a guide to the 
kinds of (locally-defined) mental states an individual will possess, and what their behavioural 
dispositions are, as well as what, given this information, they are likely to do given the 
restrictions of their environment. No internalist is going to claim that the behaviour of two 
individuals with locally-identical mental states is going to be the same if one of them is 
paralysed. If someone is paralysed they are not going to get into a physical fight no matter what 
their internal mental states are - knowing this fact about context is going to be crucial for making 
accurate predictions about their behaviour. Similarly, things that happen in the environment are, 
on the whole, exactly what cause us to behave in the first place (so long as they are processed or 
represented mentally).   
Furthermore, as we have seen above, a change in an agent’s environment can mean 
change in behaviour even where the relational properties of that agent’s mental states stay the 
same. Consider the case where we say that the Oscars have different behaviour because the 





distinction between behaviours allows for the possibility that, if we considered both men in the 
same environment (so, say, Twin-Oscar has suddenly been placed on Earth), their behaviour 
would suddenly be directed at the same objects and performed in the same location, and 
therefore count as the same despite the different historical-relational properties of their mental 
states.  
Indeed many changes in environment alone might result in our wanting to classify 
behaviour differently - completely independently to the relational properties of the mental states 
of the agent acting. If I am the last person to vote in an election it is possible that mine is the 
casting vote that causes the Prime Minister to lose her job. One might view my voting in this 
context as being significantly different from my voting in the case where my single vote would 
have made no difference whatsoever in the outcome of the election, as my action in the latter 
case is merely voting, while in the former it is deciding an election. In this case the historical-
relational properties of my mental states, just like the local properties of my mental states, will 
not be able to explain the difference between the behaviour exhibited in both of these cases. The 
only thing that will be significant in explaining or making predictions about the difference in 
these cases will be information about context. So variation in behaviour consistent with variation 
in environment is not enough to show us anything about the explanatory power of the relational 
properties of mental states. In such cases it is evident that the behaviour differs because the 
environment differs, rather than in virtue of a difference in the relational properties of the 
accompanying mental states. 
 In a final case to illustrate the redundancy of relational properties of mental states to 
explanations of behaviour, consider Celeste, who has a normal life on contemporary Earth. 





phenomenal states, and whose brain is identical to Celeste’s at every moment. However, while 
Twin-Celeste has all of Celeste’s beliefs about the world, they are all false - Twin-Celeste is in a 
Matrix-style scenario, where her mental experiences are the product of being hooked up to a 
network of computers and the minds of other people, all of them, like Twin-Celeste herself, with 
their bodies physically located in pods of which they will likely never be aware. When Celeste 
kicks a football, Twin-Celeste only believes that she is kicking a football. This, is a case where 
the intrinsic mental states of the doppelgängers are indistinguishable, while their behaviour 
clearly differs - in the case of Twin-Celeste there is no physical movement at all accompanying 
her being in a particular mental state, so no behaviour.  
 What could the internalist say in response to such a case? The internalist can point out 
that such an example does not mean that the local properties of Celeste and Twin-Celeste’s 
mental states do not differ in causal powers, even if they differ in causal effects. If their 
situations were switched, Twin-Celeste now in the real world, would behave in exactly the same 
way as Celeste did when she was in the real world. ⁠40 We cannot know much about the behaviour, 
behavioural dispositions or (by extension) the mental states of an individual who is unable to 
move any part of their body. However, such a case tells us nothing about the causal powers of 
the mental states of that individual - it is not the fact that Twin-Celeste has a particular series of 
mental states that explains the fact that she is not moving her body at all. Rather, what explains 
the lack of behaviour is something external, but non-mental. 
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40 Of course, if you are actually talking in the terms specified in the Matrix movies, Celeste 
would behave exactly as Twin-Celeste did (both in the real world and in the Matrix world) but 
Twin-Celeste would not be able to act as Celeste did in the real world as her muscles would have 
deteriorated given the fact that they had never been used. However, we will have to ignore this 
technical point, as this difference would result in a difference in (internally defined) mental 





 One could argue that, in this case, were we to know the relational properties of Celeste 
and Twin-Celeste’s respective mental states then we would know whether the woman we were 
contemplating was in the real world or the Matrix. This would not only explain the differences in 
their behaviour, but it would allow us to make predictions about their future behaviour – 
knowing the relational properties of Twin-Celeste’s mental states allows us to identify that she is 
in the Matrix, and so we can predict that she will not behave at all, because she never moves, 
even when she believes herself to be moving. 
However, it is unclear that we get more or new information from knowing the indexical-
relational properties of an individual’s mental states.41 To know what indexical-relational 
properties a mental state possesses we already have to know the second part of the relation – we 
already have to know the thing about the world that such properties were supposed to reveal over 
and above their non-relational constituents. We just wouldn’t know what mental state they were 
in without already knowing what environment they were in. So we end up with something 
circular: Celeste has a particular mental state because she is, say, about to drink x. Therefore, 
Celeste having this mental state is an indicator that she is about to drink x. It is true that our 
predictions would be better if we knew more about context, but not in any way that related to an 
individual’s mental states. As we need to know already about context to know the indexical-
relational properties of an individual’s mental states, knowing which indexical-relational 
properties her mental states possessed would hardly be a better predictive aid, given that the 
extra detail we get from an account of a situation that includes relational properties of mental 
states only adds knowledge that we already had. 
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41 We do get new information when we know about an agent’s historical-relational properties, 
but as has been established though switching cases, such properties lead to worse predictions 





Not only are causal powers local, but also when it comes to explanation of behaviour we 
gain nothing by talking in terms of the relational properties of mental states that we would not 
get from talking in terms of local properties plus context. Furthermore, when individuating 
behaviour along the lines of relational properties we see that it is very difficult to do so in an 
informative, non-circular way, and that such a behavioural taxonomy is more likely to lead to 
erroneous behavioural predictions. There is, therefore, no explanatory value in using relational 
properties for individuating behaviour. 
 
 
§5. Psychology and broad individuation 
The argument that Fodor makes in Psychosemantics extends beyond pointing out that relational 
properties do not have causal powers. The significance of this, for Fodor, lies in the fact that 
science (the example he focuses on is physics) individuates entities in accordance with their 
causal powers. Indeed, many authors have viewed the significance of this debate as being about 
scientific practice, especially (ideal) practice in psychology. Andrew Pessin and Sanford 
Goldberg (1996), for example, argue that the key question of the externalism/internalism debate 
about content is: “Which of these competing views of content (if either) is most appropriate for 
psychology?” 
If Fodor’s (1987) argument “depends on the claim that scientific theories individuate 
entities by their causal powers” (Egan, 1991:181), then I agree that it does not succeed. Burge 
(1986) argues that psychology itself type-distinguishes mental states on the basis of relational 
properties, and this extends to folk psychology; after all, we use intentional language to describe 





taxonomic system that is not so individualistic that it groups together or classifies mental states 
idiosyncratically. The special sciences are often focused on macro-level general taxonomies that 
do not directly map onto the properties or entities that are the focus of physics, making it a poor 
comparison base. We need generality for special sciences, as essentially what the special 
sciences do is explain things at a more manageable level that would likely be explained more 
accurately if investigated at the more micro level - the domain of the hard sciences.  
 The fact that broad language is used in psychology, however, does not necessarily entail 
that psychologists are (or should be) committing themselves to externalism about mental content. 
There is a question about what ontology we (and psychologists) are committing ourselves to 
when we use intentional language to give explanations of behaviour. Intentional language can be 
used as a way of talking generally. For example, when describing the mental states of 
individuals, it is possible that we are making internalist assumptions that are assumed in our 
descriptions though not stated explicitly for the sake of brevity. Consider Burge’s (1979) 
example of Alf who believes that he has arthritis in his thigh. While we can describe Alf’s 
mental states by making reference to the arthritis concept, we can also describe what is going on 
in his mind without referring to an externally-individuated concept. It will just take longer. 
Furthermore, if we were to fully describe his experience of hearing about a painful illness that 
was located in the limbs and that required certain treatments etc. accompanied with the fact that 
he had pain in his thigh that he connected in his mind with this illness, we wouldn’t need to 
employ the concept of arthritis (or any question about whether he had made an error) to explain 
why he went to the doctor.  
In this case, even if we do employ broad language, its usefulness might once again be tied 





his environment. We don’t need to know which of the two men, described by Burge, we are 
considering to explain or predict how they are going to act.42 Context will be very useful in 
making predictions regarding their behaviour, but this is because it will give us some insight into 
the likely outcomes (or effects) their behaviour will have, completely independently of what 
relational properties their mental states may possess. Context will let us know whether a doctor 
will dismiss Alf or not – the relational properties of his mental states alone will not do this. This 
leaves open the question of whether Alf and his twin have the same concepts or not, but what it 
does tell us is that we would expect them to behave the same way, if their environment was the 
same. Our use of broad language is not necessarily in conflict with our working assumptions 
being internalistic.  
 Colin McGinn (1982) further points out that while folk psychology does employ both 
wide and local mental descriptions, the wide part of those descriptions does, or is taken to, play 
an explanatory role. Knowledge of truth-conditions is a valuable part of the way we understand 
and attribute mental states, without our mistaking truth conditions for explanatory properties of 
those mental states:  
 
[C]onsider the factive propositional attitudes, e.g. knowing, remembering, 
perceiving. We do commonly employ these in explanatory contexts, yet it would be 
agreed that they are hybrid states requiring the world as well as the agent’s head to be 
a certain way. What we should say of this is clear: only the internal component of the 
condition reported is doing explanatory work – the rest is, from an explanatory point 
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42 This is a point made by Loar (1985) who describes an example where we read the diary of one 
two people who have locally-identical, but relationally-different mental states. We do not need to 
know whose diary we are reading, or what the referents of their words are for their diary account 





of view, idle… Commonsense psychology is not methodologically solipsist in the 
properties it invoked, but we need not conclude that it violates methodological 
solipsism with respect to its explanatory dimension. (McGinn, 1982: 215)  
 
All this said, one thing that does make relational taxonomies of behaviour or mental states appear 
to be appropriate for explanations is that they have a wider scope, and, therefore, make better 
candidates for the units of psychological laws. The internalist has several advantages when it 
comes to cases such as that described in Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario. By focusing on instances 
where the intrinsic mental states are fixed, but relational or broad content is not, such scenarios 
do not require any theory of how to internally individuate concepts. However, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the claim that internally identical mental states are completely identical mental 
states is only a small part of what is required of an internalist theory of concepts. I have argued 
that a robust internalist theory of concepts entails that concepts are idiosyncratic and cannot be 
(ontologically) individuated as being the same if there were any internal (intrinsic) differences 
between their instantiations. 
As was established in §3, to define behaviour as being in accordance with one’s theory of 
mental state individuation would risk circularity when discussing the power of mental states to 
explain instances of behaviour. So if an internalist theory of behaviour individuation or 
psychological laws were tied to internalist individuation of mental states then it would be 
uninformative and circular, as well as too narrow. Psychological theories can be compatible with 
internalist commitments and still generalise over mental states. The question is what is the 





and whether the generalisation is meant to give us information about any particular individual, or 
just about a group.  
For the sake of explanatory breadth you might want to taxonomise in a way that relies on 
generalisations that roughly, but not strictly, adhere to causal roles. I have mentioned that there 
may be many ways of differentiating between categories or types, and these can be assessed as 
better or worse only against the goals of the person for whom any taxonomy is developed. We 
can think of this in the way that we think of statistical probability. Statistical probability is a 
function over a population - its value depends on the interests (uses etc.) of the user for whom it 
is a tool. It will be better or worse as a system depending on the information we have and the 
population we specify. For an individual to have a particular probability of, say, developing 
Alzheimer’s disease, means that they are a member of a population x where n-number of 
members of x have historically developed Alzheimer’s. So the probability for them is not an 
instantiated trait.  
 Why is this relevant? Well this is essentially what we do in the case of concepts when it 
comes to groups and generalisations. To say that everyone in the Starbucks on 35th Street has a 
dog concept allows us to make a number of predictions about their behaviour under likely and 
hypothetical conditions (for example if I were to ask each one of them if they knew what a dog 
was, or ask them to describe a dog). Their behaviour will, of course, vary, and there could be 
some cases where we don’t think they do have a dog concept. Rather, talking generally in terms 
of behaviour and prediction does most of what we want in making conceptual generalisations - 
we have defined our population, and made (largely) testable predictions about them as a 
population. The variation in behaviour doesn’t matter too much so long as it is in line with what 





 We can still believe that internalist explanations are best for explaining individual 
instances of behaviour, while using statistical or behaviourist explanations when talking about 
populations. And, in doing so we still assume that an internalist mechanism is what is doing the 
work in the case of every individual who makes up that population group. This is like the case of 
Alzheimer’s: any one individual’s likelihood of developing the disease is merely a function over 
a particular group of which they are a member. Their actually developing the disease, if they do, 
has a local explanation. Statistics can be very useful making predictions, but they are not causes 
within themselves. Similarly, talking in general terms about behaviour can help us make group 
predictions, while we still acknowledge that individual mental states vary, depending on local 
properties.  
 In fact, if the externalist wants to take our language as an indicator of appropriate 
taxonomies, then they might do well to keep in mind that we generalise over properties of the 
world all the time, not just mental states. There is a big difference between the stuff around us 




I have argued here that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers. 
While one can make reference to the relational properties of mental states in explanations, I have 
suggested that this does not mean that they have explanatory power. As believing that relational 
properties contribute to the content of mental states forms the basis for most externalist theories 
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43 See Fodor (1987) on this point. Malt (1994) showed that subjects were likely to classify some 
substances such as pool water as being water, and others such as tea as not being water even 
though pool water is lower in H2O than tea. This suggested that, even when subjects said they 





of concepts, this means that concepts, in the way conceived by externalists, also lack the power 
to cause and explain behaviour. If this is the case, then, quite simply, behaviour cannot be 







Chapter 3: Concept Sharing 
 
One of the most fundamental convictions we hold about concepts, independently of which theory 
of concepts we endorse, is that they are the kinds of things that can be shared. Furthermore, the 
‘publicity requirement’ – the requirement that a theory of concepts accounts for concept sharing 
– has traditionally been understood to strongly support externalist theories of concepts. It is 
widely believed that to account for how two people could possess the same concept, concepts 
must be individuated externally. In this chapter I will argue that no theory that externally 
individuates concepts can genuinely satisfy the publicity requirement.  
 Internalists who respond to the publicity requirement tend to do so by showing that, 
weighed against the other virtues of internalist theories of concepts, an inability to account for 
concept sharing is not enough to reject internalist theories outright (Prinz, 2004). Such 
internalists sometimes go on to suggest a weakening of the publicity requirement such that it 
could be stretched to include certain internalist theories. In contrast, I am concerned solely with 
what it really means for a theory of concepts to meet the publicity requirement. Here I will be 
arguing for the following: 
 
1) It is (contingently) true that individuating concepts externally is the only way that we 
can have concept identity across individuals and within the same individual over time. 
 
2) The only evidence we have that concepts share identity across individuals is 






3) Attributions of mental state content that posit externally individuated concepts cannot 




 4) We retain identity of concepts between individuals, which means externally 
individuated concepts. However we must accept that we now have no evidence for this position, 




 5) We retain the belief that a theory of concepts must explain the behavioural evidence 
we have that suggests concept sharing takes place. This evidence cannot be explained by any 
externalist theory of concepts, and therefore, counter to all our starting beliefs, it cannot be 
explained by the identity of concepts across individuals. 
 
Whichever one of these posistions one decides to take, it is clear that we were so convinced that 
people had the same concepts that no one realised the very things that motivated a belief in 
concept identity undermine any theory that could account for concept identity.  
 
 





The requirement for a theory of concepts to account for how concepts can be shared has been 
referred to as the ‘publicity requirement’ (Fodor, 1998; Prinz, 2004) since this requirement is 
often understood to demand that concepts are publicly accessible. The requirement has been 
motivated by a range of different general observations: coordination, behavioural success, 
communication (Frege, 1948; Fodor, 1998) and psychological explanation (Rey, 1985; Fodor, 
1998). The claim is that none of these things would be possible without shared concepts. If this 
claim were true, then the very fact that we are able to communicate and provide psychological 
explanations will count as strong evidence in favour of concept sharing. 
 There is a basic intuition that concepts are shared. While potentially motivated by all the 
evidence that concept sharing is drawn on to explain, this intuition is often initially presented as 
standing on its own. Frege expresses this idea: ‘[O]ne can hardly deny that mankind has a 
common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.’ (Frege, 1948: 
212) Fodor explains the claim that concepts are public as saying that concepts ‘[a]re the sorts of 
things that lots of people can, and do, share.’ (Fodor, 1998: 28) Fodor points out that most people 
have certain basic concepts such as ‘dog’, ‘father’ and ‘tree’, and that this has been the case over 
a long span of human history. To be taken seriously, he argues, any theory of concepts cannot 
undermine the intuition that these concepts are in fact sharable and shared. Prinz similarly begins 
his account of the publicity requirement by stating: ‘Concepts must be capable of being shared 
by different individuals and by one individual at different times.’ (Prinz, 2004: 14) The idea that 
having different experiences, living at a different time, coming from a different culture or any 
one of a range of possible variations between persons would result in two people not sharing a 





 More specifically, concepts appear to play an important role in explaining the success of 
language. Frege, for example, was concerned with how to reconcile the following: To be able to 
communicate linguistically, communicators need to have some kind of shared understanding or 
knowledge of the words they use. However, we cannot know everything about the referents of 
our words and often have very different mental representations associated with them from the 
representations held by others.44  
For Frege (1948), the units of which there must be shared knowledge to enable linguistic 
communication cannot be the referents of our words, because it is possible for one person to 
associate different concepts with the same referent. Similarly, these shared units cannot be our 
‘conception’ of a thing – i.e. that which includes internal images, memories and sense 
impressions – as these features are vague, will change over time and will vary between 
individuals. Conceptions, Frege argued, could not explain the publicity of language – in fact they 
threaten to undermine it. Frege, therefore, introduces ‘sense’. As an abstract object, sense does 
not vary from person to person (although people can have varying conceptions of the same 
sense), but it is also not synonymous with reference, since more than one sense could apply to 
the same referent. It is sense that is often considered to play the concept role, and because of this 
fact, concepts have commonly been thought to play a role in explaining the presence and success 
of language.  
The need for objectively sharable concepts to explain language was also defended by 
Putnam (1999). In so far as the meanings of words can be understood by many people, Putnam 
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44 ‘The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the 
language or totality of designations to which it belongs; but this serves to illuminate only a single 
aspect of the referent, supposing it to exist.’ However, ‘[c]omprehensive knowledge of the 
referent would require us to be able to say immediately whether every given sense belongs to it. 





argued, they are constituted by shared concepts. What it is then to hold a concept, as with what it 
is to understand the meaning of a word, cannot be unique to its holder, but must be both simple 
and general enough that its sharability can be explained. 
Concepts also appear central in facilitating intentional explanations of behaviour. Rey 
argues that concepts can be invoked to explain both interpersonal and intrapersonal conceptual 
comparisons (Rey, 1999: 228). We believe there are important things in common in cases where, 
for example, we buy milk. These include a shared desire for milk and a shared belief that buying 
it is the way of fulfilling that desire. Such an understanding of the psychology of others seems, 
once again, to require our being able to share concepts with others which we then attribute to 
them in order to explain their intentional states. If we did not share concepts with others then it is 
unclear how we could ever understand their mental states – yet we have good reason to believe 
that we are often very successful in representing the mental states of others. 
All these things appear to show that concepts are shared.  
 
§2. External individuation is required for concept identity across individuals 
Theories that individuate concepts internally are unable to account for conceptual identity across 
persons. The claim is that, if concepts are determined by the idiosyncratic mental experiences of 
individuals, then they could not be shared between individuals. This appears to show that 
concepts must have an external component to meet the publicity requirement.  
 Internalism about concepts can be understood as the position that states that conceptual 





their heads) is identical, then their concepts will be identical.45 So, for example, the internalist 
will conclude that the ‘Oscar-doppelgangers’ of Putnam’s (1975) Twin Earth thought experiment 
will have the same ‘water’ concept. In contrast, there are many different ways one might be an 
externalist about concepts. One could argue that concepts have their content determined by a 
thinker’s social and/or linguistic community (Putnam, 1975; Burge, 1979); that concepts have 
their content determined by real categories in the world (particularly natural categories) (Kripke, 
1981; Putnam, 1975); that concepts are mental entities individuated by the relationship between 
the mental and the external world (Fodor, 1998); or that concepts are abstract objects (Frege, 
1948; Rey, 1985, 1999). What all of these theories have in common is that, even if concepts are 
understood to have mental or internal components, each of them holds that something outside the 
head contributes to conceptual content, and, therefore, each of them individuates concepts 
externally. 
 What is significant about internalist theories of concepts is that what is in the head will 
always differ between individuals, much like Frege’s ‘conceptions’. As I have argued in Chapter 
1, if concepts are individuated internally, they are going to be individuated in terms of properties 
that are idiosyncratic to the individual, and, therefore, concepts will themselves be idiosyncratic. 
This would cut off all hope of having an internalist theory of concepts that could account for how 
two people could possess the same concept. 46  
Consider imagism: the theory, roughly held by Locke (1690) and Hume (1739, 1748), 
that postulates concepts as internal images, fainter copies of our perceptual experiences. Imagism 
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can be understood for our purposes as being an ‘internalist’ theory of concepts. This theory is 
charged with failing the publicity requirement because, in so far as a person’s concepts are made 
up of combined images that have arisen from that person’s own perceptual experiences, they are 
going to differ from the concepts of others in virtue of the fact that no one has exactly the same 
perceptual experiences.47 They are not the kinds of things that can be shared.  
Definitionism, by contrast, is supposed to do well on the publicity requirement (Rey, 
1985). Definitionism is the theory that postulates concepts as consisting of definitions – usually 
understood as statements of the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as 
part of a concept category. These conditions are often understood as objective and external. The 
fact that being composed of H2O is necessary and sufficient for a substance to be water is part of 
the water concept on this account, independently of whether individuals know this. Definitionism 
can, therefore, be understood as being an externalist theory of concepts. For two people to have 
the same concept, they do not need to represent the same definition in the same way, but rather to 
both be referring to a category that is individuated by its definition conditions, even if they are 
not entirely aware of these conditions. Definitionism, therefore, appears to be able to account for 
concept sharing in a way that imagism cannot. 
Externalist theories of concepts appear to be the only theories that can account for the 
publicity requirement, something that has been widely accepted in the literature.48 Here I accept 




47 See Prinz (2004). 
48 Some authors have challenged the publicity requirement by suggesting it should be weakened 
(see for example Prinz, 2004). However, they accept that internalist theories of concepts cannot 





§3. Re-assessing the Publicity Requirement 
So far, I have conceded that there can only be concept identity across individuals if concepts are 
individuated externally – there is far too much internal variation between individuals for them 
ever to have the same concept, if individuated internally. As shown in Chapter 1, an inability to 
answer the publicity requirement, among a number of other concerns, has been understood as 
such a serious problem for internalists that almost no one now tries to argue that one should be 
an internalist about concepts to the extent that they are individuated solely internally.49 The very 
reason that internalism is understood to fail the publicity requirement is that it cannot provide a 
robust account of concept identity across persons. But remember from §1 that the arguments 
given in favour of there being a publicity requirement on theories of concepts was not argued for 
by demonstrating the individuating advantage of externalist theories of concepts. Rather, the fact 
that only externalist theories could individuate concepts in a way that accomodated concept 
identity across persons was given as a reason for why these theories met the requirement. If the 
requirement were merely that concepts were individuated such that two people could be said to 
share the same concept, then why would it need to be explained by reference to the ability of 
people to communicate, or the fact that humans share categories? Indeed, if this were only a 
matter of conceptual taxonomy, why would internalists find this objection such a problem? 
 Without investigating why it is that we believe concepts must be shared, what we believe 
concept sharing actually explains, or what evidence we have for believing that concepts are 
shared, there is no power behind the claim that theories of concepts must explain concept 
sharing.  
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 What evidence do we have that concept sharing is taking place? As mentioned above, a 
range of behaviours that I will call ‘publicity behaviour’ can be identified as the evidence we 
have for concept sharing.50 Cooperation, shared categorisation activities, and complex linguistic 
behaviour, for example, can all be understood as evidence that concepts are shared. These were, 
as shown in §1, given as the reasons for believing in concept sharing in the first place. Indeed 
without examples of behaviour where people act the same way, or act in a way that suggests they 
have the same thoughts, it is unclear why anyone would hold the intuition that two people ever 
do share the same concept. However, while this ‘publicity behaviour’ motivates the publicity 
requirement, the assumption that the sharing or public availability of concepts is needed to 
explain publicity behaviour is false. In the following section I will argue that publicity behaviour 
cannot be explained through an argument for strict identity of concepts between persons.  
 What role do concepts play in explaining complex linguistic behaviour? Why do people 
perform the same detailed actions with what appear to be the same intentions? Why do humans 
organise objects into the same categories, for what appear to be the same reasons? One answer is 
to conclude that concepts can be shared – they are common to the relevant groups of people. If 
concepts are publically accessible – if they are the kind of things we can all hold or access, even 
if we sometimes represent or interpret them differently – then they can be understood as the 
common currency of publicity behaviour. The problem appears to be solved. It is not. 
 
§4. Explaining publicity behaviour 
As argued above, the publicity requirement is motivated by the belief that concepts are needed to 
explain publicity behaviour. This behaviour is the evidence we have (and invoke) for concepts 
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being shared; it is the reason that the publicity requirement is so compelling. What has been 
missing from accounts of the publicity requirement, however, is an argument for why this 
behaviour could only be explained by a theory that individuated concepts such that they could be 
shared between people.  
Any theory of concepts that genuinely accounts for the publicity requirement needs to be 
able to explain publicity behaviour. After all one could have a theory of concept individuation 
whereby people possessed the same concepts if they had the same coloured hair, but not if they 
didn’t. By externally individuating concepts, such a theory could provide an account of 
conceptual identity across persons, but one that is pointless and uninformative. There would be 
nothing to recommend such a theory, and if it were understood to fulfil the publicity requirement 
then that requirement itself would appear to be pointless. So, if an externalist theory can account 
for concept sharing, but not explain publicity behaviour, then it should not be taken to adhere to 
the publicity requirement. Similarly, if an internalist theory can somehow account for publicity 
behaviour – which would need to be done without relying on concept identity across persons (see 
above) – then it too should be understood to satisfy the publicity requirement.  
For any theory of concepts to be able to account for the complex behaviour we associate 
with publicity, it must at a bare minimum be able to explain behaviour. In Chapter 2, I argued 
that attributions of mental state content that posit externally individuated concepts cannot explain 
behaviour. This means that externalist theories of concepts fail to meet the publicity requirement 
as they fail to explain any of the behaviour we take to be evidence that concepts are shared.  
It is unclear how anything external to the mind that is not represented (or processed) 
internally could cause any behaviour. The evidence we have that concepts are shared is 





internal mental states of individuals, not about any external content of their thoughts. Therefore, 
if externalism cannot explain behaviour, it cannot account for any of the evidence we have for 
the publicity requirement.51 In other words, externalist theories of concepts cannot explain 
publicity.  
 No matter how many elements one stipulates as external to the mind, no theory of 
concepts will answer the publicity requirement merely by side-stepping discussions about what is 
going on internally in the minds of people who hold, entertain, or master, concepts. Any theory 
that attempts to do so could not explain how concepts are shared any more than it could explain 
how our different conceptions or representations of concrete objects in the external world are 
shared. 
One of the problems with the explanatory inertness of externalism, when it comes to 
behaviour is that, in most cases, we have no ways of telling whether someone holds one concept 
or another on the externalist account. If we were presented with two individuals who had the 
same internal content but different external content, nothing about their behaviour would enable 
us to distinguish between them. We could, of course, specify what concepts each person had, but 
this will not help us with the current problem: that behaviour cannot be taken as evidence for 
which (externally defined or individuated) concepts we hold.  
 This is not to say that the external things in the world are causally inert in relation to our 
internal mental states. It is by coming into contact with the external world that we develop 
concepts. But this does not mean that anything external can cause our behaviour when we have 
not come into contact with it, or when we do not represent it internally. One might argue that our 
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behaviour changes when we make discoveries about the world, that there are things in the world 
(like, for example, natural kinds) that we study and that features of these things will influence 
how our concepts evolve over time. The external world does have indirect causal power over our 
behaviour, but only through being represented in some way inside our heads. This is best 
illustrated by considering the accounts of concepts that treat them as entirely non-mental abstract 
objects.52 
For Frege, conceptions are mental, but what played the concept role, senses, were 
abstract objects that were captured, or represented by conceptions. Similarly for Rey (1985, 
1999), concepts are external entities that are not constituted by their referents or dependent on 
the (incomplete) knowledge of the people who possess them – they are abstract objects. Rey 
defends an unusual form of definitionism according to which concepts are definitions, but those 
definitions are themselves abstract.  
 It may appear that defining concepts in entirely non-psychological terms avoids the 
problem of people with different psychological lives still being able to share concepts, but this is 
not the case. Arguing that there must be an externally located conceptual component that 
accounts for how psychologically or subjectively different individuals can possess the same 
concept does not avoid the problem that arises when we consider how these external components 
are represented internally. After all, the problem for which concepts as external entities were 
posited to answer is how we get from differing internal mental content to public communication. 
The criticism of internalist theories states that internalists rely on internal ways of representing 
external entities (the referents of concepts) and that these will always differ. But the same 
criticism applies to externalist theories. Externalists like Rey and Frege claim that we do not 
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internally represent the referent of a concept, but that concept itself. The varying nature of 
internal representations, however, is still going to pose the same problem for such theories.  By 
positing concepts as sharable in virtue of their not being internal, such theories have failed to 
explain publicity behaviour.  
 Our having two different conceptions of the same abstract object does not explain 
publicity any more than our having two different conceptions of the same concrete object. You 
and I may have different ways of mentally representing the concept of the Empire State Building, 
for example. If our both having had access to the same building does not explain how we can 
communicate about it, then how does our both having had access to the same abstract concept of 
the building explain our ability to communicate about it? 
 This problem with the failure of ‘mode of presentation’ theories of concepts to answer the 
publicity requirement is mirrored in criticisms others have made of such theories. For example, 
Fodor (1998) makes the following observation: Frege brings in the idea of modes of 
presentation, as reference alone is not enough to differentiate concepts. However, Frege was 
concerned to make modes of presentation external – otherwise they would fail to account for 
publicity; for, if they were internal then they would differ from person to person. This would 
mean that there are, potentially, an infinite number of concepts relating to the one referent, and if 
it is unlikely that any two people share the same concepts, or even that an individual may retain 
the one concept over time, then we cannot explain communication. But, Fodor points out, there 
are many ways that modes of presentation can entertained:  
 
[I]f MOPs [modes of presentation] aren't mental, what kind of thing could they 





can entertain it? (And/or: what kind of mental state could entertaining a MOP be 
such that necessarily there is only one way to entertain each MOP?)53  
 
 Consider Rey’s definitionism. If concepts are externally located definitions, a question 
arises over how these definitions are manifested mentally (or recognised, or learned). Even if we 
were to agree that only certain definitions need to be mastered for us to share the same concept, 
we must nevertheless be provided with an account of what it takes to master a definition. If 
mastering a definition requires forming a particular mental representation, then we are left 
needing to explain how these mental representations come to be identical. 
The following example illustrates the concerns expressed above: Raj has only come into 
contact with large, wild cats, while Peta has only come into contact with smaller, domestic cats. 
When Raj sees Peta’s burmese cat he thinks ‘it reminds me of some of the cats I know, but it 
clearly isn’t a cat – it is too small and it isn’t vicious’. Peta has the opposite thoughts when she 
sees a lion for the first time. Merely having a theory that individuates concepts externally will 
not tell us whether or not these two share a concept. Is it that Raj does have a ‘cat’ concept that 
he incorrectly only applies to wild cats, or is it that he does not have a ‘cat’ concept, but rather a 
‘wild cat’ concept? One cannot make such a distinction without looking at what it is like for Raj 
internally to represent the concept he possesses. Furthermore, if we were to decide that Peta and 
Raj shared a ‘cat’ concept, what publicity behaviour would this explain? They would not 
categorize the same objects into the same category; they would not be able to linguistically 
communicate about the subject of cats with any success; and we would likely explain their cat-
related behaviour in different ways. Surely the theory that did not lead to the conclusion that 
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these two shared a ‘cat’ concept would work much better at explaining all the phenomena that 
motivate the intuition that there is concept sharing between people.54 
  If attributions of mental state content that posit externally individuated concepts cannot 
explain behaviour, those theories that understand concepts to be entirely external are the worst 
placed for explaining any behavioural evidence we have about concepts. 
 
§5. What About Mentally-Based Externalist Theories? 
Most accounts of concepts that individuate concepts externally still consider concepts to be 
mental entities. It may seem obvious that there are problems with seeing concepts as mentally-
independent abstract objects, but theories of concepts that combine internal and external content 
appear to do better at accounting for publicity. If externalism alone cannot account for concept 
sharing, couldn’t a combination theory benefit from the explanatory power of its internal 
components, while still being able to avoid the problems outlined in §2, because of its externalist 
components?  
It is true that a ‘combination theory’ will be in a better position to explain publicity 
behaviour than a ‘purely externalist’ theory of concepts. However, this is only the case if you 
accept that internalist theories of concepts can account for publicity. A combination theory will 
not have any advantage over its purely internalist rivals in accounting for the publicity 
requirement. Rather, a combination theory of concepts can account for concept sharing only 
insofar as its internal component can account for concept sharing. 
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 Consider Burge’s (1979) theory of concepts as mental entities that have their content 
determined by one’s socio-linguistic community. Whatever contributes to the content of a 
concept will be the same as whatever fixes the extension of the corresponding word, and to a 
large part this will be our social (linguistic) community. This could be seen as a ‘combination’ 
account (at least in contrast to the mentally-independent account described in the previous 
section). In virtue of being mental entities, concepts can be understood as having an internal 
component, but being individuated externally. Using this account of concepts as an example, we 
can look at why its external component in no way contributes to its ability (if any) to answer the 
publicity requirement. 
 As seen in §4, externally individuating concepts cannot account for behaviour, because 
external components of thought that are not represented internally have no causal power over 
behaviour. Someone who falsely believes that they have arthritis in their thigh will behave in 
exactly the same way as someone who correctly believes that they have ‘tharthritis’ in their 
thigh. No observation we make about their behaviour could tell us which of the two (externally 
individuated) concepts they possessed. 
 Indeed, if not being able to explain publicity is a reason to reject a theory of concepts 
then we must reject ‘purely’ externalist theories of concepts. And if one believes that internalist 
theories cannot explain publicity then we must also reject combination theories of concepts. 
Anyone who wants to salvage any externalist theory of concepts’ ability to account for publicity 
must necessarily embrace the idea that internalism must actually be able to account for publicity 
after all.  
However, while combination theories have internal components that could potentially 





component hasn’t yet told us what the internal component is that is doing the work, or how it is 
doing the work.  
Let us say that the combination theorist embraces everything I have said above; for reasons other 
than publicity they believe that concepts should be individuated externally, but they accept that 
only the internal component of their theory can explain publicity. This concession alone does not 
solve the problem for such theories. If there is a possibility that the internalist can explain 
publicity behaviour they will need to tell a story of how they can do so without concept identity 
and concept sharing. For the reasons that were outlined in §2, this is going to be a challenging 
task. Presumably not all accounts of the internal components of concepts will do equally well in 
explaining publicity behaviour. But, it is a story that the combination externalist will have to tell, 
no less than the internalist, if they want to claim that their theory can account for the publicity 
requirement.  
 Furthermore, if concepts are individuated externally then the individuation of concepts 
can play no role in explanations of publicity behaviour. There is an infinite number of ways 
concepts can be individuated externally. It seems obvious that individuating them on the basis of 
certain properties (by saying, for example that you have one concept that refers to all things that 
were blue before 1999 and all the things that were green after 1999) is not going to help in 
explanations of publicity behaviour. However, there are some ways of externally individuating 
concepts that seem more useful in explaining behaviour than others. If I were to externally 
individuate concepts on a random basis, or propose a system whereby everyone’s concepts were 
now individuated according to my whims, you might think that such ways of individuating 
concepts are completely useless in explanations of the behaviours of content-bearing people. But 





linguistic community, or with reference to the natural kinds found in an individual’s 
environment?  
There are ways of externally individuating concepts that appear more consistent with the 
behaviour we observe, but this is because our internal states are generally caused by the external 
world, and any externalist account of concepts that tracks the external world is more likely to see 
an overlap between similar internal states and similar external circumstances. My water 
experiences are going to be very similar to your water experiences, so a theory that said we had a 
shared water concept would be reasonably good at predicting our water-related behaviour. But it 
would be good at doing so because our internal water-related states (the things that are causing 
our water-related behaviour) are likely to be similar. It is only when concepts are individuated in 
such a way that the external and internal states stop converging that it becomes apparent that the 
external individuation was not doing any of the explanatory work in the original water case. 
When concepts are individuated such that I might have a different concept from someone with 
internally identical mental states to me because the chemical compound of the watery stuff that 
we have come into contact with differs, what we have are outlier cases. But it is precisely these 
outlier cases that demonstrate that the external individuation of concepts cannot be considered in 
explaining what seems to be conceptually-explained behaviour.   
 
 
§6. Publicity Without Identity of Concepts 
So far, the publicity debate has been dominated by the belief that the only way to satisfy the 
publicity requirement is for a theory of concepts to provide for concept identity across persons. 





sharing takes place. However, as argued above, the only accounts of concepts that allow for 
conceptual identity across persons must individuate concepts externally, and anything that is not 
represented internally cannot cause behaviour. It is not possible to have a theory that both has 
concept identity across persons and explains publicity behaviour. This does, however, leave open 
the possibility that publicity behaviour can be explained by a theory of concepts that does not 
employ external individuation.  
If whatever explains publicity behaviour (or, whatever explains the appearance of 
concept sharing) must be internal, then there remains the question of whether any theory of 
concepts can account for publicity behaviour. For a theory of concepts to be able to do so, it must 
be at least in part internalist, and only the internal components of a theory are able to be 
employed in an explanation of publicity.  
We are now in a position where we have to accept that any externalist theory of concepts 
cannot explain publicity. Yet the intuition remains that concepts are what explain cooperation, 
categorisation, communication. If we believe that concepts do play such roles, then we must 
explore the possibly that internalist theories of concepts can fill them, or otherwise give up on 
the prospect of any theory of concepts ever being able to meet the publicity requirement.  
Of course, we began with the belief that internalist theories of concepts are unable to 
answer the publicity requirement, but we must remember that this belief was motivated in part by 
the assumption that concept identity was needed to explain publicity. Now we know concept 
identity is unable to explain publicity, because any theory of concepts that can provide a robust 
account of concept identity across persons must necessarily do so using tools that have no 
causal/explanatory power over behaviour. So we have a much greater reason to believe that there 





Furthermore, something has to explain publicity behaviour. Throughout the history of the 
publicity debate we have had two pieces of data that may have seemed irreconcilable: internal 
mental states vary between people, and people usually behave as if they don’t. But the fact that 
these are two points of data means that they are reconciled – they are both true of the world and 
we know this because we have observed them to be true. It may be that some non-conceptual 
psychological mechanism or mechanisms explains this data, but if we are convinced by the 
arguments given in §1, then we will favour a conceptual explanation, if available, over a non-
conceptual one.  
When considering the behaviour that has been taken to be evidence for publicity, why do 
we come to the conclusion that people share concepts? We identify a similarity in concept-
relevant behaviour. However, while there are cases where people group things together in the 
same way, cooperate with others and linguistically communicate, there are also plenty of cases 
where these activities either fail or they differ between people. A good predictor of where shared 
understanding is going to fail is if two individuals have had different experiences, are from 
different cultures, communities, environments etc. These are the very differences that allow us to 
predict variation in the internal components of contents, that was thought to undermine the 
viability of internalist theories of concepts – but in fact variation in environment predicts 
variation in concepts which predicts variation in behaviour, consistent with the behaviour we 
actually observe. It may be the case that Peta and Raj (mentioned in §4) are unable to 
communicate with one another about cats without misunderstanding. It is an advantage of 
internalist theories of concepts to be able to predict behavioural differences in such cases, and 
this also indicates that they would be in a good position to explain the successful cases of 





 Historically, psychologists studying concepts have used variations in behaviour to 
identify variations in concepts. Prototype theory, for example, predicts that if an individual has 
only (or mostly) been exposed to small, European birds, then a bird resembling a robin is likely 
to be the prototype she uses to distinguish her concept ‘bird’. (Barsalou, 1987) This is measured 
by timing how long it takes subjects to classify something as a bird. Individuals are quicker at 
identifying and classifying birds that are closer to this prototype. This theory predicts that 
prototypes will vary depending on the birds one has been exposed to, but even with variation in 
prototypes there is usually enough similarity for there to be a very strong overlap between what 
one classifies as a ‘bird’, even if classification times vary. 
 It is common for internalists to suggest that similarity can explain sharing of concepts in 
a way that is not as strong as identity, but sufficient for explaining publicity.55 My ‘dog’ concept 
may not exactly resemble your ‘dog’ concept, but with all their variations it could be argued that 
there is enough overlap between our two concepts, enough similarity between them, that it could 
explain how we would classify the same animals as dogs, and how we could communicate with 
one another about dogs. 
Fodor and Lepore (1992; and Fodor, 1998) reject the idea that there can be a meaningful 
account of concept similarity: “[A]ll the theories of content that offer a robust construal of 
conceptual similarity do so by presupposing a correspondingly robust notion of concept 
identity.” (Fodor 1998: 34)  Fodor and Lepore (1992) argue that for two things to be similar they 
must share some identical features. But, they continue, if identity is necessary for similarity, then 
if one has a theory that cannot account for identity one cannot simply avoid this problem by 
claiming that all one is aiming for is similarity. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





To understand the Fodor/Lepore argument we should begin by understanding how one 
theory of concepts, prototype theory, constructs its account of similarity across concepts. One 
version of prototype theory explains concepts in terms of stored lists of the prototypical features 
of categories. (Rosch, 1973, 1975) The features that make up one person’s concept ‘dog’, for 
example, may include having a tail, barking, having a snout etc. Possessing a complete feature 
list is sufficient for concept possession, although no single feature may be necessary for 
something to count as a member of the concept category. So one person’s ‘dog’ concept feature 
list may lack ‘barks’, and yet it could contain enough of the features of dogs that it could still be 
understood as being a ‘dog’ concept.  One may believe that feature lists will (or must) be the 
same between people for concept sharing to take place, but there is evidence to suggest that the 
features considered to be prototypical of a particular category will differ depending on what 
tokens of that category-type individuals have been exposed to.  If similarity were enough to 
explain publicity then according to such a theory, two people would only need a certain overlap 
in the list of features they associate with a single concept to be able to communicate. 
 Fodor and Lepore use the example of prototype theory to illustrate their point: it is easy 
to claim that two concepts are sufficiently similar, they say, if they have enough overlap of 
feature-lists, but what is it for a feature on one list to overlap with a feature on a different list? If 
my concept ‘dog’ and your concept ‘dog’ both include “has a snout” as an item on our feature-
list then we are still going to have to explain what it means for both of us to mean the same thing 
by “has a snout”. Surely such a feature minimally requires the concepts ‘possession’ and ‘snout’, 
but this assumes that those concepts are identical between two people who have similar concepts 





may construct their accounts of concept similarity in different ways, they all face the same 
problem: similarity presupposes identity. 
Philosophers have responded in different ways to Fodor/Lepore’s criticism of concept 
similarity. Certain perceptually based concept-internalists have argued that Fodor’s criticism 
does not work as a response to those theories that account for concepts being similar in terms of 
shape or form. For example, an alternative version of prototype theory suggests that the 
prototypes that form concepts are more like statistically-constructed images than lists (Smith, 
1995).56 Such a theory seems as if it may best provide for the publicity requirement. If the mind 
can statistically combine the average and salient features of the objects with which it comes into 
contact as a means of aiding categorisation, then it seems initially plausible that these ‘averaged’ 
images may be the same from person to person, or at least so similar that the minor differences 
would not be an obstacle to publicity. Furthermore, this account does not need to rely on identity 
in the way Fodor suggests. One way of responding to Fodor’s criticism of similarity, therefore, is 
to argue that similar concepts are those that look the same. Of course, some primitives that are 
identical will still be needed - colour and form, for example - even in cases of statistically similar 
appearance, but this may be something it wouldn’t cost theories of concepts to admit (Prinz, 
2004).  
Paul Churchland proposes that concepts can be understood as being represented by 
positions on a multi-vector state space.57 On Churchland’s account, similarity of concepts 
consists in their similar positions in a multidimensional space with coordinates determined by 
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particular properties, and with the positions in this space corresponding to the degree to which 
those properties are attributed to the concept in question. Fodor and Lepore (1992: 197-202) 
have argued that on such an account similarity of concepts would require identity of the 
dimensions on which they were positioned. As these dimensions are understood to represent 
semantic properties, what needs to share identity for there to be similarity in such a case is not 
perceptual primitives, but semantic primitives, ie concepts. Churchland (1993) has challenged 
Fodor and Lepore, arguing that similarity on the state-space account doesn’t need to rely on 
dimensional primitives, but rather that similarity can emerge at an abstract level. You can have 
complex statistical data sets that generate similar representations without identical overlap.58 
There are further arguments against the Prinz and Churchland accounts of concept 
similarity; however, my intention here is merely to set up their positions as possible internalist-
compatible ways that the publicity requirement might be met by a theory of concepts. It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to argue against Fodor and Lepore over the question of whether 
similarity (or correspondence) of concepts is sufficient in explaining publicity behaviour. Maybe 
they are right, and similarity cannot do what identity was brought in to do. But you know what 
else can’t do what identity was brought in to do? Identity. 
 
§7. Behavioural Similarity? 
It has been suggested to me that rather than trying to find an internal way of explaining publicity 
behaviour, if the behaviour is what we are trying to explain, I should just individuate concepts in 
terms of the behaviour we observe.59 The concept in this case would be whatever plays the role 
of causing the behaviour that we witness in cases that lead us to believe that concepts are shared. 
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Such a position would essentially be externalist in the sense that concepts, in virtue of being 
individuated in terms of the behaviour they accompany, are externally individuated. If there were 
internal variation, while something external, behaviour, remaind the same, then concepts would 
remain the same (this is in essence the mark of an externalist theory of concepts). Yet it would 
also admit that internal stuff has causal power, as what is going on internally explains the 
presence of the external phenomena we are using to individuate concepts.  
 While such an approach may initially seem appealing, it does not work. Aside from the 
obvious difficulties such an account would face with how to relevently individuate behaviour, it 
makes the assumption that concepts are what is causing publicity behaviour. However, as has 
been acknowledged, it is possible that publicity behaviour is actually caused by non-conceptual 
psychological states. To merely define concepts as being whatever causes such behaviour 
without having an account of how they meet any of the other requirements for theories of 
concepts can only allow for a circular answer to the publicity requirement.  
 There is, of course, an obvious practical benefit to such an account – it provides a way of 
generalising over concepts. When I say someone has a water concept what I am doing is 
concluding from the way they behave that they have a concept, caused by interactions with 
water, the possession of which is likely to predict certain subsequent behaviour. It is useful to 
generalise in this way as I rarely have insight into the internal concepts of others, and because I 
want to be able to predict what they will do even if I am not informed about their internal mental 
states (often when I have not even met them and have very little information to go by). So, one 
might say, here I am, externally individuating concepts in a way that allows me to explain 





 The question is, what exactly are we doing when we make such generalisations? One 
option is that the very nature of someone’s internal states is irrelevant to what we are trying to 
capture when we are generalising over the concepts of others. In other words, when two people 
act in the same way (or one person acts in the same way at different times), this just means they 
possess the same concept. To claim as much is to say that when behaviour (x) is exhibited, 
concept (y) is present. Such an argument is essentially behaviourist. It entails that concept (y) 
can’t explain behaviour (x) because concept (y) is defined purely in terms of the presence of 
behaviour (x). 
Alternatively, when we generalise over the concepts of different individuals, we may 
believe that we are generalising over something internal. This means we would actually expect 
the internal stuff to be doing the work in causing behaviour. The ability to generalise over 
internal mental states might be a useful tool, although it does not account for publicity, but it re-
enforces the belief that publicity is something a theory of concepts needs to explain. What we are 
doing in such cases is grouping together or classifying concepts in a way that is helpful to us, but 
does not itself tell us anything much about those concepts. Classifying something as a cat may 
allow me to better predict and understand the behaviour of individual cats, but my classification 
is not what causes or explains their behaviour. 
 
Conclusion 
What does it mean to say that a theory of concepts must meet the publicity requirement? Either it 
means that a theory of concepts must account for identity of concepts across persons, or it means 





communication – all the things that suggest that concepts are shared. What I have shown above 
is that it can’t mean both, since these two things are incompatible.  
 In Chapter 1 I ran through four of the greatest problems for the internalist. Here I have 
shown that one of these problems – that internalism cannot explain publicity – is not a problem 
at all. In fact, it is a disadvantage of externalist theories of concepts that they are unable to 
explain publicity, while internalist theories are the best situated for these explanations. Another 
of the apparent problems mentioned in Chapter 1 is that internalism entails that concepts are 
idiosyncratic. Here I have also begun to demonstrate why this could be true of internalism at the 
same time as not being a problem. Through similarity of concepts, rather than identity, it may be 
possible to explain publicity. 
 This chapter, and Chapter 2, have examined the questions of what could count as 
evidence for the externalist position, while focusing on behaviour as evidence of the mental 
states of others. However, there is another kind of evidence that has not yet been addressed: the 
evidence of our intuitions. It is possible to argue that one reason to believe that concepts are the 
kinds of things that are shared is that this fits our intuitions about what something must be, in 
order to be considered a concept. The above discussion of the publicity requirement has shown 
that the fact that behaviour cannot be used as evidence for externalism means that the very 
behaviour that led to the belief that concepts are shared also cannot be used as evidence for 
externalism. In the following chapter I will argue that our intuitions, even where they are 








Chapter 4: Twin Earth Intuitions 
 
The aim of this thesis is to challenge the reasons one might have for being a concept externalist. 
In the two preceding chapters I have argued that no behaviour, including cooperative, linguistic 
and categorisational behaviour, can be evidence for externalism about concepts. Chapter 5 will 
address the question of whether an externally based conceptual taxonomy is still necessary as the 
only way to explain how our concepts accurately (or inaccurately) capture or represent the world. 
Evidence and explanation are deeply intertwined in these arguments – so far the focus has been 
on denying that there is anything that could count as evidence for externalism by looking at 
physical or observable evidence.  
If an externalist system is one that provides the best framework for a particular 
explanation (such as explaining how our concepts could be wrong or inaccurate), the question 
arises as to whether this explanatory power can itself count as evidence for externalism, or at 
least as a reason to prefer it over its alternatives. However, a theory that no evidence can count in 
favour of, but is still the most useful to use because of the explanations it offers, does not 
necessarily reflect ontological reality so much as indicate a useful tool. The decimal system, for 
example, isn’t the kind of thing we could have evidence for, but there are many reasons why it is 
a good system to use. Similarly with concepts, there may be reasons for adopting an externalist 
taxonomy or terminology, without its being strictly correct. To say that externalism is useful 
because it is correct, we need some reason, aside from its usefulness, for believing its accuracy. 
One of the best reasons would be if there were evidence that either supported or was predicted by 





 This chapter will be concerned with something that lies on the border of the 
evidence/explanation question: intuitions. In arguments for externalism, it is common to make 
use of hypothetical scenarios that are meant to show someone that their intuitions are 
externalist.60 The fact that ‘Twin Earth’ scenarios described by Putnam (1975) and Burge (1986) 
generate externalist intuitions has been used as evidence for externalism, and the assumption has 
been that it is externalism (or at the very least, broad content) that explains why we have these 
intuitions in the first place.61 If this were true then, even if there isn’t physical or observable 
evidence for externalism, such as behaviour, and even if this means that externalism is unable to 
explain activities such as communication, there would still be evidence for both the truth of 
externalism, and evidence that externalism has explanatory significance.  
This chapter will begin by questioning whether the Twin Earth style hypothetical 
examples really do generate the kinds of externalist intuitions that they are presumed to. Many 
people have pointed out problems with relying on intuitions to support philosophical arguments, 
and have challenged the Twin Earth style scenarios on these grounds.62 More important than this, 
I argue, is the fact that, even if such intuitions were universal, they could not count as evidence 
in favour of the truth of externalism, or the existence of broad content. To say that observation x 
is evidence for the truth of theory A, one must have an account of how A either explains or 
predicts x. But externalism itself cannot explain why we would have externalist intuitions.  
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60 “Putnam’s Twin Earth example has become a sort of paradigm in the philosophies of lanugage 
and mind. It has featured in the centre of many discussions and has carried considerable 
influence.” Segal (2000: 24) 
61 Some, such as Chalmers (2002), take the Twin Earth case to indicate that there is both narrow 
and broad content. Narrow content, Chalmers argues, is what is needed to explain what is the 
same between the doppelgängers’ mental states, while broad content is needed to explain the 
difference between their mental states. This suggests that the Twin Earth scenario generates two 
kind of intuitions, though, while I will come back to this point, any theory that incorporates any 
notion of broad content will be incompatible with internalism as described in Chapter 1. 





The mere presence of externalist intuitions is not evidence against internalism – it is very 
common for our intuitions to get things wrong. I will argue that it possible to explain the 
presence of externalist intuitions purely using internalist language. Indeed, the internalist can 
offer an account of what is happening in many of the thought experiments lying at the 
intersection of philosophy of mind and language, including Frege and Kripke puzzles, without 
needing to invoke broad content. The cases that are challenging or interesting for the externalist 
have a relatively simple explanation that can be given solely in terms of non-referential 
properties. If all that is left is an intuition that there must be more to the story, then such an 
intuition tells us nothing. 
Before I begin, a brief note on intuitions. I will be taking intuitions to be something like 
the following: unconscious or subconscious thoughts/beliefs/reactions that in response to certain 
triggers can become conscious, though not rationally explained when they enter conscious 
thought. Consider my intuition that there is something dangerous about someone I have just met 
– let’s call him Professor Moriarty. If I observed that Moriarty was carrying a knife, then it is 
much more likely that I would simply believe that he was dangerous, on the grounds that I could 
observe him in a dangerous act (namely knife-carrying). I would not have any trouble rationally 
explaining this belief. In contrast if, during my encounter, Moriarty had been knifeless, then I 
may still develop the intuition that he was dangerous.  
There are two things it is reasonable to consider when trying to decide whether or not to 
trust a particular intuition. The first is past accuracy – if intuitions of the same kind have always 
turned out to be well founded in the past then this might be a good reason to trust present 
intuitions. Repeated success may be attributable to an ability to pick up on unconscious 





consciously represented) that really do give accurate information about the situation, even if 
conscious reflection cannot reveal why. This approach, however, requires evidence – namely 
evidence that proves (or indicates) that past intuitions were accurate. If every time I intuit that 
someone is dangerous, they turn out to be carrying a concealed weapon, I will have reason to 
trust my intuitions, but only if I discover that they have a concealed weapon either through direct 
observation, or being told about the observations of others. As I have shown, however, in 
Chapters 2 and 3, there is no observable evidence that supports externalism, so it would not be 
possible to know the accuracy of my past externalist intuitions when trying to judge my present 
ones. It is also unclear what other types of intuitions I might have that would indicate that I 
should trust my externalist intuitions, even if there were somewhat similar intuitions that were 
empirically verifiable. So this approach is not going to be the one to take when trying to explain 
why we should trust our externalist intuitions. 
The second way of working out whether or not to trust a particular intuition is to find out 
why we have that intuition, and whether the mechanism that has produced it, or the 
(unconsciously processed) information that has led to it is reliable. For example, certain 
‘mothers’ intuitions’ about whether one should be concerned about a particular tone in the cry of 
a very young baby might be explained by the discover of innate abilities to distinguish between, 
and be alerted by the frequencies of a baby cry. To trust an intuition on this analysis of this case 
is to show that there is a reliable innate mechanism for generating such intuitions (or that the 
content of the intuitions is innate). Alternatively, intuitions might be caused by unconsciously 





rational or observable phenomena.63 If we don’t have the success of previous intuitions to rely 
on, then to be able to trust the intuition that x is dangerous, say, we must be able to see not only 
that x really is dangerous, but that the dangerousness of x caused the intuition. If I intuited that 
Moriarty was dangerous, but only because I feel unease when I encounter men in dark coats, 
then, even if he were dangerous, this would be a coincidence. Moriarty’s dangerousness would in 
no way be responsible for my intuiting that he was dangerous. 
 Imagine then that I have the intuition that theory y is correct. To work out whether or not 
my intuition should be trusted one must ask whether it is generated by reliable innate 
mechanisms. If it is not then the final question is whether my intuition is caused by the 
correctness of y. The primary way a theory could cause us to intuit its truth is indirectly, by 
having its truth manifested in a way that is observable (either consciously or unconsciously), and 
these observations causing us to develop our intuitions.  
 
 
§1. Do we have Twin Earth intuitions? 
There is a range of possible intuitions that could be generated by the Twin Earth scenario, but the 
main intuition that this thought experiment has been drawn on to show is that there must be 
something more to conceptual content than what is in the head.64 It is this intuition that forms the 
basis of the externalist’s position – that there must be broad content. The presence of broad 
content does not rule out the possibility of there also being narrow content, and some take the 
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63 One could have mathematical intuitions, for example, caused by unconsciously picking up on 
mathematical patterns that were not themselves ‘observable’ in a strict sense. 
64 In its orginal formulation this conclusion was meant to be about linguistic meaning, but as it 
has been taken to extend to mental content, and as that is the topic I am interested in here, I will 





fact that we have intuitions that suggest that there is something the same about the 
doppelgängers’ thoughts to indicate that there must be narrow content.65 However, no one 
interprets this case as one that generates internalist intuitions – specifically, the intuition that 
there is only narrow mental content. For this reason, we can think of the typical intuitions 
generated by Twin Earth scenarios as being externalist (as they are inconsistent with 
internalism).66 
The value of using intuitions to support and guide philosophical theories has become a 
hotly debated topic. While the fact that many or most people share a particular intuition might, 
through inference to the best explanation, lead one to believe that such an intuition indicates 
something of the nature of whatever is being contemplated, this method has been shown 
repeatedly and consistently to fail.67 
 However, while it is the case that our intuitions about the nature of the external world 
may not reveal much, and are, on the whole, easily trumped by empirical evidence, it is different 
to trust intuitions about the world than to trust intuitions about our own minds or thoughts. If I 
want to know how gravity works or whether the world is flat I should look to the world (or use 
rational reflection based on observations and bring in more data where there is no way of 
deciding between alternatives) rather than reflect on my own thoughts. However, in the case of 
our own thoughts, concepts and word meanings, our internal reflections may well be the best 
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65 See Chalmers (2002). 
66 For a discussion of why theories that combine broad and narrow content cannot be thought of 
as internalist see Chapter 3: §5. 
67 Consider, for example, the popular intuitions/beliefs that there is magic; that the sun revolves 
around the earth; that a bleeding a person will cure their illnesses; and that atoms are indivisible, 





evidence we have for telling us what is going on.68 The special access we have to the nature of 
our own thoughts is significant in giving us a way of understanding and investigating them in 
cases where an empirical alternative may not be available. The value of the externalist intuitions 
that arise from contemplation of Twin Earth scenarios should not be dismissed merely due to a 
general distrust of using intuitions to support philosophical arguments.  
 Another recent line of attack on intuition-based arguments in philosophy questions 
whether we actually do have the intuitions that philosophers claim we have. The assumption that 
the intuitions that motivate and support any number of philosophical arguments are widely, if not 
universally, held only holds weight if it is actually true. However, studies in experimental 
philosophy have shown that we have a tendency to be quite bad at knowing what the intuitions of 
others are, and especially when they differ from us due to factors, such as culture or gender, that 
should be irrelevant to the theories being defended.69 Furthermore, while it has been criticised by 
some, experimental philosophy has shown us that our intuitions about theories of reference differ 
cross-culturally.70 This is significant for making predictions about the likely responses generated 
by Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario as it was originally set up to deal with the question of word 
reference.  
While we do not have empirical results that indicate how widely Twin Earth intuitions are 
actually held, we do have evidence that at least some people, namely contemporary internalists, 
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68 Burge (1979) defends the position that we should give weight to people’s descriptions of their 
own mental states, and that it would be ‘ad hoc’ and ‘trivial’ to reinterpret what someone says 
when they give a description of the contents of their own thoughts. Burge’s policy of taking 
someone “at his word” (1979:116) suggests that he believes that first-person insights should be 
taken seriously when assessing the mind of any particular individual. 
69 For example, Machery et al (2004) have shown that there are East-West differences in the 
degree to which people have descriptivist intuitions about the attribution of proper names.  
70 There has been a great deal of debate over the value of these sorts of findings in experimental 
philosophy, that I will not go into here. For an example of a criticism of the value of Machery et 





do not have the externalist intuitions that Putnam and Burge expect from their thought 
experiments. When faced with Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario, or Burge’s arthritis example, it is 
a simple empirical fact that not everyone has the intuition that broad content is needed to explain 
such scenarios. Given the evidence that externalist intuitions are not universally generated by 
Twin Earth scenarios, if they have any evidential weight it must be in virtue of their statistical 
prevalence.  
There are also many scenarios that do generate internalist intuitions: Descartes’ malicious 
demon, for example.71 If one of the evidential strengths of externalist intuitions is their statistical 
prevalence, then the proportion of people who have such intuitions should be calculated not only 
by looking at the number of people who have them in response to the proposed scenarios, but 
also the number of people who hold incompatible intuitions generated by rival scenarios. Indeed, 
if the Twin Earth scenario counts as evidence for externalism as it generates externalist 
intuitions, what is to stop other scenarios that generate internalist intuitions equally counting as 
evidence for internalism? 
 Even if we were to accept the prevalence of such intuitions, there is a question of what 
exactly it is that such intuitions are meant to reflect. Tim Crane (1982) argues that the intuitions 
that are being generated by Twin Earth scenarios are primarily linguistic intuitions that are 
mistaken for psychological intuitions due to the way such scenarios are set up. Crane argues that, 
if anything, such examples demonstrate that experts have more precise concepts than lay people 
and thus they should be those to whom we go when we want to know the meaning of a word. In 
Crane’s words: “This is just Putnam’s division of linguistic labour – but it gives us no reason to 
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71 It is true that Putnam (1981) criticises ‘brain in a vat’ type thought experiments by arguing that 
we could not be brains in a vat, however one might still believe that the fact that they generate 
particular intuitions about the mind gives us some insight at least into folk theories of the mind, 





think that my Twin and I do not share our concepts. Indeed it gives us a reason for thinking that 
we must share them.” (Crane, 1982: 291) 
 Burge argues that the fact that Alf has a true belief in one world, but a false belief in 
another, shows that he correctly applies his concept in one case and incorrectly applies it in the 
second. As the worlds are essentially the same, Burge concludes that what is making the 
difference between truth in one case and falsehood in the other must be down to Alf’s concepts 
which, therefore, must be different between the scenarios. However, the worlds of the two men 
have significant differences that are non-conceptual, specifically, how experts, and the linguistic 
community more broadly, use the word ‘arthritis’. An alternative explanation of the situation 
would be that Alf is wrong about what word to use to describe his ailment in one case, and right 
in another. The difference between the two worlds need be nothing more than the practice of 
using particular words. One reason why we might confuse it for also being a difference between 
the concepts of the people who exist in these worlds is due to the need to differentiate the 
language we would use to describe both cases.72 The intuitions we have are really about the 
appropriate application of language.  
One problem with Putnam’s thought experiment is that intuitions are guided by the set-up 
of the scenario, which relies on our possessing pre-existing concepts relating to water. We are 
asked to assess the concepts possessed by others, but by being guided to apply the concepts that 
we possess it is possible that we are conflating (or mixing up) our concepts with those of other 
people. If we were to contemplate scenarios where we do not have pre-existing concepts we are 
likely to employ, it is likely that our responses will begin to change. This not only suggests that 
something might have gone wrong in the design of Putnam’s original scenario, but, if similar 
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scenarios generate different intuitions, then the externalist intuitions generated by the original 
scenarios may well just be the product of the way the experiment was set up, rather than an 
insight into the nature of our minds and thoughts. Consider one such scenario, which I shall now 
describe, that doesn’t begin with existing conceptual intuitions written into it. This will illustrate 
the malleability (and uselessness) of the intuitions such scenarios generate.  
Imagine, following Putnam’s model, that Twin Earth is an exact replica of Earth, and we 
have two doppelgänger twins – Agnes and Twin-Agnes. This time the watery stuff on both 
planets has the same molecular structure. In both worlds there is a substance that is pink and 
spongy, for which Agnes and Twin-Agnes have had subjectively indistinguishable experiences. 
On both planets this substance is referred to using the word ‘splonge’.  
The first question that can be asked at this stage is whether Agnes and Twin-Agnes have 
the same ‘splonge’ concept? The natural intuition, surely, would be to say that they do. For the 
moment, you don’t have any real idea of what splonge is, so it would be strange to insist that you 
don’t know whether the doppelgängers share the same concept, given the fact that their 
experiences of splonge are indistinguishable. At the moment, your concept of splonge is very 
similar to theirs – given the description of splonge specified by the thought experiment, you 
would have no way of differentiating between the splonge on Earth and the splonge on Twin 
Earth. So, without any additional information, the intuition is in favour of identical internal states 
corresponding to identical concepts. 
Notice that you are assuming that these concepts are the same, but supposed I now reveal 
that they have a different microstructure. Your intuitions may flip. Imagine that the splonge that 
Agnes has experienced is made up of blarium, while the splonge that Twin-Agnes has 





are indistinguishable at the macro level – just like H2O and XYZ. The intuition might now be 
that Agnes and Twin-Agnes have different concepts when thinking about the stuff in their 
respective worlds that they refer to as ‘splonge’.73 If our externalist intuitions in such a case are 
weaker than they are in Putnam’s original scenario then we should question our intuitions in the 
original Twin Earth case. Our original intuitions may not have been a product of the truth of 
externalism, so much as a product of our applying intuitions drawn from concepts that we 
already possessed (namely our water concept) to others.  
Even if the splonge case now generates similarly strong externalist intuitions to the 
Oscar/Twin-Oscar case – if we accept that Agnes and Twin-Agnes have different ‘splonge’ 
concepts – we need only to add a little more information to our description of this fictional 
substance once again to increase the likelihood of an intuition change. 
You are given more information about splonge. Actually, like in the case of jade (or 
water, if you count heavy water), there are two types of splonge. That is to say, there are two 
molecular compounds, both of which are indistinguishable at the macro level, and both of which 
exist on both planets and are interchangeably referred to by the word ‘splonge’. The only 
difference between Agnes and Twin-Agnes is that the particular type of splonge with which they 
have interacted is different. What can we make from this new information? The likely intuition 
now is that it turned out that Agnes and Twin-Agnes did have the same splonge concept after all. 
But what does this intuition tell us? The case where I tell you that they have both experienced 
pink spongy stuff with different molecular structures, and the case where I tell you that I have 
(made up) a concept that encompasses both of these (made up) molecular structures, nothing has 
changed. The way you think about the example has changed because first you were given a new 
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concept, and then your new concept changed. But the situation itself has not changed – surely 
Agnes and Twin-Agnes didn’t go from having the same concepts to having different concepts, to 
then having the same concepts again just because the concepts changed in the person who was 
assessing their case. 
One might say that nothing is to stop the intuitions we have in cases like that of ‘splonge’ 
from counting when contemplating the nature of our concepts. It is possible to hold this position 
while arguing that it is the fact that we have intuitions on both sides that indicates that both sorts 
of scenarios should be acknowledged, and when combined they indicate that we have both broad 
and narrow content. However, what the ‘splonge’ case shows is that the intuition that broad 
content is needed to explain particular scenarios is not reliable or consistent. When two scenarios 
are presented that are identical except for the fact that we already possess the concepts employed 
in one of them, there is no indication that intuitions about narrow content change. In contrast, the 
fact that our intuitions about broad content change so easily suggests that they are not reliable. 
The possibility of alternative scenarios where the intuitions generated can be manipulated 
so easily is a cause for concern. Furthermore, if one is to reject ‘splonge’ scenarios as being 
invalid, it must be for a reason other than just that they do not produce the right intuitions. There 
may be ways of rejecting ‘splonge’-like cases, but for the moment it is enough to accept that it is 
at least possible that in the cases presented by Putnam and Burge, even if they were to 
consistently generate externalist intuitions, they may only be doing so because of the way that 
they are presented, while parallel scenarios might not generate the same intuitions. If this is the 
case then, if one is to maintain the position that externalist intuitions are better or more accurate 
than internalist intuitions, they must provide an argument for why this is the case. But the 





themselves provide a reason to be externalist. If the value of these intuitions only extends as far 
as the value of the argument for why they are correct, then it shouldn’t matter whether or not 
anyone actually has them. 
 
 
§2. Where do these intuitions come from? 
Externalism claims to be able to explain our intuitions in Twin Earth scenarios, but intuitions 
themselves are something internal, or at the very least, they have internal components. The 
external world might explain the presence of these intuitions, in so far as it is presented to us and 
processed internally, but externalism itself is causally inert with regards to internal stuff. 
Furthermore, to find out whether others possess externalist intuitions, we look to their behaviour, 
just as we believe that our behaviour is caused by the presence of our intuitions. As behaviour 
such as the reporting of our intuitions must be caused by something internal (see Chapter 2), the 
very reasons we have for believing we possess externalist intuitions rely on the fact that such 
intuitions are internally represented. For externalist intuitions to indicate the truth of externalism, 
their presence must be able to be explained by externalism. It cant be enough that we have the 
intuition that there is broad content and it turns out that there is broad content – a coincidentally 
correct belief cannot be taken as evidence for the truth of its content. Rather, there must be some 
way that the existence of broad content explains the existence of the intuition that there is broad 





to provide a causal explanation of how these externalist intuitions got into our heads in the first 
place, such intuitions must not be evidence for externalism after all.74 
 You can’t move from that fact that most people think P, to the truth of P. In the case of 
Twin Earth intuitions, it is the presence of the intuitions themselves that is claimed to be 
evidence for externalism, and therefore it is the presence of such intuitions that the externalist 
needs to explain. The content of these intuitions is not evidence for that content being correct. 
Even if it is the case that Oscar and Twin-Oscar have different concepts, this is not evidence for 
externalism – this is externalism, or at least it is one of the tenets of externalist theories.  
So why is it, according to the externalist, that so many people have these intuitions? Or, put 
another way, how does externalism explain the presence of these intuitions? The answer is that 
externalism can’t explain the presence of any intuitions. It is easy to assume that, because the 
intuitions are externalist in their content, one way (perhaps the best way) of explaining how they 
got there would be to conclude that externalism is true, and its truth is the reason why people 
believe it to be true. Consider what explains the presence of particular beliefs: my belief that 
there is such a thing as gravity can be explained by the fact that there is such a thing as gravity, 
but only via my having observed gravity at work or (depending on how sophisticated my belief 
is), via my taking a science class at school/university etc. The fact that there is gravity is not 
something I would believe if I had never observed it (say if I was brought up on the international 
space station, with no windows), or had never heard someone talk about or explain it.  
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74 There is possibly an analogy to be made here with dualism and physicalism about the mind. 
One of the strongest criticisms of dualism is that it can’t explain how non-physical stuff could 
have a causal effect on physical stuff. If the externalist tries to explain how non-internal stuff got 
represented internally in the mind, they may end up telling a story that is quite like the 
internalist’s story after all (or it may turn out that, as with the struggles externalists have to 





One possibility is that our externalist intuitions are either innate, or stem from something 
innate, such as an innate understanding of the mind.75 There are times when one can argue from 
the fact that we have certain innate ideas or intuitions to the truth of their content. For example, 
imagine God is the kind of being who would be able to, and want to, put an innate understanding 
or knowledge of his existence into our minds. Then the intuition that God exists could be 
evidence for the existence of God. Such a theory about God would predict that we would have 
theistic intuitions. This makes the fact that people possess such intuitions (if they do) stronger 
evidence for the existence of God. As this theory predicts that people are born with such 
intuitions, it also means it is possible to discover that the majority of people did not have theistic 
intuitions, which would therefore count as evidence against the existence of God, so conceived.  
However, even if the externalist were to claim that externalist intuitions are innate (which, 
for reasons specified in the previous section, is unlikely), the innateness of such intuitions could 
still not be explained by the truth of externalism. Externalism as a theory does not make any 
predictions about our innate thoughts, attitudes or intuitions, so the existence of innate intuitions 
does not support externalism just as their absence would not be evidence of externalism’s 
falsehood.  
If externalist or internalist intuitions were innate they would not be evidence for or against 
either theory as there is no way that either theory could explain or predict the presence of such 
intuitions. This is not to say that the presence of externalist intuitions could not be explained by 
either their innateness or derived from observations. Rather, neither of these explanations 
supports externalism. For the externalist to argue that externalism, or the truth of externalism, 
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75 There is some debate over whether an innate understanding of the mind is a guine possibility. 
Gelman (2004) defends this kind of psychological essentialism. Strevens (2000) criticises this 
approach, arguing that the best account of the developmental psychology results discussed in 





explains the presence of externalist intuitions, they must give a different account of how we 
came to have such intuitions.  
One way that the externalist may try to explain the presence of a general belief in the truth 
of externalism is by pointing to observations one can make that would support the externalist 
thesis.76 But there are no observations we could make that would be predicted by externalism, 
nor are there observations we could make that could be explained by externalism. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, externalism does not have causal powers, so one cannot make observable predictions 
about outcomes that would be different, if externalism were true, versus if internalism were true. 
In Chapter 3, I argued that even the basic behaviour that externalists often use as evidence for 
their theory, such as communication and cooperation, cannot be caused by relational properties 
or broad content, and so cannot be evidence for externalism. If there were observations we could 
make that would be predicted (or uniquely predicted) by externalism, we might also ask why the 
externalist wouldn’t just use these as evidence in favour of their position, rather than the beliefs 
or intuitions that these observations cause or support.  
As I have mentioned, there have been attacks on the usefulness of intuitions, but there is at 
least prima facie reason to think that cases concerning the mind might prove to be special, as 
knowing about our minds and thoughts may require the kind of introspection that uses intuitions. 
However, even if this is the case, it does not mean that the way to use our intuitions to find out 
about the mind is merely to listen to them. There is a long debate over whether externalism is 
inconsistent with self-knowledge, I will not be discussing it here77, but it is certainly the case 
that, if to know the contents of your thoughts requires empirical investigation or rational 
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observations may be responsible for intuitions where they are unconsciously, or subconsciously 
formed.  





calculations, then we cannot use the un-investigated thoughts themselves (in this instance our 
intuitions) as a guide to their contents.  
 Even if our externalist intuitions ended up reflecting the truth, we would have no way of 
telling, as the intuitions themselves are the evidence we have for the accuracy of such intuitions. 
We could have an intuition that there are ghosts, and have it turn out that there are, in fact, 
ghosts, but this fact would in no way be connected with such an intuition. Whether or not 
externalism is correct, as a theory it neither predicts nor explains the fact that we have externalist 
intuitions generated when contemplating Twin Earth-type scenarios. Therefore, such intuitions 
cannot count as evidence for externalism.  
 
  
§3. Internalist explanations of Twin Earth intuitions 
As I have stressed in previous chapters, where there is no externalist explanation possible for a 
state of affairs, whatever explanation there can be must be internalist, or at least compatible with 
internalism.78 In the case of explaining externalist intuitions, the fact that externalism could not 
explain or predict such intuitions does not mean that the truth of internalism as a theory could 
offer an explanation or predict phenomena such as specific intuitions. It only needs to be the case 
that there could be an internalist-compatible explanation of individual cases of the acquisition 
and manifestation of such intuitions, such as an explanation that only assumes the presence of 
narrow content. The externalist’s claim, after all, was that such intuitions were a reason for 
believing that the externalist was right, which means that they were required to show how the 
presence of such intuitions indicated that externalism itself was the correct theory of mind. It is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!






possible to give an internalist explanation of why it is that a certain person believes in fairies, 
without the belief in fairies itself giving any reason to either be or not be an internalist. 
 This said, where internalism is able to give an account of why it is people might hold 
externalist intuitions, assuming externalism is false, this would at least demonstrate how it is that 
an internalist explanation can be given for such phenomena. Internalists can take a very different 
approach than externalists to the kinds of scenarios that externalists have debated. The internalist 
does not need to give an explanation that is compatible with a particular theory of reference. 
Indeed, for the internalist, whether concepts refer or not is irrelevant to the ontology and 
structure of concepts, so the very question of reference should be ignored in internalist 
conceptual explanations. What is required of the internalist is to give an explanation that is 
essentially based in conceptions or narrow content. The best internalist explanation will be one 
that explains how those conceptions got into the mind in the first place, and how their presence 
can explain conceptually-associated behaviour. 
 In this section I will attempt to give such an explanation for the presence of Twin Earth 
externalist intuitions. In the following section I will show that many of the hypothetical scenarios 
focused on by externalists can have their mental dimensions simply and easily explained in terms 
that use only conceptions. Before beginning, I will clarify the terms I will use to express this 
position.  
First, I will assume a theory of concepts for this debate whereby concepts are structured 
clusters of conceptions. One of the great difficulties with internalism is that it is hard if not 
impossible to fully describe particular concepts without resorting to language that suggests that 
an externalist position is being taken. Concepts, for the internalist, are idiosyncratic, vague, and 





simply say I have the ‘table’ concept, the internalist, to be strictly accurate, is unable to use this 
terminology. I will be adopting the practice of saying that someone has ‘C-table’ in place of 
saying that they have a ‘table concept’. By this I mean that they have a concept (a structured 
cluster of conceptions) that is similar enough to the concepts of others who are likely to use the 
word ‘table’ in the way that I do, or who interact with the same kinds of objects as I interact with 
either when this concept was formed, or when it is activated. Concepts are messy for the 
internalist. The important thing is that I have a way of grouping together concepts on the basis of 
internalist-compatible, pragmatically appropriate considerations without it seeming as if I am 
conceding the externalist’s point.  
 Here is one such internalist explanation: Oscar and Twin Oscar’s thoughts are 
indistinguishable, but there is a way that I can distinguish between them because I represent their 
concepts differently from the way they represent them. When the Twin Earth scenario is 
described, I form a couple of new concepts that concepts that represent Oscar and Twin-Oscar’s 
concepts.79 When representing Oscar’s water concept I will develop a C-“Oscar’s water concept” 
which could include being related to watery stuff, being held by Oscar, and being caused by (or 
about) H2O.80 My C-“Twin-Oscar’s water concept”, on the other hand, could includes being 
related to watery stuff, being held by Twin-Oscar, being referred to as ‘twater’ and being caused 
by (or about) XYZ.81 Based on this, I form my intuition that Oscar and Twin-Oscar have 
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79 Just as I form new concepts in the ‘splonge’ case described above. 
80 As ‘C-’ placed before a word or phrase indicates the possession of a concept that might be best 
captured in general terms by using that word or phrase, it might be appropriate to say that I have 
C-“Oscar’s C-water”. What is important is that I have formed a new concept which represents or 
regards what I imagine Oscar’s water concept to be. 
81 Note that none of these things need to be true of the concepts of Oscar or Twin-Oscar, but 
rather they include things that I think of when representing the concepts of the two fictional men. 
So the fact that one of the features of my C-“Twin-Oscar’s water concept” is that it is referred to 





different concepts. What is significant in my representation of the situation is that I have 
different concepts associated with each of their concepts, so what is happening in that case is that 
I am applying my own concepts to other people. This does not mean I share my concepts with 
these other people.  
 The externalist might argue that this explanation begs the question – because it assumes 
that my C-“Oscar’s water concept” is different to Oscar’s C-water. In other words, it assumes 
that I do not share a water concept with Oscar. One of the central arguments of internalism is 
that, while the Oscars have the same concept, I do not have the same concept as either of them, 
so the argument above is deriving an internalist conclusion from premises that already assume 
the truth of internalism. However, the externalist’s argument that I share a water concept with 
Oscar begs the question in exactly the same way, since this is one of the things the externalist is 
trying to argue.82 
 Furthermore, if the internalist argues that one of the reasons you intuit that Oscar and his 
Twin have different concepts is because you represent their concepts differently (or rather, your 
concepts of their concepts are different) then this should predict that under similar circumstances 
(where you are presented with a hypothetical where you have to say whether or not you believe 
two people have the same concept) the more you represent the concept-possessors as different, 
the more likely you are to believe that they have different concepts. This is the case with the 
following scenario that actually generates anti-externalist intuitions: Oscar is a man who lived in 
1750 and worked as a poor labourer, and has seen the rain and very dirty water (which he drinks 
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philosophers who are discussing this case. The fact that I think of it as called a ‘twater concept’ 
rather than a ‘water concept’ is one of the features that distinguishes the way that I represent the 
concepts belonging to Oscar and the way I represent the concepts belonging to Twin-Oscar. 
82 In fact, while the externalist assumes that Oscar and Twin Oscar do not share concepts, they 
seem to be also committeed to the fact that I share a twater concept with Twin Oscar as well. We 





and has seen used in land irrigation). George II was King of Great Britain in 1750, and (say) was 
protected from ever observing or even hearing about the rain, but he did go the seaside, and had 
regular baths, unlike Oscar. Furthermore, the King had never drunk water, but only beer and 
wine. This meant that his H2O-directed interactions were never of the same sort as Oscar’s. 
When Oscar thought about the brown H2O in his cup and the King thought about the clear blue 
H2O of the sea, did both men mean the same thing by ‘water’, and were their ‘water’ concepts 
the same? If it is the case that, in response to this scenario, the most likely intuition is that the 
two men had different concepts, then this would suggest that one of the things one does doing 
when thinking about attributing concepts in such cases is developing concepts oneself in an 
effort to imagine the concepts of others, and then applying those concepts to others. Of course 
the internalist would argue that the water-related concepts of Oscar and George II are different, 
but it is not the fact that we intuit that they are different that is being used to argue for 
internalism. 83   
 One can account for why we have the intuitions we do by giving a causal account of how 
those intuitions got there that makes no externalist assumptions. One of the benefits of viewing 
intuitions in this way is that if the intuitions themselves are understood as being internal then we 
can explain how the intuitions themselves causally influence our behaviour (such as our 
tendency to verbally report our intuitions, or to treat the doppelgängers differently), and such 
power, as we have seen, cannot lie in any of their externalist elements. 
 
§4. Internalist explanations of externalist scenarios 
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Due to the long tradition of treating conclusions about word meanings and debates in the 
philosophy of language as a guide to concepts and the approach of the philosophy of mind, many 
scenarios that could raise purely linguistic challenges have been used to draw conclusions about 
the nature of the mental. The Twin Earth scenario provides a prime example as it was originally 
conceived to be a case that illustrated a point about meaning rather than mental content. As has 
been discussed throughout this thesis, one of the dominant theories of concepts has been that 
concepts have their content determined in virtue of their referential properties. As I have argued, 
if there were referential or (broadly speaking) intentional properties of concepts, they would not 
make for a stronger conceptual theory. However, there is another reason for favouring an 
internalist account of concepts, and this is that it completely avoids all the challenges that other 
theories of concepts face when it comes to puzzles over reference. The internalist can explain 
what is going on in Frege puzzles, for example, merely by describing the relevant conceptions of 
the people involved. If concepts don’t refer, or if they are not determined or defined by 
reference, then Frege puzzles are irrelevant to deciding between competing accounts of concepts. 
 In “A Puzzle About Belief”, Kripke (1979) introduces the case of Pierre, a Frenchman 
who, never having been to the UK, has a belief that might be described by Pierre himself as 
taking the form: “Londres est jolie.” When Pierre finally makes a trip to London, he dislikes it 
and forms the belief that he expresses: “London n’est pas jolie.” However, as Pierre does not 
realise that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are the same place, he also retains his first belief about 
Londres being pretty. As the two terms co-refer, there is a puzzle in how he could hold the two 
contradictory beliefs: namely that London both is and is not pretty.  
 For the internalist, however, the Pierre does not itself represent a puzzle about belief. For 





being called ‘Londres’ and one that has features including being ugly, and being called 
‘London’.84 The difficulty arises when working out what language would be best used to 
describe such concepts. Mostly it is the case that using very general language will suffice to do 
the work in conveying information about concepts even if it does not accurately capture the 
nature of concepts in any of their specific manifestations. Talking as if everyone shares a ‘table 
concept’ will often be useful, even if their concepts actually differ. However, cases like that of 
Pierre show us that this strategy does not always work. As the language that we use to describe 
Pierre’s concepts is general language, if his London/Londres concepts are to be represented by 
one word alone, it will be the same word. This does not fully capture what it is for Pierre to 
possess a particular concept (that is made evident in this example), but most of the time it does 
the work. Cases like this reveal that a more detailed account, an account that makes more of an 
effort to represent or describe ‘conceptions’, would actually be more accurate, even if not strictly 
necessary to get the gist across in most cases.85 It is an advantage of internalism that it is in no 
way challenged by such scenarios. 
 Taking the model of Frege cases, then, it becomes easy to see how the internalist can 
explain away any mental or conceptual dimension to such problems. There may still remain a 
question about the references of words or sentences, but there is no paradox in the thoughts of 
those described in such situations. To explain the challenge behind Frege puzzles simply: it is 
often the case that we learn identity relationships a posteriori. However, identity relationships 
are the kind of thing that should be knowable a priori. We can work out from a (and nothing 
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84 Note that these are in no way the only differences between Pierre’s concepts. His C-London is 
very likely to be far richer than his C-Londres seeing as he has actually been to London and so 
will presumably have a much large cluster of conceptions that form his C-London. 
85 It is not strictly true that all ravens are black, but enough are that my making such a statement 





else) that a = a. If it is also the case that b = a then the two terms, a and b should be 
interchangeable (they both have the same referent), but this would mean that, by a simple act of 
substitution, b = a means the same thing as a = a and this is the kind of thing we should be able 
to know using logic alone.  
 Consider Lois Lane, who knows both Clark Kent and Superman, but does not know that 
they are the same person. This appears to be more than just a problem of language. It might be 
the case that I know the word ‘red’, but I do not know the German word ‘rot’. My learning that  
‘red’ =  ‘rot’ is not the same as my learning that Clark Kent = Superman, for in the latter case I 
am learning more than just that there is another name that could be used to refer to Clark Kent 
and that this is ‘Superman’. An internalist account would point out that there is a lot more going 
on in this situation than Lois Lane’s just using two different words. These two concepts are 
completely separate in her mind. The simplest way to explain the scenario would be to examine 
what is meant by Clark Kent = Superman. If this is not an accurate expression of the relationship 
involved, then the Frege puzzle would not be a puzzle at all. In fact, for the internalist, questions 
over the identity of anything external to the mind are irrelevant to our understanding of concepts. 
Rather, if we want to know whether there is anything paradoxical going on in the mind of Lois 
Lane then we need to express the relationship in terms of whatever is in her head. On the 
internalist account for Lois, C-Clark Kent ≠ C-Superman. Therefore, her thoughts that represent 
Clark Kent in his different manifestations are not contradictory. 
This response may seem problematic at first, because it appears to preclude the 
possibility of Lois Lane (or anyone) ever being able to learn an identity relationship. We want to 





the relationship that is relevant isn’t even a real identity relationship? What exactly does Lois 
Lane learn? What happens is that Lane’s concepts change.  
There are cases of some relationships that are just incorrectly phrased in identity terms. 
Bertrand Russell (1905) points out in “On Denoting”, for example, that “Scott is the author of 
Waverly” should not be understood as saying that there is something x that is both denoted by 
Scott and “the author of Waverly”. This is because intuitively, what we mean by “x is the author 
of Waverly” is that “x wrote Waverly”, making “the author of Waverly” no longer substitutable 
for “Scott”, as they are not equivalent. The “author of Waverly” understood in this way does not 
express a proper identity. 86 
It is easy to explain what happens to one’s concepts when one learns something in the 
form of: “Scott is the author of Waverly”. A new feature is added to one’s C-Scott, namely 
something of the form “wrote Waverly”.87 This is also what happens when someone points to the 
person sitting by the bar and says, “that man there, drinking a martini, is Jones”. ‘Currently 
drinking a martini’ is something that will be added to your C-Jones. 
The Clark Kent/Superman case, however, does not seem to fall into this category. This is 
because Lois Lane already has two concepts, namely C-Clark Kent and C-Superman. If she 
didn’t – if she had always known the relationship between Clark Kent and Superman (as we did), 
or if she only knew Clark Kent, but not Superman, and was learning for the first time that Clark 
Kent had a secret double life dressing up in a red and blue costume, and that he had super powers 
etc. – then the case would be very different. Surely this, if nothing else, shows that it is the 
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86 Russell (1905). 
87 Or possibly something is added to one’s C-Waverly if they are familiar with Waverly, but not 
with Scott. In this case, “written by Scott” may become a new feature of the concept. It is, of 





cognitive change that is important in this case, and not just the linguistic change or the external 
identity relationship, and, therefore, that it is the cognitive change that needs to be explained. 
One way of explaining the change that happens is the following: Lois Lane’s C-Clark 
Kent and C-Superman start off by having some concept features in common (maleness, for 
example, height perhaps, hair colour etc.) and many features not shared (such as ‘needs glasses’ 
and ‘can fly’). There is not enough overlap between the two concepts to be indistinguishable to 
Lane. Furthermore, the two concepts have some features that are contradictory – ‘Clark Kent is 
boring’ doesn’t contradict ‘Superman is exciting’, for example, but they contain features that are 
inconsistent with one another. All these things can explain not only why the two concepts are 
separate, but why they would have to change quite a bit for Lois Lane to be able to ‘work out’ 
that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person: in other words, for her C-Clark Kent and her 
C-Superman to merge.88 Lane’s two concepts may have more and more in common, the more 
interaction she has with Clark Kent/Superman both in and out of costume. This does not 
necessarily mean that she will easily make the connection, or that she will not be surprised when 
such a connection is made for her. 
One day, Clark Kent reveals his secret identity to Lois Lane, and she has a sudden 
realisation. Enough new information has been added to each concept (at a pace too fast for 
gradual change) that the integrity of both is threatened, and the two will merge into one.89 Some 
of the features of each concept will probably be lost when they combine, while others may be 
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88 The idea of ‘learning’ and ‘working out’ an identity relationship, at least understood 
traditionally, may be a problem for this theory. However, it could be explained more in terms of 
a realisation that the thing in the external world responsible (perhaps causally) for Lois Lane’s 
different concepts is one person, not two. 
89 Which, as I am assuming for this discussion that concepts are structured clusters of 





added as a narrative is told (either by Clark or Lane herself) which helps firmly to root the 
features of the new concept. 
Such an explanation of what happens in these cases explains how the different concepts 
were acquired, how conceptual change can map change in behaviour, and it also shows why it is 
that one feels like they have had a realisation, or learned something new, when they learn a new 
identity relationship. As I will be discussing in the next chapter, conceptual change is central to 
an internalist explanation of how concepts can track the world even though we cannot be wrong 
about our own concepts. 
What is significant here is that, not only can conceptual (mental) explanations be given 
for the what is going in traditional puzzles about reference, but the very existence of such 
puzzles suggests that any theory of concepts that draws on reference to inform its account of 
conceptual identity will face a whole raft of additional challenges that a purely internal account 




Things are not looking good for externalism. There is nothing that could count as evidence for 
the truth of the externalist theory of mind. Externalism does not entail anything observable that 
would not also be entailed by internalism. As we have seen in this chapter, even the presence of 
externalist intuitions, the commonness and consistency of which is questionable, is unable to 
count as evidence for externalism itself.  
 But the fact that there is no evidence for externalism is not its main problem, nor the fact 





by these failings. While internalism has the tools to offer explanations of behaviour and the 
presence of intuitions, externalism appears unable to explain anything. If externalism about 
concepts was supposed to tell us something about how our thoughts are related to one another, 
about how our thoughts relate to our behaviour, or about our interactions with others, then it fails 
these roles.  
 There is one area in which externalism might still be useful – it might offer explanations 
where internalism cannot. Internalism, particularly the kind of idiosyncratic concept internalism 
that I have argued all internalists should adopt, is unable to explain how we could be wrong 
about our own concepts, either in representing them, or in applying them. If the basic building 
blocks of thought can’t be wrong, then this raises some serious problems about our ability to 
have true thoughts, problems that seem to entail scepticism or even solipsism. Is this a reason 
above all others to continue to be an externalist, or to believe the truth of externalism? In the next 
chapter I will argue that it is not, and that internalism, in contrast, can get around the problems 
associated with the fact that we are unable to be wrong about our own concepts. 
 As for intuitions, there might still remain the intuition that there is more to the story than 
internalism tells us about all of these things, but as we have seen here, there is no reason to trust 







Chapter 5: Truth, Error and Predictions 
 
In “Individualism and the Mental”, as we have seen, Burge presents the example of a man, Alf, 
who has many true beliefs about arthritis. However, Alf also has one false belief about arthritis: 
he believes he has arthritis in his thigh. Upon visiting a doctor, Alf is told that it is impossible to 
have arthritis of the thigh, so he revises his beliefs about arthritis. The intuition is that Alf did 
have the arthritis concept, and that Alf’s arthritis concept was wrong.  
 Burge (1979) believes this intuition to be so fundamental that it is written into the 
language we use to discuss concepts: “The patient does not say (or think) that he had thought he 
had some-category-of-disease-like-arthritis-and-including- arthritis-but-also-capable-of-
occurring-outside-of-joints in the thigh instead of the error commonly attributed. This sort of 
response would be disingenuous. Whatever other beliefs he had, the subject thought that he had 
arthritis in the thigh.”90 
 The belief that we can be wrong about our concepts, whether this means we misrepresent 
them (or some of their features) or we misapply them to the world, is a significant feature of 
externalist arguments. This is not just a case, like that discussed in Chapter 4, of mere appeal to 
intuitions. Rather, it is argued, an ability to get concepts ‘wrong’ in one way or another is what is 
needed to explain why it is that, when corrected, we accept that we were wrong, and modify our 
beliefs accordingly (Burge, 1979). If no one can be wrong about their concepts, then how can 
concepts track the world? If concepts are idiosyncratic mental representations that are merely 
caused by interactions with the world, but are not themselves about the world and do not refer to 
the world, then how can they function as units in thoughts that have truth values? And what 
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about the fact that we believe we can discover new things about our concepts (particularly our 
natural kind concepts), which would also be precluded by the internalist model? If a theory of 
concepts entails that we can make no meaningful statements about conceptual veracity and can 
learn nothing new about our own concepts, this would be a worrying consequence. 
 Externalism’s weakness so far has been its lack of explanatory power, which has meant 
there is nothing that could count as evidence for the externalist theory. However, the truth 
relationship is about more than just explaining the behaviour of individuals, and the accuracy of 
thoughts cannot be explained by intrinsic properties of the mind contemplating them. Truth is a 
relational property, and as relational properties are the exact properties of mental states that the 
internalist denies contribute to content or concepts, the internalist appears to be in a position of 
being unable to explain or account for one of the fundamental functions of thought. As put by 
Farkas (2008: 157): “[I]t is often claimed that internalism faces a decisive objection: for 
internally individuated states are not suitable for laying a claim of truth upon the world.” 
 Contrary to the way it may appear, however, none of this is a problem for the internalist. 
In this chapter I will show how the internalist does not need to rely on the idea of conceptual 
truth to explain how concepts can track objects and environments of the external world. Rather, 
our concepts allow us to make constant predictions about the world that are either reinforced or 
undermined by our new experiences. New observations often lead to our revising or changing 
our concepts, usually so they better track the world and provide us with more reliable future 
predictions.  
 Using this model, the internalist can explain how discussions about concepts do not need 
to bring in the idea of truth or correctness to be able to show how we could experience something 





thoughts being true or correct is that they facilitate our interactions with the world, allowing us to 
make predictions and judgements while learning from mistakes, then this can be explained by 
understanding one of the roles of concepts as serving as predictive tools which are constantly 
revised in the face of new information. This account of concepts can also explain why it is that 
we believe (and report) that we were wrong about our concepts when corrected. The internalist 
theory can do everything that the externalist theory can do in this respect, and in some instances 
it can do more. 
 We need to begin with two main principles: i) We can have an account of concept error 
that does not presuppose that we can be wrong about our own concepts; and ii) Ruling out the 
possibility of our being wrong about our concepts does not rule out the possibility of conceptual 
change. 
 It is worth noting first, that what it means to be wrong about one’s own concepts is 
complicated. It is not just the case that to be wrong about a concept is to misapply that concept. 
For the externalist, it is not the case because it is possible for one to misapply one’s concept for 
non-conceptual reasons. If I were tricked into believing that a cleverly disguised mule is a zebra, 
the misapplication of my zebra concept to such a mule would not indicate any error in the 
concept itself. Comparatively, if we consider Burge’s arthritis case, the argument is that Alf’s 
‘misapplication’ of his arthritis concept is due to some problem with his concept, regardless of 
whether it is the way he represents it, or the way he uses it.91  
Furthermore, what it means to ‘apply’ a concept is somewhat fraught. If Alf died before 
he could tell anyone he had arthritis in his thigh, or if he had believed that arthritis was an 
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91 If Alf held the appropriate beliefs about arthritis, but believed that there was a joint in his 
thigh, he may apply his arthritis concept with the same consequences, but it would not indicate 
that he was getting something wrong about arthritis so much as that he was getting something 





ailment of the limbs, but had never formed the belief that it had afflicted him anywhere other 
than in the joints, would he have applied his arthritis concept? We can imagine that Alf has the 
false belief about rabies that it can only afflict dogs, but he sees a person with rabies who 
happens to be wearing a dog costume, and, believing he or she is a dog, forms the belief that that 
person has rabies. If Alf were to find out that what he was viewing was a human and not a dog, 
he would ‘correct’ himself, retracting his statement that they had rabies. However, on one 
reading Alf correctly applied the rabies concept, as the person he was looking at did have rabies, 
according to the standard definition of the disease. If the only criteria for conceptual error were 
reduced to misapplication of concepts, then this wouldn’t capture the fact that there appears to be 
conceptual error even in cases where, for purely accidental reasons, the application of a concept 
is in line with the ‘correct’ application of that concept. ‘Misapplication’ of concepts can be an 
indication of conceptual error, or the result of conceptual error. But the error itself happens 
before the concept is applied at all.  
For this reason, I will talk in terms of people being wrong about their concepts. This will 
cover cases like the arthritis case where Alf is said by externalists to be incorrect in the way that 
he represented the arthritis concept, and that this was manifested in his incorrectly attributing 
features to the disease that it does not possess. This is what I mean when I refer to people being 
wrong about their own concepts, and what I mean when I talk of concepts being correct or 
incorrect, which can be understood as covering the view that concepts can be incorrectly 
represented, and that concepts can incorrectly represent or capture aspects of the external world. 
  





Concepts give us information about the world and they help us navigate the world. The main 
way concepts do this is by allowing us to make predictions. Some predictions we make using 
concepts will be about the things we will directly come into contact with, while others will be 
about things we believe will be caused by something about which we have a concept. I might 
have never seen a tiger, but my C-tiger helps me to make predictions about what other people are 
likely to say when they are talking about tigers, for example. There will be cases where these 
predictions do not come true, in which case we may be prompted to revise our concepts. The 
predictions we make on the basis of our concepts can be in error without our needing to make a 
ruling on whether or not those concepts were correct or incorrect. It is this feature of concepts 
that allows the internalist to avoid the need to explain how we could be wrong about our 
concepts. 
 To see how such an explanation can be applied to cases where it appears that someone is 
wrong about their concepts, consider again the arthritis case presented by Burge (1979). The 
internalist can provide an explanation of what is going on in this case that has explanatory and 
predictive power, and does not need to employ the idea of concepts being correct or incorrect. 
Alf has arthritis in his wrists and ankles and now he has a pain in his thigh that he is worried is 
the same disease. On the basis of this belief, he will also have beliefs about the future – he may 
imagine being prescribed with the same medicine, or having more of the symptoms he had in his 
ankle joints (like the duration of the pain; the ailment getting worse when the weather is damp 
etc.). Now, presumably these predictions will turn out to be incorrect – the world will not match 
up with his expectations. When they do, Alf, if sensible, will revise his C-arthritis so this doesn’t 
happen again. After revising his C-arthritis – which now includes the feature that arthritis only 





thigh, or prescribe the same medicine for his thigh problem as he was prescribed for his ankle 
problems. Before Alf revises his concept, his original C-arthritis is likely to lead him to getting 
some things wrong – but it needn’t be the concept itself that is wrong, so much as the predictions 
that have been generated when contemplating the concept that are wrong. This is why Alf’s 
doppelgänger makes the exact same predictions, on the basis of the exact same concept. The 
difference is that Twin-Alf’s predictions are not going to get anything wrong, because, due to the 
environment that he is in, his predictions will likely turn out more or less accurate.   
This way of describing things gives a much better insight into Alf’s mental states than 
just saying that he was mistaken about what arthritis was. The longer and more complex a 
description, the better we can come to understand what was going on in Alf’s mind. We can 
understand why it is that Alf holds the concept that he does, and what that concept might lead 
him to expect about the world. Merely knowing that he has the arthritis concept, but he gets parts 
of it wrong, is not going to tell us much.   
 As I have repeatedly stressed throughout this thesis, it is not the case that the internalist 
denies that there is a connection between the external world and our internal concepts. To the 
contrary, it is through contact with the world that we gain the material that shapes our concepts. 
Furthermore, it is very unlikely that developing concepts is just a random process – it is 
facilitated by innate, internal organisational capacities, which presumably work on something 
like the principle that relevantly similar information should be organised together. ‘Relevantly 
similar’ here need not in any way denote quality of information (so it is not the case, for 
example, that all loud sounds are features of one concept cluster, and all sweet tastes are features 
of another), but rather information that comes together and that repeats. This means that we can 





use of reference, for example. Such an account will predict that there will be errors as well as 
success in the world-tracking of concepts. 
 The fact that, for the internalist, we are unable to make discoveries about our own 
concepts, does not mean that we are not able to make discoveries about the world and modify our 
concepts accordingly. The fact that we believe these to be discoveries about our concepts, or 
believe that new information reveals that we were wrong about our concepts is a function of the 
fact that an error has been made at some level (but a predictive, rather than conceptual error), and 
the fact that new information often leads us to review or change our concepts. Those earlier 
models of our concepts that did not serve us well in terms of their predictive power are regarded 
as being incorrect in virtue of possessing this flaw. 
 
§2. How to explain self-reporting of error 
Burge (1979: 94) is right to say that “[t]he patient does not say (or think) that he had thought he 
had some-category-of-disease-like-arthritis-and-including- arthritis-but-also-capable-of-
occurring-outside-of-joints in the thigh…” It would indeed be odd for the patient in his example 
to use such complicated language to describe his mental states. Such language would be 
generally unhelpful and unnecessary,92 and the far briefer and more general description is all we 
need. This does not mean, however, that we should take Alf’s word that his concept was wrong 
rather than just different. 
According to the internalist, as argued above, our concepts are constantly changing as we 
interact with the world, amassing more and new information. From the point of view of having a 
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new concept we are going to look back on our old concepts and think that they were wrong. Why 
is this? Because the reason we change or reject certain concepts is that they made predictions that 
turned out not to be accurate, so compared to the new versions of these concepts that we now 
hold, when looking back the old versions appear flawed (which, just like the new versions, they 
are) and wrong. This does not, however, entail that these concepts were incorrect.  
We will tend to believe in the superiority or correctness of whatever concept (or version 
of a concept) we currently hold. I might believe that penguins cannot fly, which means that I 
predict I will not see a flying penguin. But, upon seeing a video of a flying penguin on the 
internet (unknown to me, the video has been digitally manipulated) it turns out that my 
prediction was inaccurate. I revise my previous concept to add the feature of flying. Conceptual 
change happened because I was presented with new information, but such conceptual change, 
and the feeling that I had been in error, do not show that my previous penguin concept was 
wrong.  
When our concepts are different from the concepts of others, or make different 
predictions, we may feel our concepts are likely to be better predictors of future experiences, 
which is why, in many cases where our concepts differ, we believe that other people’s concepts 
are wrong. But we can explain this without having to refer to truth. Furthermore, we then do not 
need to explain why in some cases of concept revision we feel that our concept was false, and in 
others we just feel like it was missing something or was incomplete. 
This is not to say that this is the only way of explaining what is going on, but it is one 
way that is open to the internalist. One of the strengths of internalism is that it can account for 
conceptual change in individuals in a way that externalism struggles with due to its insistence on 





thigh, the externalist must say something along the lines that Alf revises his beliefs, but his 
concept remains the same. Another interpretation is that Alf’s concept has just changed in virtue 
of the fact that he has received this new information.  
As discussed briefly in Chapter 4, it can be the case that Alf is getting something wrong, 
even if it is not his concept. Crane (1982) argues that in these situations someone can be, and 
usually is, wrong about the meaning of a particular word. This failure to use a word properly 
comes from the fact that the person has been associating a different concept with it than that of 
experts and/or their wider linguistic community. Indeed, argues Crane (1982: 291), the very role 
of experts is to correct people about their word usage because it is experts who have the more 
precise concepts: “Such a person, someone ‘in the know’, has the more precise concept, and is 
thus in a position to correct the uses of the word “aluminium” of those speakers who do not 
distinguish sufficiently between aluminium and molybdenum.”  
This is an important point. Just because you cannot be wrong about your concepts does 
not mean that you cannot be wrong about the meanings of words as, in most contexts, word 
meaning is going to be determined by a social group. However, getting word meaning wrong is 
just one thing you might get wrong because of your concepts. This does not mean that your 
concept is wrong, but rather that it is not providing you with the tools to function optimally in 
your environment, whether that function includes being able to linguistically communicate with 
others such that you can be understood, or making predictions about the members of a category 
you have come into contact with etc. 
One might argue that our concepts and concept-dependent behaviours rely on our ability 
to track particular objects. One of the tools we might use to track objects is our vision, and 





lot of the conceptual work for us, and then refer to them to give our concepts their content, and 
therefore it appears as if whether our concepts are correct is not just about how they correspond 
to our world, but also how they correspond to the world of experts. 
Consider the case of Flora, who decides that she wants to get someone else to settle 
certain disputes she has about concepts: Flora can’t tell the difference between gold and fool’s 
gold, so when she goes to a jewellery shop looking for a gold ring, she decides to ask the 
jeweller to tell her which of the rings are truly gold and which are fool’s gold. The jeweller tells 
her that one particular ring is gold, and she decides to buy it. In this case Flora’s behaviour is 
clearly affected by her choice to use somebody else as an instrument in identifying where to 
apply her C-gold, and she is taking that person to be an authority on gold. Flora’s concept, as 
defined internally, would surely predict that all the gold-looking rings were gold, as she does not 
know the atomic number of gold, and knows no way of distinguishing real from fake gold. The 
fact that she is able to pick out gold objects despite her limited knowledge of how to identify 
gold, by using an expert, surely shows that internalism is getting something wrong. 
In fact, this picture of the kinds of predictions to which concepts can contribute is far too 
limited. Flora wants a gold ring - to put it crudely she wants more than just a ring that is metal 
and yellow. She wants a ring that has a particular value and that other people refer to as ‘gold’. 
How does she determine whether or not to apply her ‘gold’ concept to any individual object? She 
may begin by looking at a particular ring, and trying to work out on the basis of its appearance 
whether it is yellow and whether it looks like it is made out of metal. But just looking at it won’t 
determine whether it is valuable – value is not a visual property. To decide its value she has 
different interactions with the external world: she asks the person selling the ring whether it is 





ring under reddish light that made it look yellow. It could be that the jeweller lies to her about the 
value of the ring, etc. However all of these things, including the judgements of experts, are still 
the very kinds of things that she will make predictions about based on what her C-gold is, and in 
turn these will determine her subsequent behaviour. 
The fact that it is called ‘gold’ by experts is part of her C-gold concept. This means that, 
if she has a ring that she believes to be gold, she will predict that experts will also call it gold. 
Similarly, she will predict that if there is something that experts refer to as ‘gold’ it will have the 
appearance that she believes gold things have. None of this means that the decisions of experts 
determine her gold concept, although those decisions of experts of which she is aware might 
determine how she applies her concept, and whether or not the predictions made on the basis of 
her C-gold are going to turn out to be correct. To believe that a particular ring is gold, for Flora, 
is to believe that it is yellow in colour, shiny, and going to be referred to as ‘gold’ by people she 
takes to be experts. If the experts do not behave in the way she expected, the predictions she 
made will turn out to be false. The fact that part of her concept is that it includes the application 
of words by experts just shows that it is different from that of the experts, who presumably 
believe that what they say is irrelevant to something being gold. 
   
 
§3. Externalist theories are not very good at explaining conceptual error 
Chapter 1 discussed several different kinds of mental content externalism, and noted that the 
kind of externalist theory one adopted would have an effect on a range of things, such as what 
one believed counted as cases of conceptual error. The externalist theory of concepts that has 





or defined by an individual’s social or linguistic community. This might also include a 
specification that for many concepts it is particular members of any community, experts on the 
referent of the concept, who take primary responsibility for defining the concepts about which 
they are experts. Cases such as those presented by Burge (1979) and Putnam (1975) make it clear 
what it is to be wrong about or misapply a concept on such a theory, but actually it is more 
complicated than it appears. 
 The first problem is that, with concepts being socially determined, while they might not be 
idiosyncratic to any specific individual who possesses them, they are in a way idiosyncratic to 
any community which develops or employs them. This suggests that a concept could be 
anything, and could refer to anything. Just as we could have had a concept that refers equally to 
ailments of the joints and of the thigh, we could have a concept that combines H2O and XYZ. 
While socially-determined concepts may give us rules about misapplying concepts, they do not 
strictly give us a framework for discovering new things about our concepts, or deciding which 
concept a society actually has. Unless one builds in an additional theory of indexically fixing the 
referents of socially-determined concepts, for example, then the question isn’t settled whether or 
not the communities of Earth and Twin Earth in 1750 had ‘water’ concepts that could actually 
refer to the watery substance on both planets. 
 The criticism of internalism centres around the idea that if a concept is merely whatever an 
individual takes it to be, then an individual can never be wrong about their concepts. If one 
instead adopts the line that a concept is merely whatever a society takes it to be, then can a 





particular way, could they not be in error? Or, even more interestingly, does this mean that 
experts couldn’t be wrong about the concepts they define or use as experts?93  
 As has been pointed out above many times, internalism does not rule out the fact that you 
could be wrong about word meaning (in fact whether you are right or wrong about word meaning 
is irrelevant to the internalist). If the meaning of a word is fixed by the way it is used by a 
community then if you use a word not in the way your community uses it, you can said to be 
using the word incorrectly, at least relative to that community. Being wrong about the way you 
use a word can be as simple as using it in a way that precludes other members of your linguistic 
community from understanding what you mean. None of this is incompatible with internalism. 
 On the purely social externalist account that does not anchor concepts in a theory of 
indexical reference or in some rules about natural kinds etc., determining the concepts of a 
community is nothing more than determining the linguistic meaning or reference of terms used 
by that community. In other words, such an account seems to suggest that being wrong about a 
concept amounts to nothing more than being wrong about how to use a word within your 
social/linguistic community. However, you can be wrong about word meaning without being 
wrong about a particular object, set, state of the world etc. What is the value of identifying this 
kind of error for a theory of concepts? It means that any understanding of concepts will add 
nothing to any existing account of linguistic meaning, since the two are synonymous.94 
Furthermore, the reason we think concepts can be correct, or represent a truth about the world, is 
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93 There is an interesting question as to whether we should in fact be internalists about the 
concepts of experts. As those who decide what concepts a society has in their field of expertise, 
the society’s concept simply is their concept, which means that they cannot be wrong about their 
own concepts. 
94 Even those where speaker’s intentions determine speaker’s meaning, as such an approach 
determines ‘literal’ or ‘social’ meaning first and then looks back from that to say what the 





more significant and wide-ranging than just a question of whether we are using our words 
correctly. 
 If, to get around these kinds of problems raised by social externalism, one takes Putnam’s 
approach by anchoring socially-determined concepts indexically, there are still more problems. 
Putnam argues that the meaning of a natural kind term is dependent on its referent, and its 
referent is dependent on context. Water is H2O because the stuff that happened to play the 
‘watery stuff’ role on earth was H2O, fixing the referent (and therefore the meaning) of the term 
‘water’ indexically. Similarly it happened to be the case that XYZ was what plays the ‘watery 
stuff’ role on Twin Earth, so XYZ is the referent of the term ‘water’ on Twin Earth, which means 
that the term ‘water’ means XYZ when Twin Oscar says it. The parameters of what is being 
referred to can still be fixed socially, or by experts, but by having the reference of a concept, and 
therefore the concept itself, tied to a particular property or set in virtue of the context of the 
concept-holders means that we can discover new things about our concepts by investigating the 
world we are in. It also means that even experts can have an incomplete or partially incorrect 
understanding of their concepts. 
  The virtue of the ‘indexical’ account of concepts is that it explains many cases where we 
believe a whole society was in error. This can be particularly illustrated with cases of scientific 
changes and revisions like our understanding of electrons (this example was used by Putnam 
(1975: 132)), or the widespread belief that a whale was a kind of fish.95 Remember that social 
externalists like Burge, could not simply say that people had an incomplete concept of ‘fish’, 
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biologist’s denial that whales are fish shows his ‘concept of fishhood’ to be different from that of 
the layman; he simply corrects the layman, discovering that ‘whales are mammals, not fish’ is a 
necessary truth.” See Sainsbury (2014) for a convincing argument in favour of the fact that, at 
least in the early 19th century, people had a concept that included both whales and fish, which 





because if an entire linguistic community can have an incomplete concept, conceptual content is 
not determined socially. 
 While one of the virtues of the social externalist position is that it can potentially extend to 
all concepts, Putnam only uses his ‘indexical’ account for fixing the referents of concepts when 
discussing natural-kind concepts. If extended further, we would face many of the problems with 
theories that state that concepts are determined by reference: does this mean that we could not 
have concepts about things that don’t exist (or that they are all the same concept)? Does this 
mean that we could not have two concepts associated with one referent? For non-natural kinds it 
is also unclear what it would mean, for example, to be a ‘sofa’ in this context, except where it is 
defined socially.96 
 The group of concepts that refer to natural categories, while potentially being a good 
candidate for having a non-arbitrary way of determining conceptual truth or accuracy, ends up 
being a very small category, and also a rather problematic one. Its smallness alone should make 
us worried if this is the only thing that can track the truth of our concepts, because it would mean 
we cannot be wrong about the vast majority of our concepts. And yet we seem to be able to be 
wrong about them, and we believe, when corrected, that we were wrong. The internalist can 
explain this, while it turns out that the externalist does not seem to be able to. 
 Concepts referring to biological kinds are some of the most basic kinds of concepts. It is 
assumed, for example, that the concept ‘dog’ applies to something that is determined 
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96 Nick Miller, personal communication, has provided me with the following example: “This 
reminds me of the story of my Australian colleague at Sochi Winter Olympics, who arrived at his 
hotel in Sochi, Russia, to find there was no bed in his room. He went to reception to complain 
and they said: “Oh no, you have a sofa bed!”. Oh I see, he thought, and went back up and tried to 
work out how the sofa unfolded into a bed. He couldn’t, so he went back down to reception 
again, where they explained it didn’t fold out, they had just meant it was a sofa that he could 
sleep on - a sofa bed. It is unclear whose concept was wrong here. Or indeed what kind of expert 





biologically: it is not our belief that makes a dog a dog, but some fundamental feature of its 
nature that is entirely external to us. We can, therefore, be correct or incorrect about our ‘dog’ 
concept, what features should be part of it, and how it should be applied. This claim, however, 
can be easily refuted on the grounds that biological kinds are nothing like as rigid or independent 
as we may like to think they are. There are strong Darwinian grounds for arguing that natural 
kind categories are actually somewhat vague.97 This claim was actually made as early as the 18th 
century, well before Darwin, with the Comte de Buffon (1749-67) pointing out that the concept 
of rigid biological kinds fell apart as soon as you began to consider the cases that did not easily 
fall into existing biological categories – monstrosities being the most obvious example. Phillip 
Kitcher (2003) also notes that the strong externalist positions of Kripke and Putnam never make 
reference to biological kinds, and stick instead to the easier cases of elements and compounds 
presumably for this reason.98 
 With the exclusion of biological kinds from the kinds of concepts of which we can 
provide an account of truth or accuracy that is rigid and non-arbitrary, all we are left with is 
elements and compounds. But even with these, there are problems. If an ‘element’ concept itself 
had its content determined merely by the chemical compound to which it refers, then it would 
turn out that our ‘ice’ and ‘water’ concepts are the same. Furthermore, even with the natural 
categories that we are inclined to accept as being fixed we do not tend to treat them in a non-
vague way when we actually use them.99 
 Making an argument for externalism that has only element concepts at its disposal seems 
really rather weak. If one were able to show that a strictly internalist account of concepts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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98 Kitcher, (2003), “No genetic or karyotypic property will play for species the role that atomic 
number does for the elements.” 





couldn’t account for concepts relating to any natural kinds, then this might cause some real 
problems for the theory, but such an argument really needs to include biological kinds to be at all 
convincing. When biological kinds are removed and all we are left with are elements and 
compounds, the objection from externalism seems suddenly to lose a great deal of what made it 
appealing in the first place. If we can’t explain our tiger and dog concepts in these externalist 
terms, then who cares if we can explain water and gold in such terms? Or, put another way, if we 
have accepted that you can’t be wrong about almost all your concepts, once you have accepted 
that there must be something else explaining the appearance of being correct or incorrect in the 
case of ‘dog’, ‘brisket’, ‘sofa’ etc., how far a stretch is it to accept that whatever explains the 
usefulness of those concepts could do the same thing in the case of concepts relating to elements, 
rather than needing a separate rule specifically for these cases? 
 
§4. ‘Appropriate’ vs accurate concepts 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it can be useful to group concepts together such that we talk generally 
as if a group of people have certain concepts in common, even if this is not technically the case. 
We can group things together in any way we like, but, depending on our purposes, it might be 
more useful to apply certain taxonomies rather than others. This might mean, in the case of 
concepts, that we use an externalist model to group certain concepts together on the basis of any 
number of their intrinsic or relational properties. Yet these taxonomies need not reveal something 
about the underlying mechanism, the structure, the ontology of the thing we are discussing, but 
rather about our purposes in using them. The fact that you can place something in many different 






While the internalist cannot have a theory that sees some concepts as more correct than 
others, for the purposes of functioning in a particular environment, an account can be developed 
of which concepts might be more ‘appropriate’ than others in a particular context. One way that 
we might develop a theory of which concepts or kinds of concepts would be appropriate to hold 
is by looking at the function of concepts. There is an evolutionary story to be told about why we 
have concepts, why we have the kinds of concepts we do, why we have the extremely 
complicated and yet easily manipulable concepts that appear to be unique to humans. If concepts 
are (or began as) ways of classifying the world into groups so that we could make predictions 
about new things we may encounter that resemble the ones about which we already know 
something, then one of the values of concepts, or one of their functions, is truth tracking. 
However, if concepts perform a predictive function well enough, it is not necessary that we bring 
in the idea of truth to explain their functional success, especially where the idea of ‘truth’ relates 
to something that might not provide the most useful predictions, such as whether or not it is 
correct to classify two substances under the same concept if they have different microstructural 
properties.  
 Believing that we can be wrong about the world, or that there are important features of 
the world that we may fail to represent or misrepresent will provide evolutionary advantage to a 
degree. Representations may be fallible, but the only way to understand what it means for a 
representation to fail is by looking at its function. McGinn (1982: 212; original italics) argues: 
“representations can perform their function even when they incompletely or improperly represent 
the object or state of affairs in question.” If they perform their function appropriately, then what 
is the basis on which to say that they have failed? In what way is Oscar’s water representation 





 If considered in the context of thinking about the evolutionary function of concepts, 
‘correct’ concepts may be better at providing us with good predictions, but, even if this is the 
case, their value is purely in their predictive power; there is no innate value in truth when it 
comes to survival. This is especially true of the kinds of things that externalists now argue our 
concepts are tied to: microstructural properties, DNA and evolutionary history. Whether we were 
right or wrong about these things wouldn’t make much difference to our likelihood of survival. It 
is true that tracking categories of objects on the basis of non-superficial or hidden similarities 
may increase survival, but only if we are aware of such properties such that we can make 
predictions about them.  
 These days, however, including such features as part of our concepts might be important 
for our concept being ‘appropriate’ for social reasons rather than brute evolutionary survival 
circumstances. If I wish to function as a member in a particular socio-linguistic community, it 
will be very useful if my concepts function in similar ways (and are themselves similar to) the 
concepts of other members of that community. Just as I can be wrong about the meanings of 
words, I might find that my concepts are ‘inappropriate’ for my context, meaning that I find it 
difficult to understand others, or accurately represent the minds of others, such that I can make 
vital predictions about their behaviour that will help me have smooth interactions with them.  
On this account, you could say that Alf did not have an appropriate ‘arthritis’ concept, 
meaning that his concept was not similar enough to the concepts of the other members of his 
community that it would not cause him problems in trying to communicate with them or predict 
their behaviour. Such an account does not have to admit that Alf was wrong, nor does it assume 








If the internalist can explain how concepts can allow us to make predictions about future 
interactions with the world, and if they can explain how concepts can be revised so that these 
predictions can potentially become more accurate over time, then the internalist does not need to 
explain how we could be correct or incorrect about our concepts. Any further measure of truth or 
correctness about concepts does not have a role in explaining the cognitive significance or causal 
powers of concepts.  
 As mental entities that explain things like behaviour, concepts needn’t be the kinds of 
things that have accuracy conditions. Like any concrete object such as a chair which can neither 
be true or false, correct or incorrect, but can function in better or worse ways, and can be 
compared favourably or unfavourably to other chairs, we can have an account of concepts being 
appropriate without requiring them to be correct. And so the last hurdle for internalism, the fact 
that one cannot be wrong about one’s own concepts, turns out not to impede the function of their 
concepts or reduce their explanatory power. And this hurdle can be cleared without needing to 
enter into detailed or complicated epistemological debate. Indeed, if concepts are not taken to 
refer, then we are more likely to be able to make better predictions about how concept-possessors 
are going to behave on the basis of their concepts. If concepts are not defined externally then we 
can provide an account of how concepts help us track and navigate the world that does not only 
apply to a very small handful of cases, and tells us something more than just about what words 
mean in the linguistic community of which we are a member.  
Externalism began by looking like the only theory that could explain one of the primary 













Every morning Violet walks her dog in the local park, and there she sees what she believes is the 
same man walking his dog. One morning she turns up at the park and discovers that there are 
actually two different men, identical twins, who have taken it in turn to walk their (shared) dog 
on alternate mornings, and she has mistaken these two people for one person. What is going on 
in this case? 
Call the time before Violet sees the twins together T1 and the time after she realises that 
they are twins as time T2. If what you want to do is explain Violet’s behaviour, or make 
predictions about her behaviour, then you can be totally neutral about the question of whether or 
not at time T1 Violet’s concept was mistaken. What makes this case interesting is that is that at 
time T2 she realised that there were two people when she had thought there was one. Whether 
this means that she was always referring to one twin, and there was a specific twin to which she 
was referring, or that she has been referring to two people, and her concepts or judgements were 
empty, is a debate that never needs to get settled. All we need to know for behavioural reasons is 
that at T2 Violet’s concepts separate. 
 Why is it irrelevant what concept Violet has at T1? To begin with, there is no evidence 
we could have that would distinguish between someone who has two concepts of the same 
person, and someone who has one concept that happened to apply to two people. In this case, 
both sides would be able to claim the same evidence as supporting their particular theory. 
Whether she possessed one concept or two at T1 also doesn’t change our predictions of how she 
would act. If it was never revealed to her that she had in fact sometimes seen one twin and 





observing the men, or giving them the odd wave, and nothing much more. How we individuate 
her concept or concepts at this stage wouldn’t change that. It also wouldn’t change what happens 
at T2, as presumably at this stage all theories of concepts would agree that she now has two 
concepts.  
The question of how to divide up Violet’s concept or concepts at T1 is only interesting if 
one is an externalist. It is Violet’s relationship with the external world that is strange in this case. 
It is this that makes what is going on in her mind seem like it must also be strange. But for the 
internalist, such cases are as normal as all others. On one possible internalist explanation, for 
example, Violet simply has a concept that combines features she has gathered from her 
experiences of observing the two men (and any related thoughts, associations etc.). When she 
suddenly sees the two men together, her previous concept is most likely undermined while two 
new concepts are formed. Contrastingly, if one believes that reference in some way contributes 
to conceptual content, or even just that the external world can determine conceptual content 
beyond what we internally represent, then such a case is not going to lend itself to such a simple 
explanation.  
If it turned out that there was an answer to the question about whether Violet possessed 
one dual-referring concept or two internally-indistinguishable but singularly-referring concepts 
at T1, the answer could be arrived at only theoretically. At the very least, this case would not be 
used to demonstrate anything that would assist in choosing between theories of concepts. Rather, 
one would have to develop a theory of concept taxonomy or concept individuation independently 
of any information about human behaviour and that no observations could support over its rivals 





tells us we should classify the concept or concepts at T1. It is unclear what the point of such a 
theory, or, by extension, making such a distinction, would be. 
 I have argued that this uselessness of certain conceptual theories is true of all externalist 
theories of concepts. A theory of concepts should be able to explain something. But once you 
have explained the relevant behaviour, the idea that there is some further (untestable) question 
about what we (or our concepts) were referring to from the start begins to looks like a 
philosophical myth. 
 
In this thesis I have attacked the main arguments that have been given against internalist theories 
of concepts, and the arguments given for externalist theories. I have argued that it is not only 
possible for internalism to explain how concepts can fulfil many of the main criteria we have for 
determining the best theory of concepts, but that externalism cannot provide accounts of 
concepts which fill these criteria.  
I began by showing that the evidence we have for concepts is evidence for internalism, 
not externalism. It is by observing people’s behaviour that we come to know they possess 
concepts, but only internally-defined mental states can cause behaviour. This means that 
externalism cannot account for the evidence that we have that lets us know that others possess 
concepts. It also means that it cannot account for the very kinds of behaviour that concepts are 
specifically brought in to explain, such as linguistic communication. If one believes that 
predictive power and being able to explain evidence are virtues of a good theory, then at the very 
least one should question whether externalism is as strong as its internalist rivals.  
The lack of causal power in externalist theories of concepts extends further than 





externalism undermines not only the value of such a theory, but also the reasons to hold it over 
internalism is something that has been largely overlooked, even by critics of externalism who 
have pointed out its causal inefficacy. The fact that we tend to have externalist intuitions in 
response to Twin Earth-type scenarios, for example, has often been brought up as a point in 
favour of externalism. However I have shown that, even if we universally had such intuitions, 
their presence in our minds could not be explained by the truth of the externalist doctrine.  
While only externalism can account for its being possible that we could be both wrong 
about our concepts and that we can learn new things about our concepts, this does not have any 
value outside the theory itself. As this is a question of conceptual taxonomy, it is possible to 
define (or individuate) a concept such that the person who possesses it is wrong about it, or 
define (individuate) it in another way such that the person is not. Indeed how to define accuracy 
conditions of concepts is one of the things debated between externalists. In a case where two 
theories of concepts had different accuracy conditions for concepts, the only thing that would 
decide between the two theories would be other unrelated strengths or weaknesses – because as 
they are defining their own truth conditions, looking to the world would not give any evidence 
that could count in favour of one over another. Even for externalists, merely having a theory of 
concepts that accounts for how people could be wrong about their concepts is not useful without 
it also being able to account for how this fact contributes to concepts’ causal or explanatory 
power.   
The internalist is able to use the only tools at their disposal – conceptions –to explain the 
things concepts have traditionally been thought to explain, as well as capture what it is to 
acquire, access and use concepts. The internalist shows how easy it is to ‘solve’ Frege puzzles, 





should be turning to a new way of looking at concepts that focuses on explaining the evidence 
we have for there being concepts, rather than beginning with a theory and assuming it fits.  
The problem with externalism as a theory of concepts is that it focuses on theories of 
concept individuation that are irrelevant to the functions that we believe concepts to perform. 
When investigating concepts, which are meant to explain our behaviours and interactions, a 
debate over whether two concepts count as the same or different in virtue of their relation to the 
world tells us nothing. It may be useful to apply certain models of concept individuation 
depending on our goals – this is particularly so when generalising over a population. However, 
this does not mean the underlying mechanism that explains how these concepts work is not an 
internalist one. One can carve up concepts any way one likes: it will not reveal what concepts 
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